This paper offers an original argument for a Humean thesis about promising that generalises to the domain of normative powers. The Humean ‘natural unintelligibility’ thesis – prominently endorsed by Rawls, Hart, and Anscombe, and roundly rejected or forgotten by contemporary writers (conventionalists and non – conventionalists alike) – holds that a rational, suitably informed agent cannot so much as make a promise (much less a morally-binding promise) without exploiting conventional norms that confer promissory significance on act types (e.g., signing on (...) the dotted line) that would not otherwise have such significance. The argument (like Hume’s) is action-theoretic in character; its central premise is the Contribution Condition on acting with an aim: roughly, that doing X in order to (bring about) Y requires that the agent believe that their having X-ed on the occasion might come to fully or partly account for Y’s coming to pass. The argument generalises to the broader domain of exercises of normative powers, i.e., to acts that modify normative properties by ‘fiat’ or ‘stipulation’. This stipulative act has been characterised in three different ways, each of which is given due consideration. Finally, two different ways of accommodating the ‘natural unintelligibility’ thesis are considered, as is the thesis’s normative significance. (shrink)

Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with. We consider a variety of ways that the tension between this intuition (...) and panpsychism could be resolved, ranging from complete rejection of the theory to complete dismissal of the intuition, but argue in favour of more nuanced approaches which try to reconcile the two. (shrink)

Review of Newton and the Origin of Civilization, by Jed Z. Buchwald and Mordechai Feingold.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 544, index. $49.50.

Ayurveda is science of living being. Aim of Ayurveda is mantainance of healthy life and pacification of diseases of diseased ones. Dharma, artha, kama and moksha these four are together called chaturvidha purushartha which is achieved by arogya (health).Ayurveda holds view of its independent darshanika viewthough it has shades of nearly all six astika darshanas. Mimamsa’s first verse implies its motto to explore Dharma. Ayurveda considers dharma as one of basic component to health. Dharma has been described under trieshana by (...) acharya Bhela. Various conducts are described under sadavritta, achararasayana, moksha marga, naishtikichikitsa. Ayurveda describes three types of treatment which are yuktivyapshraya, daivavyapashraya and sattvavajaya. This daivyapashraya includes mantra, ausadhi, mani, mangal, bali, upahaar, homa, niyama,prayashchita, upawaas, swastyayana, pranipata, gamana etc. These type of methods are widely described in karma kanda of mimamsa darshana. This treatment method has been used in curing of diseases like unmada,graharoga. Methods of yagya has been described as well as used in putreshti and punsawansamskara described in charakasamhita. With this paper karma kanda widely used in treatment has been described in Ayurveda. (shrink)