This study explores a liberatory epistemic virtue that is suitable for good learning as a form of liberating socially situated epistemic agents toward ideal virtuousness. First, I demonstrate that the weak neutralization of epistemically bad stereotypes is an end of good learning. Second, I argue that weak neutralization represents a liberatory epistemic virtue, the value of which derives from liberating us as socially situated learners from epistemic blindness to epistemic freedom. Third, I explicate two distinct forms of epistemic transformation: constitutive (...) and causal epistemic transformation. I argue that compared with the ideal conception of epistemic virtue, constitutive epistemic transformation that involves good learning has a transcendent value in light of agents constantly renewing their default epistemic status toward ideal virtuousness. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

This book talks about the city's reception of philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is to show that philosophy is essential for the maintenance of human security in our cities. The importance of this apology for philosophy is precisely to undo a common but erroneous conception of the nature and disadvantages of this discipline and to politically base its existence. To do this, we will present a characterization of philosophy and some of the most important criticisms of its development within (...) the city, and show that they are not sustainable. Subsequently, we will approach the concept of human security, constructed by Amartya Sen and Obuchi Keizo, and indicate how philosophy is fundamental to its preservation. /// Este livro fala sobre a recepção da filosofia pela cidade. O objetivo deste capítulo é mostrar que a filosofia é essencial para a manutenção da segurança humana de nossas cidades. A importância dessa apologia da filosofia é justamente desfazer uma concepção comum, porém errônea, da natureza e das desvantagens dessa disciplina e fundamentar politicamente sua existência. Para fazermos isso, apresentaremos uma caracterização de filosofia e algumas das mais importantes críticas ao seu desenvolvimento no seio da cidade, e mostraremos que elas não se sustentam. Posteriormente, abordaremos o conceito de segurança humana, construído por Amartya Sen e Obuchi Keizo, e indicaremos como a filosofia é fundamental para a sua preservação. (shrink)