Outbreaks of novel influenza viruses are continually occurring on many places on our planet, with the ultimate and most extreme consequence being a full-scale pandemic. Modern communication technology is widely used for risk communication regarding recommended change in behavior patterns and other precautions in order to mitigate the transmission. However, the assumption and bias that modern communication technology constitutes the norm causes vulnerable groups to be at possible risk of systematic exclusion to correct and updated information. Through conducting a literature- (...) and case analysis, the aim of this study is to identify insufficient or inadequate risk communication efforts in South Korea and Vietnam during influenza outbreaks, especially with concern of vulnerable groups. Further, to analyze how national influenza preparedness plans observe or ignore these insufficiencies. Results show that vulnerable groups are explicitly recognized in the preparedness plan of Vietnam. However, the South Korean preparedness plan show a more homogenous approach. Both South Korea and Vietnam showed a broad variety of channels used in their risk communication strategies which could be positive in terms of a broad outreach to a heterogenous population, including vulnerable groups. Four key factors that moderate the outcomes of risk communication were identified: Channels, Messages, Transparency and Trust. (shrink)

The modal ontological argument (MOA) proceeds from God’s possible existence to God’s actual existence. A prominent objection to the MOA is that it suffers from a symmetry problem: an exactly parallel modal ontological argument can be given for God's non-existence. Several attempts have been made to break the symmetry between the arguments. This draft is a mostly comprehensive survey of those attempts. -/- The draft was initially written as a supplement to the 2024 Summer edition of the SEP entry on (...) Ontological Arguments. However, the draft is not included in the SEP entry. (shrink)

In his essay Tracy Lupher (henceforth, TL) is concerned with Robert Kane's (1984) version of the modal ontological argument (MOA). As he correctly points out, Kane's argument is valid only if the accessibility relation between possible worlds is assumed to be symmetric. TL's remarks pave the way to thinking that the MOA is intended to establish the existence of a perfect being as a matter of logical necessity. Moreover, given TL's undisputed supposition (even shared by Kane) that S5 - in (...) which the accessibility relation is symmetric - captures the notion of logical necessity, the real issue becomes whether the premise of the MOA is true. Contrary to TL's main claim, the discussion thus shifts back from technical arguments for why the appropriate modal logic must have a symmetric accessibility relation to metaphysical, theological, or conceptual considerations about the notion of a perfect being itself. I argue that it is only due to such considerations that we even start to ponder the question of what modal logic is the appropriate one to choose. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a modal version of the ontological argument (MOA) in a two dimensionally extended way. This modification of MOA, I argue, might respond to Tooley’s (1981) and Findlay’s (1948) prominent objections against the argument. The MOA has two distinct key premises that are criticized by Tooley and Findley. According to Tooley, the structure of the argument allows to define further properties that exclude the existence of God-like beings. Findlay, however, argues against the proof (...) in a Kantian way by claiming that the very property of necessary existence is contradictory, therefore no being can possess it. In this paper, I am going to show how Tooley and Findlay’s critique re-frame the original ontological argument debate. I will provide a comprehensive map over all possible ways of refuting the MOA. Finally, I argue that, once we apply a two dimensional framework, we are in a position to refute Findlay’s criticism. (shrink)