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Works by N. Rescher
5 found
Order:
- Plenum theory.Nicholas Rescher & Patrick Grim - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):422-439.Plena are large-scale macro-totalities appropriate to the realms of all facts, all truths, and all things. Our attempt here is to take some first technical steps toward an adequate conception of plena.
- (1 other version)Oversimplification.Nicholas Rescher - 2007 - Epistemologia 30 (1):41-60.
- The Concept of Randomness.Nicholas Rescher - 1961 - Theoria 27 (1):1-11.Though there be no such thing as chance in the world, our ignorance of the real causes of any event begets a like species of belief or opinion.
- Consciousness.Nicholas Rescher - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (1):11-18.Consciousness is sometimes viewed as a particular parametric factor in the analogy of blood pressure or electric charge. The paper argues that this is an erroneous conception becomes consciousness involves a varied assortment of different phenomena that have no single unified commonality. And so even as ‘abnormal psychology’ has to be a disjointed assembly of diverse specialties so will ‘consciousness studies’ have to be.
- How Modeling Can Go Wrong: Some Cautions and Caveats on the Use of Models.Patrick Grim & Nicholas Rescher - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (1):75-80.Modeling and simulation clearly have an upside. My discussion here will deal with the inevitable downside of modeling — the sort of things that can go wrong. It will set out a taxonomy for the pathology of models — a catalogue of the various ways in which model contrivance can go awry. In the course of that discussion, I also call on some of my past experience with models and their vulnerabilities.
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