The article provides an analysis of the noosphere concept as the way to the sustainable development of our planet. It offers to consider the epoch of noosphere as the period when the human mind will be able to define the terms necessary for nature and society co-evolution while forming a collective will of the mankind. The author suggests making an analysis of three main problems having appeared owing to the latest development of the anthropogenic civilization: 1) surviving in terms of (...) continuing perfection of weapon of mass destruction; 2) raising the ecological crisis worldwide and its deepening because of the global financial downturn; 3) keeping a personal individuality as a biological and social structure while strengthening comprehensive processes of alienation. The article proves that their decision is closely connected with the following components of noosphere: joining efforts of all the mankind without any exceptions, adopting new values of national and interpersonal cooperation, improving relationships among the nations, accepting and following democratic principles of public life, developing science and culture, changing the governmental and individual approaches to the usage of natural resources, deciding military conflicts and threats peacefully, spreading new principles of noosphere education, etc. (shrink)

Brian Garrett claims, in defence of Gaunilo’s Perfect Island and contra Plantinga, that ‘Properly understood, the great-making qualities of an island are maximal’. This article demonstrates that they are not, thus ‘the greatest conceivable island’ remains an incoherent concept and Gaunilo’s parody fails.

Are there any truly ontologically random events? This paper argues that randomness is an unavoidably epistemic concept and therefore ascription of ontological randomness to any particular event or series of events can never be justified.

A critique of J. L. Schellenberg's argument from Divine Hiddenness: Schellenberg's conclusion that since apparently there are 'capable inculpable non-believers in God' the cognitive problem of divine hiddenness is actually an argument for the non-existence of God. Schellenberg's conclusion seems at least partly based on his misunderstanding or disregard of significant aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition and certain assumptions, especially regarding nature of religious belief as well as primacy and instrumentality of reason. I suggest that given the kind of God (...) proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition it is not necessary that reasonable non-belief in His existence be impossible; moreover it may even be the case that possibility of reasonable non-belief is necessary given the nature and purposes of God as proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition. (shrink)

In 'Weak agnosticism defended' Graham Oppy set out to ’show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism’. Oppy begins by differentiating between strong agnosticism, which obliges rational persons to suspend judgment on the question of God’s existence, and weak agnosticism, which allows rational persons to do so. Weak agnosticism is thus the philosophical position that it is possible and rational - but not obligatory - to suspend judgment on the question (...) of God’s existence. The question I discuss in this paper is whether one can consistently practice agnosticism, as opposed to merely suspending judgment regarding the existence of God? Does acceptance of the the sis that ’agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism’ entail the possibility of actual consistent practice of agnosticism? (shrink)

I have argued that the central Christian doctrine of general resurrection (with particular reference to the Pauline corpus) can and should be understood in a scientifically and philosophically informed context, and have proposed a personalist-phenomenological model of general resurrection as a personally continuous transformative re-embodiment by the grace of God within an interpretative framework that respects the methods and findings of science while rejecting scientism and associated physicalist metaphysical claims. I have considered and rejected the re-assembly model of resurrection on (...) theological, philosophical and scientific grounds. (shrink)