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  1. (1 other version)What Kind of Necessary Being Could God Be?Richard Swinburne - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):1--18.
    A logically impossible sentence is one which entails a contradiction, a logically necessary sentence is one whose negation entails a contradiction, and a logically possible sentence is one which does not entail a contradiction. Metaphysically impossible, necessary and possible sentences are ones which become logically impossible, necessary, or possible by substituting what I call informative rigid designators for uninformative ones. It does seem very strongly that a negative existential sentence cannot entail a contradiction, and so ”there is a God’ cannot (...)
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  2. (1 other version)God As the Simplest Explanation of the Universe.Richard Swinburne - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):1 - 24.
    Inanimate explanation is to be analysed in terms of substances having powers and liabilities to exercise their powers under certain conditions; while personal explanation is to be analysed in terms of persons, their beliefs, powers, and purposes. A crucial criterion for an explanation being probably true is that it is (among explanations leading us to expect the data) the simplest one. Simplicity is a matter of few substances, few kinds of substances, few properties (including powers and liabilities), few kinds of (...)
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  3. A Cartesian Argument for Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):33-47.
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  4. Response to Reviewers.Richard Swinburne - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):51--63.
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  5. Uma defesa do dualismo de substâncias.Richard Swinburne & Jaimir Conte - 2008 - Princípios 15 (23):291-313.
    Argumento neste artigo que embora existam muitas maneiras diferentes de descrever o mundo ou algum segmento dele, qualquer maneira que deixe de acarretar logicamente uma separabilidade do corpo e da alma como os dois componentes de cada ser humano conhecido (o corpo sendo uma parte contingente e a alma a parte essencial do homem) deixará de fornecer uma descriçáo completa do mundo. T ítulo original do artigo: “ What makes me me? A Defense os Substance Dualism ”. Apresentado no I (...)
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  6. Précis of Mind, Brain, and Free Will.Richard Swinburne - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):1--3.
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