This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis provides (...) the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well. (shrink)

This essay examines theoretical arguments surrounding the use of post-colonial theory as a way to fill in the epistemological lacuna in the studies of post-socialism. It reviews the various streams of this theoretical development and employs Edward Said’s notion of “traveling theory” to demonstrate that theoretical claims made by proponents and opponents of this particular comparative perspective are historically, socially, and geographically situated, although not fixed. Disciplinary, national, and institutional affiliations, instead of theoretical justifications, are identified as important factors in (...) the propensity to accept or resist the introduction of post-colonial perspective on Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The essay concludes by acknowledging the potential usefulness as well as the limits of post-colonialism in the conceptualization of the post- socialist space. (shrink)

Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea (...) of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit ‘too many thinkers’ where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism. (shrink)

Vzrůstající využívání digitálních technologií ve vědecké práci a komunikaci vyvolává otázku, jaká je epistemologická povaha takto vytvořeného vědění. V tomto eseji využívám pojmový aparát, který vyvinuli Steven Shapin a Simon Schaffer k analýze historického sporu mezi Robertem Boylem a Thomasem Hobbesem o způsob vytváření vědění v přírodní filosofii, a aplikuji jej na problematiku digitálního výzkumu. Jejich koncepty tří technologií vytvářejících vědění – materiální, literární a sociální – se ukazují jako heuristicky užitečné koncepty i pro reflexi digitálních technologií. Ty jsou v (...) eseji představeny nikoliv jako samostatné technologie vytváření faktů, nýbrž jako prvky, kolem nichž se dosavadní vědecké technologie radikálně rekonfigurují. Zvláštní pozornost esej věnuje představě kódu jako literární technologie a roli digitálních technologií v humanitních vědách. (shrink)

Studie recenzuje následující díla: Maurice HALBWACHS, Kolektivní paměť. Praha: SLON 2009, 289 s. ; Françoise MAYER, Češi a jejich komunismus: paměť a politická identita. Praha: Argo 2009, 273 s. ; Zdeněk VAŠÍČEK – Françoise MAYER, Minulost a současnost, paměť a dějiny. Brno – Praha: CDK – Triáda 2008, 199 s. Studie konstatuje, že v češtině začíná být k dispozici dostatečné množství publikací o sociální paměti, aby teoreticky zabezpečily širší pojetí výzkumů paměti. Zároveň by však tyto výzkumy neměly být podřizovány historiografii, (...) a především je v nich zapotřebí pracovat nejen s koncepty identity a sociálních svazků, ale i moci a konfliktu. (shrink)

Recenzní studie vychází z kolektivní monografie editorů Charlese Bazermana, Adairy Bo- nini a Débory Figueiredo, Genre in a Changing World a věnuje se tématům souvisejícím s významem žánrů ve vědecké a akademické praxi. Identifikuje zejména dvě oblasti, na něž se ve zvýšené míře soustředí badatelské aktivity pra- cující s žánrem jako analytickým nástrojem: žánrovou pedagogiku na univerzitní úrovni a oborovou enkulturaci. Zatímco první oblast ohraničuje akademické texty vůči jiným textovým formám, druhá se zabývá jejich vnitřní rozrůzněností. Studie zdůrazňuje demonstro- vaný (...) přínos přístupů založených na žánrech pro výzkumy vědecké praxe, avšak dochází k závěru, že je zapotřebí důsledněji promýšlet jejich epistemologické implikace. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity. Some proponents of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitution avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion. I argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied (...) to the phenomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and temporal vagueness. There are what I call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness cases, in which the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an analysis of Marya Schechtman's theory of personal identity defended in her book Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.

The article focuses on one of the identity-related practical concerns discussed in contemporary debate on personal identity, namely self-concern. The dominant view seems to be that people’s concern for their future selves is preconditioned by their ability to anticipate the experiences of their future selves and that, as a result, a psychological theory of personal identity is required to justify self-concern. I argue that self-concern in its most general form is not preconditioned by the possibility of anticipation. I provide examples (...) showing that people may legitimately be concerned for their future selves even if those selves are unconscious or dead, that is, in states that the people cannot anticipate. I contend that self-concern is not rooted in our desire to have positive experiences, but in our desire to live meaningful lives. Since the value of our lives can be influenced by events that only take place after we cease to exist, I further argue that certain posthumous states of affairs relevant to our lives can also be the legitimate target of an indirect sort of self-concern. Inspired by Marya Schechtman’s theories, I develop a form of the narrative theory of personal identity in the sense of characterization and show that narrative continuity can be both a source of meaning in a person’s life and a ground for the person’s self-concern. It turns out that the sort of identity that justifies non-anticipatory self-concern cannot be numerical identity, because it does not provide the persistence conditions of people. (shrink)

The article introduces a special themed issue of Theory of Science on epistemologies of spaces and places. It provides a disciplinary context of the theme and reviews some of the key arguments that led to the so-called spatial turn in social sciences and the humanities. Science studies in the broad sense have also been affected by this shift of research interest to spatial aspects of science at both micro- and macro-levels. Scientific knowledge has been subject to analyses that stress its (...) local contingencies, mobility and dependencies on spatial arrangements. The ensuing new epistemologies require novel concepts or reconsideration of the older terms, such as universality or objectivity. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do (...) not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place. (shrink)

Recenze: Vojtěch Hladký - Radim Kočandrle - Zděněk Kratochvíl, Evoluce před Darwinem. Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart 2012, 248 s.