I argue against the interpretation of propositions as intentions and proof-objects as fulfillments proposed by Heyting and defended by Tieszen and van Atten. The idea is already a frequent target of criticisms regarding the incompatibility of Brouwer’s and Husserl’s positions, mainly by Rosado Haddock and Hill. I raise a stronger objection in this paper. My claim is that even if we grant that the incompatibility can be properly dealt with, as van Atten believes it can, two fundamental issues indicate (...) that the interpretation is unsustainable regardless: (1) it is hard to determine, without appealing to propositional intentions on pain of circularity, what intention a proof-object should be understood as a fulfillment of; (2) due to a difficult fulfillment dilemma, it is unclear, at best, what the object of an intention corresponding to a proposition is. (shrink)

In the following interview, conducted by email between June 21 and July 2, 2020, Filipe Cahungo talks about his academic trajectory, Angolan philosophy and the relations – including tectonic ones – between Brazil and Angola. I hope that our dialogue can strengthen (on the intellectual and emotional levels) a relationship that already exists (on the historical and geological levels). I also hope that readers are not bothered by the fact that I use the Brazilian Portuguese spelling and he the Angolan (...) one. As Rafael Haddock-Lobo explained, it is only possible to philosophize in Portuguese. Not because Portuguese is a metaphysically privileged language. Not because we lexically distinguish between “being [ser]” and “being [estar]”, something that neither the French or the German languages do. It is only possible to philosophize in Portuguese for a much simpler reason: it is in our mother tongues, with their particular spellings, that we feel most comfortable. Filipe Miguel Mário Cahungo was born on August 13, 1992, in the province of Bengo, municipality of Dembos-Quibaxe. He attended the “Seminar of the Missionaries of the Divine Word” in Angola from 2010 to 2016. In 2013, he joined the Instituto Superior Dom Bosco, a unit attached to the Universidade Católica de Angola, where he attended studies in philosophy as a Seminarian of the Congregação dos Missionários do Mundo Divino. In 2017 he graduated in Philosophy at the Instituto Superior Dom Bosco – Universidade Católica de Angola. He is a member of the Organização Ondjango Filosófico (FILONORG). He investigates African philosophy, African theology and African spirituality, and is the author of several academic articles. (shrink)

In this review article, I introduce a classification of metaphysical and epistemological forms of disjunctivism and critically discuss the essays on disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception, the philosophy of action and epistemology that are published in Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock’s collection 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl are two seemingly different philosophers in their methodology. Both have significantly influenced Western philosophy in that their contributions established fields within philosophy that are of intensive study today. Still, their differences in methodology have, in certain instances, yielded similar or distinct results. Their results ranged from the distinction of sense and reference, objectivity, and the theory of mathematics: specifically, their definition of number. Frege and Husserl have such striking similarities in their theory of sense and (...) reference and related notions that from their apparent correspondence, Frege seems to have acknowledged the coincidences in their theories (Frege & Kluge, 1972) (Hill & Rosado Haddock Intro, 4, & 30-33). That is not to say there are exact parallels between Frege and Husserl and their results, as I will acknowledge their similarities and differences within scale. So, I intend to demonstrate their respective theories and results descriptively to show their likenesses while still recognizing their divergences in scope and methodology. Indirectly, I would also hope to illustrate the ties, in terms of subject matter, of these two philosophers who are historically considered at odds with one another; be it personally, in their schools of philosophy, or methodologically (Hartimo 47-53). (shrink)