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  1. Hormone Replacement Therapy: Informed Consent Without Assessment?Toni C. Saad, Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (12):1-2.
    Florence Ashley has argued that requiring patients with gender dysphoria to undergo an assessment and referral from a mental health professional before undergoing hormone replacement therapy is unethical and may represent an unconscious hostility towards transgender people. We respond, first, by showing that Ashley has conflated the self-reporting of symptoms with self-diagnosis, and that this is not consistent with the standard model of informed consent to medical treatment. Second, we note that the model of informed consent involved in cosmetic surgery (...)
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  2. Responding to Objections to Gatekeeping for Hormone Replacement Therapy.Toni C. Saad, Daniel Rodger & Bruce Philip Blackshaw - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (12):828-829.
    Florence Ashley has responded to our response to ‘Gatekeeping hormone replacement therapy for transgender patients is dehumanising.’ Ashley criticises some of our objections to their view that patients seeking hormone replacement therapy (HRT) for gender dysphoria should not have to undergo a prior psychological assessment. Here we clarify our objections, most importantly that concerning the parity between cosmetic surgery and the sort of intervention Ashley has in mind. Firstly, we show Ashley’s criticism of our comparison is insubstantial. We then examine (...)
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  3. Can Conscientious Objection Lead to Eugenic Practices Against LGBT Individuals?Toni C. Saad & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (4):524-528.
    In a recent article in this journal, Abram Brummett argues that new and future assisted reproductive technologies will provide challenging ethical questions relating to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Brummett notes that it is likely that some clinicians may wish to conscientiously object to offering assisted reproductive technologies to LGBT couples on moral or religious grounds, and argues that such appeals to conscience should be constrained. We argue that Brummett's case is unsuccessful because he: does not adequately interact (...)
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