In Aristotle’s moral psychology, deliberation (βούλευσις) is a very important concept that bridges the agent’s desire and action. However, his theory of what kind of desire is connected to deliberation creates puzzle for the reader: on the one hand, he repeatedly emphasizes that wish (βούλησις) sets the end for the agent, and deliberation finds the means for the agent to achieve the end of the action, and on the other hand, his moral psychology suggests that there are three kinds of (...) desires, namely, wish, spiritedness (θυμός), and appetite (ἐπιθυμία), and that, according to this division, all three kinds of desires can set the end of the action for deliberation. The traditional way of resolving this puzzle is to abandon wish as the only kind of desire that sets the end of deliberation and action, and to argue that at least appetite can also set the end of deliberation and action for the agent. The key rationale is that the akratic fails to achieve the object of her wish, but instead achieves the object of their appetite, and thus appetite sets the ends for their deliberation and actions. In addition, although the intemperate achieves the object of her wish, she also achieves the object of her appetite. This article argues against this traditional interpretation. Instead, I defend the view that, first, the end of all actions is set by the wish of the agent, and, second, the starting point of every act of deliberation is the end of the action set by the wish. On the basis of this interpretation, I also explain why the intemperate and the akratic agents initiate their deliberation with the end set by the wish. (shrink)

Anscombe introduces the notion of "non-observational knowledge" by taking the knowledge one usually has of the position of his limbs as an example. According to her definition two requirements need to be met when we speak of "observing something": first, we can speak of separately describable sensations (call it the SD condition); second, having such sensations is in some sense our criterion for saying something (call it the CS condition). The "sensations of position"-so called by Anscombe-play a central role in (...) understanding the knowledge we usually have of our bodily position as non-observational. But, do we really have such sensations? If yes, how can we tell whether they are "separately describable" or not? In what sense can having a given sensation be or be not our criterion of saying something? And, why (and how) are the above question to be related to our understanding the knowledge that we usually have of our bodily position as non-observational knowledge? By clarifying the ambiguity in the possible meanings of "sensation of X", I'll try to defend my understanding of Anscombe's answers to the above questions, namely, that we do have sensations of position, and usually they are neither separately describable nor our criterion of saying something-in the sense that we usually don't identify our bodily position by identifying the sensations of position, and that. (shrink)