According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they (...) decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors. (shrink)

This book-chapter investigates the pragmatist Zionist thought of Mordecai M. Kaplan, and considers its pluralistic and holistic traits, vis-a-vis monist and fundamentalist approaches to Zionism.

Gerontologia kreatywna - dział gerontologii społecznej postulowany przez Anitȩ Stefańsk¸a} i Martȩ Szabelsk¸a}-Holeksȩ. Docelowo subdyscyplina ta ma zajmować siȩ problematyk¸a} twórczości i kreatywności osób starszych. Gerontologia kreatywna jest przede wszystkim zwi¸a}zana z psychologi¸a} twórczości, a szczególnie z akmeologi¸a} kreatywn¸a}, czyli psychologi¸a} osobowości twórczej człowieka. Gerontologia kreatywna z jednej strony korzysta z wiedzy pochodz¸a}cej z geriatrii, gerontopsychologii, gerontologii eksperymentalnej, gerontosocjologii i geragogiki. Z drugiej strony zaś podstawy gerontologii kreatywnej osadzone s¸a w działach akmeologii kreatywnej, w szczególności w: historii akmeologii kreatywnej, (...) akmeologii kreatywnej działalności zawodowej, akmeologii kreatywnej osobowości, eksperymentalnej akmeologii kreatywnej oraz stosowanej akmeologii kreatywnej. Konceptualizacja teorii gerontologii kreatywnej jest prób¸a zastosowania teorii istniej¸acych już na gruncie psychologii i gerontologii. Gerontologia kreatywna jako nauka multidyscyplinarna ma także korzystać z dorobku socjologii, filozofii, medycyny, biologii, ekonomii, demografii, antropologii społecznej i kultury, pedagogiki społecznej, kultur i twórczości oraz nauk o kulturze i sztuce. ** Creative gerontology - department of social gerontology postulated by Anita Stefańska and Marta Szabelska-Holeksa. Ultimately, this sub-discipline is to deal with the issues of creativity and creativity of older people. Creative gerontology is primarily associated with the psychology of creativity, and especially with creative acmeology, or the psychology of the creative personality of a human being. On the one hand, creative gerontology uses knowledge derived from geriatrics, gerontopsychology, experimental gerontology, gerontosociology and geragogy. On the other hand, the foundations of creative gerontology are embedded in the sections of creative acmeology, in particular in the history of creative acmeology, creative occupational acmeology, creative personality acmeology, experimental creative acmeology and applied creative acmeology. Conceptualization of the theory of creative gerontology is an attempt to apply theories already existing on the basis of psychology and gerontology. Creative gerontology as a multidisciplinary science is also to use the achievements of sociology, philosophy, medicine, biology, economics, demography, social anthropology and culture, social pedagogy, cultures and creativity as well as the sciences of culture and art. (shrink)

To date, both the United States federal government and twenty-one individual states have passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts that aim to protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs substantially burdened by governmental interests. RFRAs accomplish this by offering a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors that is satisfied only when (1) an objector has a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened; (2) the government has a very good reason (e.g., health or safety) to interfere; and (3) there is (...) a reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest. Legal balancing tests like those found in RFRA are content neutral insofar as they sideline the belief-content of conscientious objections as irrelevant when determining the permissibility of granting legal accommodations. However, some theorists worry that this legal picture may be backward: perhaps balancing tests should be content non-neutral given the usual features of conscientious objections. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs seem undeserving of special legal accommodations because they possess uniquely strong empirical and theoretical ties to intolerance. Thus, the illiberally intolerant content of these conscientious objections might actually give the state a reason to refuse to grant legal exemptions. In this paper, I offer a cursory defense of content neutrality with respect to balancing tests like those found in RFRA. To begin, I outline Nehushtan’s argument for content non-neutrality. The cornerstone of his argument is that illiberal intolerance is intolerable such that conscientious objections that are based upon illiberally intolerant values provide the state with strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant an exemption. I argue that, even when the illiberally intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant factor in determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption, there remain significant problems. It is difficult, for example, to determine which views are illiberally intolerant and difficult to say whether illiberally intolerant views can effectively serve as the principled demarcating line in balancing tests. To conclude, I offer several cursory arguments in favor of adopting content-neutral approaches without necessarily making a comprehensive case. By drawing on the work of Amy Sepinwall, Nadia Sawicki, and Nathan Chapman, I show that content-neutral approaches can help to safeguard robust protections for conscience by permitting atypical exercises of conscience, protect minority thoughts and practices from being coercively supplanted by majoritarian understandings of morality, appropriately maintain the skepticism and humility that we owe each other as compatriots in a pluralistic society, and allow the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has an important place in political history among other things. (shrink)