This chapter articulates two concerns that Karl Jaspers raised (with Hannah Arendt) about the common practice of viewing moral evil as unintelligible. The first is that this involves exoticizing the act and/or perpetrator in such a way that moral condemnation becomes difficult. The second is that it can lead us to treat the perpetrator, place, or victim as tainted or stained by a force whose motives we cannot grasp; this in turn can lead to magical thinking about evil as somehow (...) contagious or contaminating. After distinguishing some of the main categories of evil discussed in the western tradition, I examine ways in which moral evil, in particular, has been characterized as unintelligible, and try to discern which of them raises these Jaspersian concerns. I argue that there are at least two conceptions of “radical evil”—not the Kantian one, but the ones articulated by Hannah Arendt—that do so. (shrink)