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  1. added 2019-03-07
    Reality TV and the Entrapment of Predators.Mark Tunick - 2012 - In Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey (eds.), Law and Justice on the Small Screen. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing. pp. 289-307.
    Dateline NBC’s “To Catch a Predator”(2006-08) involved NBC staff working with police and a watchdog group called “Perverted Justice” to televise “special intensity” arrests of men who were lured into meeting adult decoys posing as young children, presumably for a sexual encounter. As reality television, “To Catch a Predator” facilitates public shaming of those caught in front of the cameras, which distinguishes it from fictional representations. In one case, a Texas District Attorney, Louis Conradt, shot himself on film, unable to (...)
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  2. added 2019-02-03
    What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?Daniel Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts (...)
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  3. added 2017-11-22
    Killing Minimally Responsible Threats.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):114-136.
    Minimal responsibility threateners are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a nonnegligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill her (...)
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  4. added 2017-11-04
    Should Law Track Morality?Re'em Segev - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):205-223.
    Does the moral status of an action provide in itself a non-instrumental, pro-tanto reason for a corresponding legal status – a reason that applies regardless of whether the law promotes a value that is independent of the law, such as preventing wrongdoing or promoting distributive or retributive justice? While the relation between morality and law is a familiar topic, this specific question is typically not considered explicitly. Yet it seems to be controversial and each of the contrasting answers to this (...)
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  5. added 2017-09-04
    ‘Drugs That Make You Feel Bad’? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions.Jonathan Pugh & Hannah Maslen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):499-522.
    In many jurisdictions, an offender’s remorse is considered to be a relevant factor to take into account in mitigation at sentencing. The growing philosophical interest in the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice raises an important question about such remorse-based mitigation: to what extent should technologically facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To motivate this question, we begin by sketching a tripartite account of remorse that distinguishes cognitive, affective (...)
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  6. added 2017-08-06
    The Concept of Entrapment.Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):539-554.
    Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law- enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-12
    Trying to Make Sense of Criminal Attempts. [REVIEW]Ken Levy - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (3):656-664.
    Issues include attempts generally; the problem of outcome luck; the impossibility defense; physical movement and intent; and reckless attempts, attempted rape, and attempted theft. In the final section, I offer a hypothetical that challenges Prof. Donnelly-Lazarov's theory.
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  8. added 2016-05-06
    After “Mental Illness” What? A Philosophical Endorsement of Statutory Reform.Edmund Byrne - 1980 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:122-131.
    This article argues in favor of modifying the medical model of severe psychiatric disturbances that underlies calling them "mental illness." The key reason for this proposal is that numerous specialists other than physicians as well as non-specialists contribute to the process of assisting a person recover from what the author suggests might better be called "extraordinary functional disability." There is little uniformity in existing definitions under state laws, but all involve three types of intervention: civil commitment; civil determination of legal (...)
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  9. added 2016-05-06
    Polemarchus and Socrates on Justice and Harm.Andrew Jeffrey - 1979 - Phronesis 24 (1):54-69.
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  10. added 2016-04-24
    Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense.Andrew Ingram - 2012 - American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...)
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  11. added 2015-09-18
    It's Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense.Ken Levy - 2014 - New Mexico Law Revview 45:225-274.
    Suppose you are at the gym trying to see some naked beauties by peeping through a hole in the wall. A policeman happens by, he asks you what you are doing, and you honestly tell him. He then arrests you for voyeurism. Are you guilty? We don’t know yet because there is one more fact to be considered: while you honestly thought that a locker room was on the other side of the wall, it was actually a squash court. Are (...)
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  12. added 2015-09-18
    Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention.Ken Levy - 2011 - San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from (...)
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  13. added 2015-09-02
    Justifications, Powers, and Authority.Malcolm Thorburn - 2008 - Yale Law Journal 117:1070.
    Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the structure and function of justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is a widely shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional structure. Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to decide ex post (...)
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  14. added 2015-08-31
    Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-Forfeiture Theory of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    I argue that rights-forfeiture by itself is no path to permissibility at all (even barring special circumstances), neither in the case of self-defense nor in the case of punishment. The limiting conditions of self-defense, for instance – necessity, proportionality (or no gross disproportionality), and the subjective element – are different in the context of forfeiture than in the context of justification (and might even be absent in the former context). In particular, I argue that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent (...)
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  15. added 2015-08-31
    Self-Defense and Imminence.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    This paper argues that there is a significant moral difference between force applied against (imminent) attackers on the one hand and force applied against “threatening” people who are not (imminent) attackers on the other. Given that there is such a difference, one should not blur the lines by using the term “self-defense” (understood as including other-defense) for both uses of force. Rather, only the former is appropriately called self-defense, while for the latter, following German legal terminology, the term “justifying defensive (...)
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  16. added 2014-05-15
    Just Cause and 'Right Intention'.Uwe Steinhoff - 2014 - Journal of Military Ethics 13 (1):32-48.
    I argue that the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus ad bellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied. The advantage of this account is that it is applicable to all wars, even to wars where nobody will be killed or where the enemy has not committed a rights violation but can be justifiably warred against anyway. This (...)
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  17. added 2014-03-29
    Not Guilty By Reason of Genetic Determinism.Mark Philpott - 1996 - In Henry Tam (ed.), Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development. Avebury. pp. 95-112.
    In February 1994, Stephen Mobley was convicted of the murder of John Collins. Mobley's lawyers attempted to introduce genetic evidence in an attempt to have Mobley's sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment. I examine the prospects for appeal to genetic determinism as a criminal defense. Guided by existing standards for insanity defenses, I argue that a genetic defense might be allowable in exceptional cases but will not be generally available as some have worried.
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  18. added 2014-03-19
    Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2014 - In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. London: Springer. pp. 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  19. added 2014-03-12
    The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman.Re'em Segev - 2008 - Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
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  20. added 2014-01-13
    Entrapment and Retributive Theory.Mark Tunick - 2011 - In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press.
    I address the question, ‘Should a retributivist support an entrapment defense and if so, under what circumstances?’, by considering the culpability of entrapped defendants. An entrapment defense is invoked by defendants who claim they violated the law because they were enticed to crime by the police and would not otherwise have committed the crime. There are different rationales for the defense: people who are normally law abiding, and who are not predisposed to commit crimes, do not commit crimes merely when (...)
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  21. added 2013-08-26
    Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea.Lucinda Vandervort - 1987-1988 - Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2 (2):233-309.
    In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather than (...)
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  22. added 2012-12-04
    On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsucessful Psychopaths.Katrina Sifferd & William Hirstein - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):129-140.
    The psychological literature now differentiates between two types of psychopath:successful (with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals. We argue that many successful psychopaths are legally responsible for (...)
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  23. added 2012-01-24
    Insanity Defenses.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy - 2011 - In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
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