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  1. added 2017-05-22
    Law, Virtue, and Justice (Law and Practical Reason). [REVIEW]Jason Cruze - 20016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (6):743-746.
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  2. added 2016-10-06
    Equality and Differences.John Finnis - 2012 - Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics 2 (1):Article 1.
    Fifty years ago this year a legal practitioner turned military intelligencer turned philosopher, Herbert Hart, published The Concept of Law, still deservedly best-seller in thought about law. It presents law, especially common law and constitutionally ordered systems such as ours, as a social reality which results from the sharing of ideas and making of decisions that, for good or evil, establish rules of law which are what they are, whether just or unjust. But right at its centre is a chapter (...)
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  3. added 2016-04-17
    Why the Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies of Constitutional Textualism.Ken Levy - 2017 - Lewis and Clark Law Review 21 (1):45-96.
    My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is the (...)
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  4. added 2014-12-20
    The Normativity of Linguistic Originalism: A Speech Act Analysis.John Danaher - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (4):397-431.
    The debate over the merits of originalism has advanced considerably in recent years, both in terms of its intellectual sophistication and its practical significance. In the process, some prominent originalists—Lawrence Solum and Jeffrey Goldsworthy being the two discussed here—have been at pains to separate out the linguistic and normative components of the theory. For these authors, while it is true that judges and other legal decision-makers ought to be originalists, it is also true that the communicated content of the constitution (...)
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  5. added 2014-10-16
    On Property Theory.David Ellerman - 2014 - Journal of Economic Issues (3):601–624.
    A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole life-cycle of a property right: how it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and has almost completely neglected the question of the initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible-hand function (...)
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  6. added 2014-04-02
    Making Sense of 'Public' Emergencies.François Tanguay-Renaud - 2009 - Philosophy of Management (formerly Reason in Practice) 8 (2):31-53.
    In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.
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  7. added 2012-07-12
    The Harm Principle Vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation.Dennis J. Baker - 2008 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (66):66-99.
    In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory is (...)
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  8. added 2011-01-28
    Law is Not (Best Considered) an Essentially Contested Concept.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - International Journal of Law in Context 7:209-232.
    I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating the concept of law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria generally offered for essential contestation. I then buttress this claim with the additional explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it is (...)
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  9. added 2010-09-21
    Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty.Edward C. Lyons - 2007 - Cleveland State Law Review 55 (2):157-232.
    The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to (...)
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  10. added 2010-09-05
    Responsibility in Negligence: Why the Duty of Care is Not a Duty “To Try”.Ori J. Herstein - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (2):403-428.
    Even though it offers a compelling account of the responsibility-component in the negligence standard—arguably the Holy Grail of negligence theory—Professor John Gardner is mistaken in conceptualizing the duty of care in negligence as a duty to try to avert harm. My goal here is to explain why and to point to an alternative account of the responsibility component in negligence. The flaws in conceiving of the duty of care as a duty to try are: failing to comport with the legal (...)
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