Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Do Epistemic Reasons Bear on the Ought Simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations