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The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant's Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates’

European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):129-158 (2013)

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Noumenal Freedom and Kant’s Modal Antinomy.Uygar Abaci - 2022 - Kantian Review 27 (2):175-194.details Kant states in §76 of the third Critique that the divine intuitive intellect would not represent modal distinctions. Kohl and Stang claim that this statement entails that noumena lack modal properties, which, in turn, conflicts with Kant’s attribution of contingency to human noumenal wills. They both propose resolutions to this conflict based on conjectures regarding how God might non-modally represent what our discursive intellects represent as modally determined. I argue that these proposals fail; the viable resolution consists in recognizing that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism.Markus Kohl - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):827-845.details I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose does not commit Kant to incoherent (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Transcendental Knowability, Closure, Luminosity and Factivity: Reply to Stephenson.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - forthcoming - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis.details Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Kant on the Necessity of Necessity.Jessica Leech - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis (1):1-29.details One of Kant’s categories—a priori concepts the possession and applicability of which are necessary conditions of possible experience—is a concept of necessity. But it is unclear why the concept of necessity, as Kant defines it, should be a category thus understood. My aim is to offer a reading of Kant that fills this lacuna: the category of necessity is required to make necessity as it features in the world of experience understandable: a concept that the understanding can grasp and employ (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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