According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that this obtains even if a probability function can take these (...) evidential factors into account in ways they suggest and yield a unique probability value. Nor will the problem be solved by appealing to second-order probabilities. (shrink)

An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...) if true, confirms h is an empirical, not a priori, fact. (shrink)

The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not (...) to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation in many cases. Then given that we have information about the observed frequencies of Q among objects having one or more of the properties whose conjunction forms α , the paper shows how to establish which value of P(Q)/α is the best confirmed one. (shrink)

In 1959 Carnap published a probability model that was meant to allow forreasoning by analogy involving two independent properties. Maher (2000)derived a generalized version of this model axiomatically and defended themodel''s adequacy. It is thus natural to now consider how the model mightbe extended to the case of more than two properties. A simple extension waspublished by Hess (1964); this paper argues that it is inadequate. Amore sophisticated one was developed jointly by Carnap and Kemeny in theearly 1950s but never (...) published; this paper gives the first published descriptionof Carnap and Kemeny''s model and argues that it too is inadequate. Since noother way of extending the two-property model is currently known, the conclusionof this paper is that a satisfactory extension to multiple properties requires somenew approach. (shrink)

It is well known that Rudolf Carnap’s original system of inductive logic failed to provide an adequate account of analogical reasoning. Since this problem was identified, there has been no shortage of proposals for how to incorporate analogy into inductive inference. Most alternatives to Carnap’s system, unlike his original one, have not been derived from first principles; this makes it to some extent unclear what the epistemic situations are to which they apply. This paper derives a new analogical inductive logic (...) from a set of axioms which extend Carnap’s postulates in a natural way. The key insights come from Bruno de Finetti’s ideas about analogy. The axioms of the new system capture epistemic conditions that call for a strong kind of analogical reasoning. The new system has a number of merits, but is also subject to limitations. I shall discuss both, together with some possible ways to generalize the approach taken in this paper. (shrink)

Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary "convergence of opinion" in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions (...) of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation. (shrink)

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on (...) analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well. (shrink)