THERE COULD BE MORE THAN ONE GOD (DEFINED BY THE NORMAL DIVINE PREDICATES), ONLY IF A FIRST GOD BRINGS ABOUT (FROM ETERNITY) A SECOND GOD, AND THE FIRST TWO BRING ABOUT A THIRD GOD. IN ORDER TO EVINCE THE GOODNESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING IN SHARING, THEY WILL DO THIS NECESSARILY. BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE TO PRODUCE A FOURTH GOD; AND SINCE A GOD MUST EXIST NECESSARILY IF AT ALL, THERE WILL BE AND CAN BE ONLY THREE GODS. BUT (...) SINCE THEY MUTUALLY SUSTAIN EACH OTHER, THEY FORM A TRINITY. (shrink)

I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities'') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which (...) it is symmetrical. These structures modela variety of social situations which can thus be given a unified treatment.Among the cases I discuss are persons, which I argue are multiple-expertunities of persons at times. Taking a person as a social unity like this offersa clear sense in which some groups can also be person-like. (shrink)

Due to the competitive nature of business as a whole, it is sometimes difficult to develop moral relationships with others. However, though friendships are possible in business, most relationships must be kept on the lower level of business acquaintanceship.

Aristotle considers friendship the greatest external good, one integral to the attainment of happiness. However, while Aristotle limits distrust to what he calls imperfect forms of friendship, subsequent philosophers have stressed our uncertainty regarding the benevolence, beneficence and loyalty we may expect of friends. They do so in part because overcoming this uncertainty requires the exercise of the virtues of trust and loyalty if our friendships are to survive intact. For example, insofar as Aquinas holds that we cannot scrutinize the (...) wills of others - thus inviting uncertainty regarding their present and future conduct - he argues that friendship requires the virtue of hope as a cause of friendly love, a hope which helps us to make virtuous presumptions about others' wills. Likewise, Kant argues that all de facto friendships are plagued by epistemic uncertainty regarding the wills of others. In consequence, he treats loyalty as an unenforceable ideal of virtue. Kierkegaard goes further, framing his treatment of non-agapic love - in which he argues that friendship cannot be ethically justified - with a discussion of deception in Works of Love. If Aristotle is correct in thinking that friendship `is a virtue, or involves virtue', and that `loving is the virtue of friends', then addressing the epistemological, conceptual, and normative concerns these philosophers have regarding trust and loyalty between friends is needed to understand a central goal of the ethical life: the perfection of love. After a historical survey of the thought of these four thinkers regarding the relationship between friendship and loyalty, this study suggests that contemporary problems about the origins, nature, and limits of loyalty can be fruitfully resolved using insights derived from the historical survey. (shrink)