El resultado más importante de la epistemología de Evandro Agazzi ha sido probablemente la elaboración de un concepto analógico de ciencia, en el sentido de que, después de haber caracterizado la ciencia como conocimiento objetivo y riguroso, ha mostrado que estas dos características se satisfacen de forma diferente según las condiciones epistémicas, ontológicas y pragmáticas del conocimiento, dando lugar a las diferentes ciencias, naturales, humanas o sociales. El presente artículo subraya el hecho de que cada ciencia se caracteriza entonces por (...) su propia forma de racionalidad y, por lo tanto, el mismo concepto de racionalidad científica tiene un significado analógico bajo las mismas condiciones. Además, la analogía concierne a la racionalidad en cuanto tal y por esta vía se evita el dogmatismo que pretende reconocer una única forma de racionalidad, así como el relativismo que desconoce cualquier forma de racionalidad. Como introducción a este análisis se ofrece una presentación de los elementos fundamentales de la doctrina de la analogía según la tradición clásica y sus concepciones actuales y luego se procede a aplicar dichos requisitos al caso de la racionalidad, llegando a precisar el concepto de racionalidad analógica. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the (...) latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMetaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of (...) this paper is to explore whether the notion of functionally equivalent theories can be extended and utilized in the defence of metaphysical realism, drawing upon themes from structuralism in the philosophies of mathematics and science in which the specifics of theories do not matter as long as the relations in which they stand to other theories are maintained. I argue that despite its initial attractiveness, there are significant difficulties with this proposal. Discovering these obstacles thwarts the realist structuralist project, but reveals interesting features of metaphysical systems. (shrink)