Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...) part because of your anticipation of regret in the further future if you were to give in to the temptation. It does this by appeal to the significance of anticipated future regret to the agent ’s present standpoint, and to the role of the agent ’s standpoint in her self-governance. (shrink)

Heyman's view that addiction can be viewed as a natural outcome predictable by melioration and the matching law is provocative. Remaining to be explained more fully, however, are exactly how his view is an improvement on other reinforcement-based accounts. Included in these elaborations should be an account of how different “bookkeeping schemes” are developed and controlled and what new approaches to treatment and prevention of drug addiction are indicated.

It is difficult to accommodate compulsive drug use that destroys regulation by consequences in a unitary framework of melioration or maximization, especially as both are strategies of behavioral regulation. The “contradiction” of addictive behavior despite aversive consequences is an illusory issue because consequences that do not decrease addictive behavior cannot be considered punishing.

Heyman explains useful ways to bring addictive drug use under environmental control. We doubt that relapse is explained by drug features such as immediate reinforcement, clouding of judgment, and so forth. Relapse may require explanation in terms of enduring sensitization of incentive neural substrates, but even if its causal assumptions are wrong, Heyman's model makes useful predictions for behavioral control.

The ten vulnerabilities discussed in the target article vary in their likelihood of producing temporary preference for addictive activities automatic” habits discussed here.

Selfish Goal Theory is compatible with a behaviorally based theory that recognizes mental processes as behaviors. Both envision choices as made by the competition of purposive processes, which are autonomous in that they are not coordinated by an agentic “self.” However, the survival of mental processes – termed “goals” or “interests,” respectively – depends on a well-documented active mechanism: reward.

Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are (...) divided into those that are always avoided and those that are avoided only by higher mental processes—archetypically the passions, which are also thought of as hardwired or conditioned. Newer dichotomies within the negative have been proposed, hinging on whether a negative incentive is nevertheless sought (“wanted but not liked”) or on an incentive's being negative only because it is confining (the product of “rule worship”). The newer dichotomies have lacked motivational explanations, and there is reason to question conditioning in the motivational mechanism for the older ones.

Both experimental findings and the examination of common experience indicate that even the most aversive experiences, such as pain and panic, do not prevail in reflex fashion, but because of an urge to attend to them. The well-established hyperbolic curve in which prospective rewards are discounted implies a mechanism for such an urge, as well as for the “lower” incentives in the other dichotomies. The properties of these lower incentives are predicted by particular durations of temporary preferences on a continuum that stretches from fractions of a second to years. (shrink)

The models of internal self-control that have recently been proposed by behavioral economists do not depict motivational interaction that occurs while temptation is present. Those models that include willpower at all either envision a faculty with a motivation (“strength”) different from the motives that are weighed in the marketplace of choice, or rely on incompatible goals among diverse brain centers. Both assumptions are questionable, but these models’ biggest problem is that they do not let resolutions withstand re-examination while being challenged (...) by impulsive alternatives. The economists’ models all attempt to make a single equilibrium preference predictable from a person’s prior incentives. This was the original purpose of these models’ hyperboloid (“β–δ”) delay discount functions, which have been widely justified by the assumption that a person’s intertemporal inconsistency (impulsiveness) can be accounted for by the arousal of appetite for visceral rewards. Although arousal is clearly a factor in some cases of intertemporal inconsistency, it cannot be blamed for others, and furthermore does not necessarily imply hyperboloid discounting. The inadequacy of β–δ functions is particularly evident in models of internal self-control. I have reviewed several of these models, and have argued for a return to pure hyperbolic discount function as originally proposed, the relatively high tails of which can motivate a recursive process of self-prediction and thereby the formation of self-enforcing intertemporal contracts. Such a process does not require a separately motivated faculty of will, or incompatible goals among brain centers; but it also does not permit the prediction of unique preferences from prior incentives. (shrink)

The matching law accounts for both addictive behavior and the usefulness of a person's evaluating choices in overall categories. To explain why overall bookkeeping, once learned, does not easily win out over local bookkeeping, another implication of matching is needed: intertemporal bargaining. The role of melioration, though probably important for new addiction is separate.

A climate that is too cold to grow crops for part of the year demands foresight and self-control skills. To the extent that a culture has developed intertemporal bargaining, its members will have more autonomy, but pay the cost of being more compulsive, than members of societies that have not. Monetary resources will be a consequence but will also be fed back as a cause.

The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic signals, (4) overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual's susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential for relapse, and for the potential for treatment. (shrink)

Heyman's model explains the irrationality of addictive behavior, but it does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether this behavior is voluntary because it does not address the issue of the choice of preference functions. Furthermore, although Heyman disconfirms the disease model of addiction, this does not resolve the issue of whether addiction should be classified as a mental illness.

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

Heyman's target article contributes to our understanding of addictions by offering solutions to several paradoxes and by recognizing the stable nature of addictive behavior. Previous classical and operant conditioning models have emphasized molecular processes, such as acquisition and extinction, and have failed to address the aggregate effects of long-term exposure to the contingencies of drug and alcohol use.

Melioration is not superior and may be inferior to other extensions of behavioral choice theory to addiction studies. Progress in the addiction field will be accelerated by the demise of the disease model rather than by attempting to resolve the contradictions it has created.

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. (...) I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness. (shrink)

This paper examines why fundamental freedoms are so unevenly distributed across the earth. Climato-economic theorizing proposes that humans adapt needs, stresses, and choices of goals, means, and outcomes to the livability of their habitat. The evolutionary process at work is one of collectively meeting climatic demands of cold winters or hot summers by using monetary resources. Freedom is expected to be lowest in poor populations threatened by demanding thermal climates, intermediate in populations comforted by undemanding temperate climates irrespective of income (...) per head, and highest in rich populations challenged by demanding thermal climates. This core hypothesis is supported with new survey data across 85 countries and 15 Chinese provinces and with a reinterpretative review of results of prior studies comprising 174 countries and the 50 states in the United States. Empirical support covers freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of expression and participation, freedom from discrimination, and freedom to develop and realize one's human potential. Applying the theory to projections of temperature and income for 104 countries by 2112 forecasts that (a) poor populations in Asia, perhaps except Afghans and Pakistanis, will move up the international ladder of freedom, (b) poor populations in Africa will lose, rather than gain, relative levels of freedom unless climate protection and poverty reduction prevent this from happening, and (c) several rich populations will be challenged to defend current levels of freedom against worsening climato-economic livability. (shrink)

We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p, we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11(1):322–334, 1980), (...) we determine the optimal degree of present bias that the agent would like to have while pretending to have time-inconsistent preferences and we provide the range of present-bias parameter under which deceiving is optimal. Moreover, by allowing the constant relative risk aversion class of utility form, we characterize the distinction between pretending to be naive and sophisticated. (shrink)

Over the years, many theories have been proposed to account for the aberrant behavior of drug dependent individuals. Heyman posits that the existing theories of drug dependence are inadequate to explain the complex processes inherent in human drug-taking. He proposes that incongruous behaviors that comprise addiction, such as continued drug use in spite of adverse consequences, can be explained by application of the matching law approach. While the matching law theory of addiction explains certain aspects of human behavior, its application (...) to the area of addiction must be subjected to experimental verification. (shrink)

A recurring claim in a number of behavioural, cognitive and neuro-scientific literatures is that there is, or must be, a unidimensional ‘common currency’ in which the values of different available options are represented. There is striking variety in the quantities or properties that have been proposed as determinants of the ordering in motivational strength. Among those seriously suggested are pain and pleasure, biological fitness, reward and reinforcement, and utility among economists, who have regimented the notion of utility in a variety (...) of ways, some of them incompatible. This topic deserves philosophical attention for at least the following reasons. Repeated invocation of the ‘common currency’ idiom isn’t merely terminological coincidence because most of the claims are competing explanations either of manifest pattern in choices, or of order in the processes producing choice. We can’t suppose that the different currency claims within each area are compatible, because there are significant obstacles to identifying pairs of members of either the ‘pattern’ or ‘process’ group. There are, finally, seriously opposed positions about the relationships between the pattern facts and the process facts. There are philosophical positions both favouring and opposing a common currency. But direct consideration of the abstract relationships between claims about common currencies across scientific settings, and the arguments for and against these claims, is relatively rare. There is, though, much of philosophical interest to be found here. (shrink)

Heyman proposes that external stimuli can promote a switch from a local to a global frame of reference for evaluating the consequences of behavior and that such a change might be critical to breaking the grip of drag addiction. Could incentive stimuli promote a switch in the opposite direction and thus contribute to relapse in the recovered addict?

Extreme sensations – thirst, pain – can focus attention on local consequences at the expense of the overall, perhaps for good evolutionary reasons. Maybe the same phenomenon evolves from prolonged use of addictive substances. The matching law explains mistaken choice, not how a person who has confronted personal catastrophe manages to ignore it in making a locally induced choice.

Two issues are raised. (1) What is the nature of the drug effect Heyman thinks confers value to drugs? (2) What is the evidence that drug use decreases the value of drugs and of conventional incentives over the long-term? There is considerable evidence for the opposite; a persistent increase in the sensitivity of neural systems that mediate drug value.

The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. . How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: The Free Press.]. The influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the motivational (...) and the deficit. Motivational approaches view delusions as extreme instances of self-deception; as defensive attempts to relieve pain and distress. Deficit approaches, in contrast, view delusions as the consequence of defects in the normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities. It is argued that although there are good reasons to be sceptical of motivational theories , recent experiments confirm that motives are important causal forces where delusions are concerned. It is therefore concluded that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both motivational and deficit approaches. (shrink)

The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic signals, (4) overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual's susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential for relapse, and for the potential for treatment. (shrink)

In our target article, we proposed that addiction could be envisioned as misperformance of a decision-making machinery described by two systems (deliberative and habit systems). Several commentators have argued that Pavlovian learning also produces actions. We agree and note that Pavlovian action-selection will provide several additional vulnerabilities. Several commentators have suggested that addiction arises from sociological parameters. We note in our response how sociological effects can change decision-making variables to provide additional vulnerabilities. Commentators generally have agreed that our theory provides (...) a framework within which to site addiction and treatment, but additional work will be needed to determine whether our taxonomy will help identify and treat subpopulations within the addicted community. (shrink)

Social dilemmas occur when individuals make choices that are in their own best interest but not in the interest of society as a whole. Intrapersonal dilemmas occur when people make choices that are in the best interest of themselves at the moment of choice, but not in the best interest of themselves in the long run. A number of writers have observed that we can usefully model this self-defeating behavior by treating each individual as an aggregate of selves which have (...) competing interests, like the individual selves in a population. We undertake to synthesize and extend these contributions, applying the theory of intrapersonal dilemmas to addiction and procrastination, and discuss how the concept of multiple selves can explain why people attempt to control their behavior by imposing costs or constraints on themselves in the future, and how it can also help us develop new strategies of (personal) behavior control. (shrink)

Heyman s analysis of the relevant complex behavioral variables associated with addiction is evaluated in relation to identifying the appropriate variables in behavior analysis. The model of behavioral allocation and choice known as melioration, discussed by Heyman as a way to understand the complexities of addiction, is examined and contrasted with another model of matching called ratio invariance, which is offered in this commentary as another behavioral account with a significant potential for resolving the contradictions of addiction.

Scandals in companies such as Enron have been a source of great concern in the last decade. The events that led to a global financial crisis in 2008 have heightened this concern. How does one account for executive behaviors that led to such a crisis? This article argues that a conjunction of motive, means, and opportunity creates ‘an ethical hazard’ making questionable executive decisions more probable. It then suggests that corporate unethical behavior can be minimized by creating a process to (...) identify and remove such ethical hazards, and by appointing an ‘ethical hazards marshal.’. (shrink)

If neuroscience is to contribute to economics, it will do so by the way of psychology. Neural data can and do lead to better psychological theories, and psychological insights can and do lead to better economic models. Hence, neuroscience can in principle contribute to economics. Whether it actually will do so is an empirical question and the jury is still out. Economics currently faces theoretical and empirical challenges analogous to those faced by physics at the turn of the twentieth century (...) and ultimately addressed by quantum theory. If will emerge in the coming decades, it may well be founded on such concepts as cognitive processes and brain activity. (shrink)

Heyman's target article seeks to resolve the apparent paradox surrounding the issue of control in relation to addictive behaviour. The present commentary argues that addiction is in fact less paradoxical and more easily understandable than Heyman supposes. A fully satisfactory model of addiction, however, requires a more multifaceted approach than that provided by the type of behavioural choice theory favoured by Heyman.

Heyman's analysis of addiction in terms of matching to local relative value can be supplemented by stimulus-control processes. Stimulus equivalence can broaden the set of situations that occasion addictive behavior, and the situation-reinforcer correlation can enhance its persistence. The joint effects of stimulus-control and reinforcement processes may complicate treatment.

Ainslie challenges our interpretation of the properties of hyperbolic discount curves in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma model. In this reply, we discuss the emergence of hyperbolic discount functions in the behavioral economics literature and evaluate their properties. Furthermore, we present a summarized version of our IPD model and evaluate Ainslie’s points of contention.

Heyman's model, paradoxically, predicts that whereas a maximizing approach to drug choice will prevent escalation of drug use it will never yield complete abstinence. We suggest an alternative model that overcomes this difficulty by focusing on changes in drug tolerance. A small modification allows maximization to predict either abstinence or moderation (e.g., social drinking).

Knowledge of specific instances of melioration does not imply knowledge of the variables controlling behavior. Drug self-administration has been successfully analyzed in terms of standard variables such as the immediacy and magnitude of the drug reinforcer. An appeal to melioration may not be necessary.

Addictive behavior has never seemed rational because it persists in spite of drastic aversive consequences. This is a particular problem for models of addiction such as operant psychology which hold that behavior is controlled by its consequences. Inspite of claims to the contrary, Heymans target article illustrates how operant psychology resolves this contradiction. By using the matching law, Heyman suggests a mechanism that explains why delayed aversive events may not control behavior, and a conceptual framework in which we can understand (...) successful therapies. (shrink)

Numerous individual differences determine the effectiveness of the multiple external reinforcement contingencies that control drug seeking behavior. Differences in the capacity to frame reinforcement and also the toxic effects of drugs modulate susceptibility to addiction. As a result, not all individuals are at the same degree of risk for addiction.

The conflict between drug and conventional rewards leads to a paradox: Sanctions against drug use decrease access to conventional rewards and push drug users toward drug abuse, whereas increased access to the rewards of family, friends, and work may help reduce drug abuse. Lack of control is not specific to drug addiction and is unlikely to yield to a shift in bookkeeping.

Heyman makes a convincing case that a melioration choice strategy is sufficient to produce addictive behavior. But given a plethora of addiction theories, the question is whether melioration theory is superior to rivals more sophisticated than a simple disease model or operant conditioning account. Heyman offers little direct evidence that melioration actually causes the addictions we observe.

Choosing the smaller, less delayed reinforcers of drug abuse (including cessation of withdrawal) over the larger, more delayed reinforcers of a healthy life can be described as impulsiveness (the opposite of self-control). Examination of drug abuse using a self-control/impulsiveness framework can help explain many of the puzzles about this behavior, while tying drug abuse into a large research database.

This paper presents a very simple model in which situational cues associated with a particular consumption good compel an agent—who may have otherwise been “thinking about” something else—to consider the decision to consume that good. Within this framework, it is shown how an endowment effect and a present bias can arise through a common mechanism. The analysis points to a novel, contributing role for inattention in understanding both of these behavioral anomalies while also speaking to evidence that they are often (...) cue-induced. (shrink)

Economic models of addiction are choice-based. These models push the choice paradigm too far by modeling addiction as rational, normative behavior. Heyman's target article provides a sensible alternative to this economic approach by emphasizing that addiction is characterized by ambivalence and a perceived loss of self control. However, matching may not be a satisfactory platform on which to build this alternative model. Matching experiments do not provide evidence of ambivalence or perceived loss of self control.