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  1. Addiction-as-a-kind hypothesis.Petri Ylikoski & Samuli Pöyhönen - 2015 - International Journal of Addiction and Drug Research 4 (1):21-25.
    The psychiatric category of addiction has recently been broadened to include new behaviors. This has prompted critical discussion about the value of a concept that covers so many different substances and activities. Many of the debates surrounding the notion of addiction stem from different views concerning what kind of a thing addiction fundamentally is. In this essay, we put forward an account that conceptualizes different addictions as sharing a cluster of relevant properties (the syndrome) that is supported by a matrix (...)
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  • Drugs as instruments: A new framework for non-addictive psychoactive drug use.Christian P. Müller & Gunter Schumann - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):293-310.
    Most people who are regular consumers of psychoactive drugs are not drug addicts, nor will they ever become addicts. In neurobiological theories, non-addictive drug consumption is acknowledged only as a “necessary” prerequisite for addiction, but not as a stable and widespread behavior in its own right. This target article proposes a new neurobiological framework theory for non-addictive psychoactive drug consumption, introducing the concept of “drug instrumentalization.” Psychoactive drugs are consumed for their effects on mental states. Humans are able to learn (...)
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  • Addiction: choice or compulsion?Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Rogeberg - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 4 (77):11.
    Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain structures (...)
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  • Torturous withdrawal: Emotional compulsion in addiction.Arthur Krieger - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1-17.
    Withdrawal involves emotional pain that motivates much addictive behavior. In this paper, I argue that the emotional pain of withdrawal compels much addictive behavior. Researchers have noticed this possibility but it is widely underappreciated. Among philosophers, only Hanna Pickard has discussed emotional compulsion in addiction, and the emotional aspect of withdrawal has been almost completely neglected. Accounts of emotional compulsion in the philosophical literature (from Tappolet, Elster, and Furrow) probably do not capture how the distress of withdrawal compels, so I (...)
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  • Can an algorithm become delusional? Evaluating ontological commitments and methodology of computational psychiatry.Marianne D. Broeker & Matthew R. Broome - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-27.
    The computational approach to psychiatric disorders, including delusions, promises explanation and treatment. Here, we argue that an information processing approach might be misleading to understand psychopathology and requires further refinement. We explore the claim of computational psychiatry being a bridge between phenomenology and physiology while focussing on the ontological commitments and corresponding methodology computational psychiatry is based on. Interconnecting ontological claims and methodological practices, the paper illustrates the structure of theory-building and testing in computational psychiatry.First, we will explain the ontological (...)
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  • Reinforcement learning: A brief guide for philosophers of mind.Julia Haas - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12865.
    In this opinionated review, I draw attention to some of the contributions reinforcement learning can make to questions in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I highlight reinforcement learning's foundational emphasis on the role of reward in agent learning, and canvass two ways in which the framework may advance our understanding of perception and motivation.
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  • The evaluative mind.Julia Haas - forthcoming - In Mind Design III.
    I propose that the successes and contributions of reinforcement learning urge us to see the mind in a new light, namely, to recognise that the mind is fundamentally evaluative in nature.
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  • Denial in Addiction.Hanna Pickard - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):277-299.
    I argue that denial plays a central but insufficiently recognized role in addiction. The puzzle inherent in addiction is why drug use persists despite negative consequences. The orthodox conception of addiction resolves this puzzle by appeal to compulsion; but there is increasing evidence that addicts are not compelled to use but retain choice and control over their consumption in many circumstances. Denial offers an alternative explanation: there is no puzzle as to why drug use persists despite negative consequences if these (...)
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  • Addictive actions.Edmund Henden - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):362-382.
    It is common to think of addiction as involving behavior which in some sense is ?out of control.? But does this mean addictive actions occur because of compulsion or because of ordinary weakness of will? Many philosophers argue that addictive actions occur because of weakness of will, since there is plenty of evidence suggesting that they are not caused by irresistible desires. In fact, addicts seem, in general, to perform these actions freely in the sense of having the ability to (...)
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  • Graded Abilities and Action Fragility.David Storrs-Fox - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Recent work by Alfred Mele, Romy Jaster and Chandra Sripada recognizes that abilities come in degrees of fallibility. The rough idea is that abilities are often not surefire. They are liable to fail. The more liable an ability is to fail, the more fallible it is. Fallibility is plausibly significant for addiction, responsibility, and normative theorizing. However, we lack an adequate account of what fallibility consists in. This article addresses that problem. Perhaps the most natural approach is to say (roughly) (...)
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  • Evolving resolve.Walter Veit & David Spurrett - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    The broad spectrum revolution brought greater dependence on skill and knowledge, and more demanding, often social, choices. We adopt Sterelny's account of how cooperative foraging paid the costs associated with longer dependency, and transformed the problem of skill learning. Scaffolded learning can facilitate cognitive control including suppression, whereas scaffolded exchange and trade, including inter-temporal exchange, can help develop resolve.
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  • Mechanisms for Robust Cognition.Matthew M. Walsh & Kevin A. Gluck - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1131-1171.
    To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness (...)
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  • A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency and Criminal Responsibility.Stephen J. Morse - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):490 - 518.
    ABSTRACT The article begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the label of ?disease? or ?moral weakness?. It then turns to the criteria for criminal responsibility and shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the (...)
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  • On the biomedicalization of alcoholism.Ron Berghmans, Johan de Jong, Aad Tibben & Guido de Wert - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (4):311-321.
    The shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism from a moral paradigm towards a biomedical paradigm is often characterized as a form of biomedicalization. We will examine and critique three reasons offered for the claim that viewing alcoholism as a disease is morally problematic. The first is that the new conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease will lead to individualization, e.g., a too narrow focus on the individual person, excluding cultural and social dimensions of alcoholism. The second claim (...)
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  • The Science and Moral Psychology of Addiction: A Case Study in Integrative Philosophy of Psychiatry.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2024 - Critica 56 (167):127-155.
    Though addiction is a complex empirical phenomenon, some of the most pressing questions about it concern how we should evaluate agents who are living with it. To that end, a fruitful methodology is to tease out from our best sciences consequences at the level of moral psychology. Taking account of epidemiology, behavioral science, animal studies and, chiefly, neuroscience, I argue for a view according to which addiction involves dysfunctional motivational states (which I call “hybrid intentions”) as well as cognitive distortions. (...)
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  • Computational psychiatry.P. Read Montague, Raymond J. Dolan, Karl J. Friston & Peter Dayan - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):72-80.
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  • How the Neuroscience of Decision Making Informs Our Conception of Autonomy.Gidon Felsen & Peter B. Reiner - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (3):3-14.
    Autonomy, the ability to make decisions for ourselves about ourselves, is among the most prized of human liberties. In this review we reconsider the key conditions necessary for autonomous decision making, long debated by moral philosophers and ethicists, in light of current neuroscientific evidence. The most widely accepted criteria for autonomy are that decisions are made by a rationally deliberative and reflective agent and that these decisions are free of undue external influences. The corpus of neuroscientific data suggest that human (...)
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  • Constitutive explanations in neuroeconomics: principles and a case study on money.Carsten Herrmann-Pillath - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (4):374-395.
    So far, the methodological debate about neuroeconomics rarely refers to original methodological positions in the neurosciences. I confront one of the most influential ones, the constitutive explanations or mechanism approach, with methodological claims that directly relate the economic model of choice with neuronal embodiments, represented by Glimcher’s influential work. Constitutive explanations are composite and non-reductionist, therefore allow for recognizing complex causal interactions between basal neuronal phenomena and cognitive structures, also involving external symbolic media. I demonstrate the power of this methodology (...)
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  • Processing speed enhances model-based over model-free reinforcement learning in the presence of high working memory functioning.Daniel J. Schad, Elisabeth Jünger, Miriam Sebold, Maria Garbusow, Nadine Bernhardt, Amir-Homayoun Javadi, Ulrich S. Zimmermann, Michael N. Smolka, Andreas Heinz, Michael A. Rapp & Quentin J. M. Huys - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:117016.
    Theories of decision-making and its neural substrates have long assumed the existence of two distinct and competing valuation systems, variously described as goal-directed vs. habitual, or, more recently and based on statistical arguments, as model-free vs. model-based reinforcement-learning. Though both have been shown to control choices, the cognitive abilities associated with these systems are under ongoing investigation. Here we examine the link to cognitive abilities, and find that individual differences in processing speed covary with a shift from model-free to model-based (...)
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  • Craving for drugs.Hanna Pickard - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):598-626.
    The image of craving as a desire of unimaginable and irresistible force is poised to solve the puzzle of addiction: persistent drug use despite severe negative consequences. But the image is flawed. Drawing on science, philosophy, and first‐person testimony, I argue against irresistibility and develop a more nuanced, heterogeneous account of craving for drugs. Craving comes in three varieties, each corresponding to a kind of answer to the question why people crave drugs: cue‐induced, goal‐focused, and attachment‐based. This in turn grounds (...)
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  • From dual systems to dual function: rethinking methodological foundations of behavioural economics.Carsten Herrmann-Pillath - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):403-422.
    Building on an overview of dual systems theories in behavioural economics, the paper presents a methodological assessment in terms of the mechanistic explanations framework that has gained prominence in philosophy of the neurosciences. I conclude that they fail to meet the standards of causal explanations and I suggest an alternative ‘dual functions’ view based on Marr’s methodology of computational neuroscience. Recent psychological and neuroscience research undermines the case for a categorization of brain processes in terms of properties such as relative (...)
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  • Is “willpower” a scientific concept? Suppressing temptation contra resolution in the face of adversity.Elias L. Khalil - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    The distinction that Ainslie draws among the triple-phenomena “suppression,” “resolve,” and “habit” is a great advance in decision making theory. But the conceptual machinery “willpower,” and its underpinning distinction between small/soon rewards as opposed to large/later rewards, provides a faulty framework to understand the triple-phenomena.
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  • Taking an engineer's view: Implications of network analysis for computational psychiatry.A. David Redish, Rebecca Kazinka & Alexander B. Herman - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
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  • Motivated explanation.Richard Patterson, Joachim T. Operskalski & Aron K. Barbey - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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