Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding (...) harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails. (shrink)

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these (...) philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities. (shrink)

The structural scarcity of healthcare resources has deeply challenged their fair distribution, prompting the need for allocation criteria. Long under the spotlight of the bioethical debate with an extraordinary peak during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, micro-allocation of healthcare has been extensively discussed in the literature with regard to issues of substantive and formal justice. This paper addresses a relatively underdiscussed question within the field of formal justice: who should define micro-allocation criteria in healthcare? To explore this issue, we first establish (...) formal requirements that must be met for allocation criteria to be considered fair and legitimate. Then, we introduce three possible answers to the research question: the attending physician, the team of physicians, and the team of experts. We discuss and then reject all of them, arguing that the task of defining allocation criteria should be assigned to a political representative, supported by a cross-disciplinary team of experts. This proposal is based on the need to take democracy seriously as a tool for making substantive allocative decisions in light of the inevitable disagreement on such matters within a community. To support this claim, we present two key arguments—the democracy argument and the consistency argument. We also pre-emptively respond to two significant critiques: the too-specificity of the decision critique and the catastrophic outcomes critique. In conclusion, we argue that our proposal offers the fairest and most legitimate decision-making process for healthcare micro-allocation. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to explore people’s attitudes toward responsibility in the allocation of public health care resources. Special attention is paid to conceptualizations of responsibility involving blame and sanctions. A representative sample of the Norwegian population was asked about various responsibility mechanisms that have been proposed in the theoretical literature on health care and personal responsibility, from denial of treatment to a tax on unhealthy consumer goods. Survey experiments were employed to study treatment effects, such as whether (...) fairness considerations affect attitudes about responsibility. We find that, overall, a substantial minority of the respondents find it fair to let the health care system sanction people—in one way or another—for voluntary behaviors that increase the risk of becoming ill. Quite surprisingly, we find that people are more prone to report that they should themselves be held responsible for unhealthy lifestyles than others. (shrink)

The prevalence of non-communicable diseases, the related increased medical costs, and the recent public health emergency bring out more forcefully pre-existing dilemmas of distributive justice in the healthcare context. Under this reality, would it be justified to hold people responsible for their taken lifestyle decisions, or would it constitute an instance of unjustified disrespectful treatment? From a respect-based standpoint, one could argue that a responsibility-sensitive healthcare system morally disrespects the imprudent ones engaging in disadvantageous differential treatment to their detriment. In (...) contrast, however, we might also have luck egalitarian reasons that explain why this differential treatment is not unjust. Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, which argues that it is bad if some people are worse off than others through no voluntary fault of their own. In this paper, I clarify the concerns about disrespect raised against the luck egalitarian viewpoint and offer possible respect-based reasons for why this might not be the case grounded in deontological concepts. First, I employ a revised Double-effect case to support responsibility-sensitive rationing. In the last part of the paper, these are further supported through the Kantian Formula of Humanity supplemented by the concept of duties. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical implications of healthcare resource allocation during the first wave of COVID-19 in Italy, from 21 February to 31 May 2020, with a focus on the utilitarian principles that prioritized age-based resource allocation. By comparing this approach to an ontological personalist bioethics framework, the study aims to offer a more equitable strategy for healthcare allocation applicable to any pandemic. Data from governmental reports, healthcare policies, and ethical guidelines were analyzed, revealing that Italy’s utilitarian method led to (...) significant ethical concerns, particularly regarding age discrimination. In contrast, the ontological personalist approach emphasizes the dignity and intrinsic worth of each individual, irrespective of age or health condition. The findings demonstrate that this personalist framework fosters a more balanced and fair allocation of resources, respecting human dignity and offering a universally applicable alternative to age-based prioritization. Ultimately, the study suggests that integrating ontological personalist principles into healthcare policies could enhance ethical decision-making in future pandemics, ensuring that resource allocation practices align more closely with human rights and individual dignity. (shrink)