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Andreas Albertsen [23]Andreas Brøgger Albertsen [1]
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Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus University
  1. A framework for luck egalitarianism in health and healthcare.Andreas Albertsen & Carl Knight - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):165-169.
    Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather (...)
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  2. A vaccine tax: ensuring a more equitable global vaccine distribution.Andreas Albertsen - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (10):658-661.
    While COVID-19 vaccines provide light at the end of the tunnel in a difficult time, they also bring forth the complex ethical issue of global vaccine distribution. The current unequal global distribution of vaccines is unjust towards the vulnerable living in low-income countries. A vaccine tax should be introduced to remedy this. Under such a scheme, a small fraction of the money spent by a country on vaccines for its own population would go into a fund, such as COVAX, dedicated (...)
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  3. What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection?Andreas Albertsen & Lasse Nielsen - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (4):427-443.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The most common criticism of luck egalitarianism is the ‘harshness objection’, which states that luck egalitarianism allows for too harsh consequences, as it fails to provide justification for why those responsible for their bad fate can be entitled to society's assistance. It has largely gone unnoticed that the harshness objection is open to a number of very different interpretations. (...)
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  4. Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation.Andreas Albertsen - 2019 - Bioethics 34 (3):272-280.
    The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and (...)
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  5. Unjust Equalities.Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
    In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...)
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  6. Rare diseases in healthcare priority setting: should rarity matter?Andreas Albertsen - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (9):624-628.
    Rare diseases pose a particular priority setting problem. The UK gives rare diseases special priority in healthcare priority setting. Effectively, the National Health Service is willing to pay much more to gain a quality-adjusted life-year related to a very rare disease than one related to a more common condition. But should rare diseases receive priority in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources? This article develops and evaluates four arguments in favour of such a priority. These pertain to public values, luck (...)
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  7. Democratic Ethical Consumption and Social Justice.Andreas Albertsen - 2022 - Public Health Ethics 15 (2):130-137.
    Hassoun argues that the poor in the world have a right to health and that the Global Health Impact Index provides consumers in well-off countries with the opportunity to ensure that more people have access to essential medicines. Because of this, these consumers would be ethically obliged to purchase Global Health Impact Index-labeled products in the face of existing global inequalities. In presenting her argument, Hassoun rejects the so-called democratic account of ethical consumption in favor of the positive change account. (...)
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  8. If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage.Andreas Albertsen - 2020 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (3):357-367.
    Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, (...)
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  9. When bad things happen to good people.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):93-112.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only (...)
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  10. Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of (...)
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  11. Deemed consent: assessing the new opt-out approach to organ procurement in Wales.Andreas Albertsen - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (5):314-318.
    In December 2015, Wales became the first country in the UK to move away from an opt-in system in organ procurement. The new legislation introduces the concept of deemed consent whereby a person who neither opt in nor opt out is deemed to have consented to donation. The data released by the National Health Service in July 2017 provide an excellent opportunity to assess this legislation in light of concerns that it would decrease procurement rates for living and deceased donation, (...)
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  12. The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should All Votes Count the Same?Andreas Bengtson & Andreas Albertsen - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice to (...)
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  13. Opt-Out to the Rescue: Organ Donation and Samaritan Duties.Sören Flinch Midtgaard & Andreas Albertsen - 2021 - Public Health Ethics 14 (2):191-201.
    Deceased organ donation is widely considered as a case of easy rescue―that is, a case in which A may bestow considerable benefits on B while incurring negligent costs herself. Yet, the policy implications of this observation remain unclear. Drawing on Christopher H. Wellman’s samaritan account of political obligations, the paper develops a case for a so-called opt-out system, i.e., a scheme in which people are defaulted into being donors. The proposal’s key idea is that we may arrange people’s options in (...)
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  14. Feiring’s concept of forward–looking responsibility: a dead end for responsibility in healthcare.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):161-164.
    Eli Feiring has developed a concept of forward-looking responsibility in healthcare. On this account, what matters morally in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources is not people's past behaviours but rather their commitment to take on lifestyles that will increase the benefit acquired from received treatment. According to Feiring, this is to be preferred over the backward-looking concept of responsibility often associated with luck egalitarianism. The article critically scrutinises Feiring's position. It begins by spelling out the wider implications of Feiring's (...)
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  15. Drinking in the last chance saloon: luck egalitarianism, alcohol consumption, and the organ transplant waiting list.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):325-338.
    The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...)
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  16. How the past matters for the future: a luck egalitarian sustainability principle for healthcare resource allocation.Andreas Albertsen - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (2):102-103.
    Christian Munthe, David Fumagalli and Erik Malmqvist argue that well-known healthcare resource allocation principles, such as need, prognosis, equal treatment and cost-effectiveness, should be supplemented with a principle of sustainability.1 Employing such a principle would entail that the allocation of healthcare resources should take into account whether a specific allocation causes negative dynamics, which would limit the amount of resources available in the future. As examples of allocation decisions, which may have such negative dynamics, they mention those who cause a (...)
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  17. Fresh Starts for Poor Health Choices: Should We Provide Them and Who Should Pay?Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Public Health Ethics 9 (1):55-64.
    Should we grant a fresh start to those who come to regret their past lifestyle choices? A negative response to this question can be located in the luck egalitarian literature. As a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice, luck egalitarianism considers it just that people’s relative positions reflect their past choices, including those they regret. In a recent article, Vansteenkiste, Devooght and Schokkaert argue against the luck egalitarian view, maintaining instead that those who regret their past choices in health are disadvantaged in (...)
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  18. The Luck Egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen - A Reply to David Miller.Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - SATS 18 (1):37-53.
    The late G.A. Cohen is routinely considered a founding father of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. David Miller argues that Cohen’s considered beliefs on distributive justice are not best understood as luck egalitarian. While the relationship between distributive justice and personal responsibility plays an important part in Cohen’s work, Miller maintains that it should be considered an isolated theme confined to Cohen’s exchange with Dworkin. We should not understand the view Cohen defends in this exchange as (...)
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  19. Distributive justice and the harm to medical professionals fighting epidemics.Andreas Albertsen & Jens Damgaard Thaysen - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (12):861-864.
    The exposure of doctors, nurses and other medical professionals to risks in the context of epidemics is significant. While traditional medical ethics offers the thought that these dangers may limit the extent to which a duty to care is applicable in such situations, it has less to say about what we might owe to medical professionals who are disadvantaged in these contexts. Luck egalitarianism, a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, appears to fare particularly badly in that regard. If we want (...)
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  20. Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care.Carl Knight & Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (8):536-542.
    Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in (...)
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  21. Assessing deemed consent in Wales - the advantages of a broad difference-in-difference design.Andreas Albertsen - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (3):211-212.
    As the debate over an English opt-out policy for organ procurement intensifies, assessing existing experiences becomes even more important. The Welsh introduction of opt-out legislation provides one important point of reference. With the introduction of deemed consent in December 2015, Wales became the first part of the UK to introduce an opt-out system in organ procurement. My article ‘Deemed consent: assessing the new opt-out approach to organ procurement in Wales’ conducted an early assessment of this.1 Taking its starting point in (...)
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  22. Joseph Fishkin: Bottlenecks—A New Theory of Equality of Opportunity: Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2014, 288 pp.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (3):331-336.
    Book review: Joseph Fishkin: Bottlenecks—A New Theory of Equality of Opportunity.
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  23.  89
    G.A. Cohens politiske filosofi.Andreas Brøgger Albertsen - 2016 - Slagmark - Tidsskrift for Idéhistorie 73:293-295.
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  24. Shlomi Segall , Equality and opportunity: Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199661817. 240 pages, £ 35.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1345-1347.
    Review: Shlomi Segall (2013) Equality and opportunity.
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