This study investigates how Islamic religiosity affects ethical decision making. The study was conducted in the Malaysian workforce across the public and private sectors with a sample of N = 160. Five factors are tested to determine if they mediate the relationship between Islamic religiosity and ethical intention. These factors are: perceived importance of the ethical issue, moral judgment, ego strength, spiritual intention, and conscience. A parallel mediation design was chosen to test six hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature. The (...) findings indicate that only the variable conscience mediates the relationship between religiosity and ethical intention. This study gives insights into the role of Islam in ethical decision-making, especially for Muslims in Malaysia, an area which has limited exploration. More generally, it contributes to the ongoing discussion in the literature on the relationship between religiosity and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

This work is an investigation into philosophical method and rational argument in moral philosophy. It makes an original contribution to human understanding, by taking some of the tools and techniques that Gordon Baker identifies in the later work of Wittgenstein, and using them as a way of fending for oneself in an area of philosophy that neither Baker, nor Wittgenstein, wrote on. More specifically, a discussion of some different aspects of the contemporary literature on Dancy’s moral particularism is used as (...) a vehicle for illustrating how Baker’s therapeutic conception of philosophy offers alternative possibilities for how we can do philosophy, and what counts as rational argument in moral philosophy. I maintain that, by considering some indicative ways in which Baker’s therapeutic approach to philosophy can dissolve, rather than solve, the kinds of perplexities found in the existing literature on Dancy’s moral particularism, we can liberate ourselves from the traditional/theoretical view of how we ought to do philosophy, and an understanding of rational argument in moral philosophy, to which we need not be committed. (shrink)