In this paper I explore white attempts to move toward a proactive position against racism that will amount to more than self-criticism in the following three ways: by assessing the debate within feminism over white women's relation to whiteness; by exploring "white awareness training" methods developed by Judith Katz and the "race traitor" politics developed by Ignatiev and Garvey, and; a case study of white revisionism being currently attempted at the University of Mississippi.

I argue that race -- the European Spectre of the title -- has received insufficient attention within Marxist theory. Liberal and Marxist accounts of modernity differ on various points, but agree in characterizing modern society/capitalism as marked by the collapse of ancient and medieval status distinctions and the corresponding emergence of moral and juridical egalitarianism. But this basically Eurocentric narrative ignores the new system of ascriptive hierarchy established by European expansionism: white supremacy. Particularly in the United States, I suggest, race (...) has been the primary social division, in that racial identity has generally trumped other kinds of group identity. Ironically, then, the Marxist model works better for race than class, and if the concept of a bourgeois revolution is expanded to mean the overturning of ascriptive hierarchy of all kinds, it has yet to be fully carried out. (shrink)

In her article, Alcoff argues for the need to examine the reality of race philosophically. According to Alcoff, liberal notions of universality as well as the postmodern critique of essentialism make it difficult to address race and its ongoing significance in social life. By engaging with authors like Charles W. Mills and Paul Gilroy, Alcoff aims to show that it is possible to develop an account of race as social and historical reality without essentializing the category of race.

In modern Western moral and political theory the notion of the liberal subject has flourished as the locus of moral experience, interpretation and critique. Through this conceptual lens on subjectivity, individuals are enabled to shape and regulate their interactions in arguably desirable ways, e.g. through principles of respect for persons and the constraints of reciprocal rights, and moral education has largely adopted this perspective. However, this article argues that some kinds of morally significant relations—those framed by social groups related to (...) each other through structures of hierarchical power—constitute a different kind of subjectivity that needs more theoretical and empirical attention. In contrast to four core characteristics of liberal subjectivity, a view of subjectivity that can be located in how individuals are members of particular kinds of social groups is offered. It is argued that unless it can accommodate working with attention to this form of subjectivity as well, moral education runs the risk of itself contributing to forms of oppression such as racism, instead of being a means of combating them. (shrink)