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  1. Which Empathy? Limitations in the Mirrored “Understanding” of Emotion.Remy Debes - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):219-239.
    The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading, and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this (...)
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  • Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
    The question of what is shared in joint action has been discussed mainly with reference to the notion of collective intentionality. The problem of how to account for intentional states that are shared between two or more jointly engaged creatures is particularly relevant for actions that involve distal intentions. Yet there is another important kind of joint action, which so far has received less interest, at least by philosophers. This kind of action can be described in terms of a shared (...)
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