Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt to (...) bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann's criticisms. Furthermore, the term “Kantian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either “Kantian rationalism” or “Kantian deontology” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into. (shrink)

The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that moral sentences have truth-value, there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true, and moral properties are not reducible to non- moral properties. Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny, and, respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume (...) that non-cognitivism and error-theory are erroneous. In chapters 2 and 3, I suggest that the two main forms of reductionism, analytic and synthetic reductionism, are mistaken. In chapter 4, I argue that the considerations in the previous chapters in relation to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism provide support to moral realism. It is also suggested that these considerations make it plausible to hypothesise that moral properties depend on non- moral properties in a way I refer to as ‘the realist formula’. The realist formula confirms moral realism since it implies that moral properties are not reducible to non- moral properties. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I argue that moral realism, much owing to the realist formula, is able to explain significant meta-ethical issues regarding moral disagreement, moral reason and moral motivation. Among other things, externalism concerning moral motivation is defended. The explanatory value of moral realism in relation to these meta-ethical issues is taken to suggest that this view is preferable to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism. Some of the meta-ethical issues discussed in these chapters, particularly moral disagreement and motivation, have been thought to provide support to non-cognitivism and error-theory. I maintain that since realism, unlike reductionism, is able to counter these arguments, it justifies us in upholding the view that moral sentences have truth-value and the view that there are moral properties. In chapter 8, various objections against realism with regard to the dependence of moral properties on non- moral properties are responded to. In chapter 9, I consider an influential argument to the effect that moral properties are not involved in causal explanations. I maintain that this argument fails and that it therefore is reasonable to assume that moral properties are natural properties. However, the discussions in chapters 8 and 9 also suggest that moral realism might face problems that cannot be thoroughly discussed in this thesis. (shrink)

Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. First of all, it is based on the (...) classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how we can arrive at moral judgements. (shrink)

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral (...) grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism. (shrink)

Quine's ethical views typify what might seem to be natural sympathies between empiricism and ethical noncognitivism. LikeAyer, he sees a case for noncognitivism rooted in an epistemic discontinuity between ethics and science. Quine argues that the absence of genuine moral observation sentences, and thus the absence of empirical checkpoints for the resolution of theoretical disputes, renders ethics, as he terms it, “methodologically infirm” However, recent papers in this journal make clear that Quine appears to be voicing mutually incompatible commitments to (...) both noncognitivism and cognitivism. Here I argue that Davidson's theory of interpretation offers promising ways to resolve these tensions. His constructive program fleshes out the implications of Quine's largely destructive critique of intensional semantics and contains a fairly well‐articulated account of evaluative semantics, one which seems to combine cognitivist and noncognitivist elements harmoniously. Moreover, it is argued that Davidson's long‐standing differences with Quine over the epistemological status Quine accords observation sentences with do not undermine Quine's metaethical critique. (shrink)

This article shows how the social sciences rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus the current social science view of determinism and social justice is antiquated, ignoring numerous common and (...) well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The article concludes with a brief consideration of deterministic consequentialist ethics, social justice, and the problems of egoism and altruism. (shrink)

If the bindingness of morality was to rest on something as ‘subjective’ as the non-cognitivist says it does, the grouse goes, and morality itself would come down crashing. Nothing less than an ‘objective’ source of normativity, it is supposed, could hold morality in orbit. Some of these worries automatically morph into worries about the projectivist model of normativity of law as well: one which understands the authority or normativity of law in terms of subjective attitudes taken towards the law. As (...) well as the stock worries about non-cognitivism, there are some additional ones that the projectivist model brings in its wake that it cannot account for the ‘uniform’ bindingness of law and that a subjective source of normativity of law based on mental states is unintelligible. This essay makes the case for acquitting the projectivist model of normativity of law from the above charges. But the route to that necessarily leads through first acquitt... (shrink)

is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture (...) the reality they are about and thus fall short of the truth we aim at. An identity theory is designed to overcome this suspicion. (shrink)

Individual autonomy is a prominent value in Western medicine and medical ethics, and there it is often accepted that the only way to pay proper respect to autonomy is to let the patients themselves determine what is good for them. Adopting this approach has, however, given rise to some unwanted results, thus motivating a quest for an objective conception of health. Unfortunately, the purportedly objective conceptions of health have failed in objectivity, and if a conception of health is not acceptable (...) for all agents, the threat of offending the patients’ autonomy arises. This article sketches an objective conception of health that is able to respect individual autonomy. (shrink)

Hobbes’s interpreters have struggled to find a plausible semantics for evaluative language in his writings. I argue that this search is misguided. Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluative statements. Rather, he sees evaluative language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. I marshal the evidence for this prescriptivist reading of Hobbes on evaluative language and show how it (...) sidesteps various textual and philosophical problems that bedevil the traditional interpretations. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant presents several formulations of the categorical imperative, first of which is called “Formula of Universal Law” containing the well-known generalizability test. Numerous pros and cons have been associated with the nature and application of this formula in the history of moral philosophy, each with its staunch supporters and opponents. In this paper, we will first review the nature of this formula and its position in Kant’s moral system. Second, we will evaluate its application in practice and argue that (...) some thinkers have not fully grasped Kant’s purpose and have attributed improper defects to this formula. Third, Shelly Kagan’s consequential interpretation of the general formula will be investigated to figure out whether it is possible to draw consequential normative sentences from this formula. Finally, we will evaluate alleged criticisms against this formula in the history of moral philosophy in some detail. Keywords: Formula of Universal Law, Generalizability, strict and wide judgments, acceptable and unacceptable in ethics, Kantian consequentialism 1. Introduction, Objectıve In this article, we will examine the first formula of Kant’s ethics which is called Universal Law. In the history of moral philosophy, different interpretations of this formula have been offered. Some commentators have considered it the best and most important of Kant’s moral formulas, while some others have deemed it completely futile. In our opinion, both groups must rethink their positions. In Kant’s ethics, the general formula is very important, but it should be used in the right place. It also seems that in the normative ethics section, the second formula is the most important and most practical form of Kantian ethics. Therefore, once the true meaning of the first formula is considered, many objections and misunderstandings are resolved. 2. Fındıngs And Argument This article is divided into four main sections: 2.1 Theoretical explanation of the universal formulation In this section, we refer to the position of generalization and rationality in Kant’s ethics and discuss the circumstances that a rule requires to become law. 2.2. Application of the universal formula How can we use this formula? Are all rules that pass the generalizability test obligatory or ethical? Is "Whistling in the dark while lonely" a moral behavior because it is generalizable? Our answer is negative. We explain our point of view and prove it by referring to the works of Kant and his commentators. 2.3. Universal formula and consequentialism Shelly Kagan thinks that we can separate Kant and Kantian ethics and then we can speak of Kantian consequentialism. This section will briefly explain and analyze this theory and Kagan’s reasons. In our opinion, Kant is not a consequentialist per se and his formula is not consequential, but with some modifications this theory is tenable. 2.4. Criticisms Two important objections have been made to Kant’s universal formula: a) Generalizability may prohibit items that are not immoral; b) Generalizability may allow things that are immoral. We will examine these two issues. Concerning the first, it seems that these critics do not know the right place to use the formula and also don’t understand Kant’s purpose of constructing this formula. In fact, in this formula Kant intends to help moral people who do not really know the correct option, and he also wants to prevent selfishpeople who want to exempt themselves from fulfillingtheir duties. Concerning the second, it should be said their maxims do not pass the test at all. 3. CONCLUSION The general formula is Kant’s most formal statement of the categorical imperative and provides the moral agent with the generalizability test. The function of this formula is not to put everything into a generalizability test. It has a more general function which, for the most part, is to determine the domain of permissible and impermissible behaviors. Concerning the problem of consequentialism, neither Kant nor this formula has such an attribute but we can establish a Kantian moral system that is consequential. Finally, regarding the two above-mentioned criticisms, both seem to be due to misunderstanding. References - Alasdair Macintyer, A short History of ethics A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, 2nd Edition, Routledge - Kant Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ED and TR: Allen W. Wood, Yale University Press - Kant Immanuel, On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy, TR: Mary Gregor, Cambridge - Onora O neil, Acting On Principle, 2nd Edition, Cambridge - Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, V1, Oxford - Paton, H. J, Categorical imperative, oxford - R. M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford - Robert B. Louden. Applying Kant’s Ethics The Role of Anthropology, A Companion to Kant, ED: Graham Bird, Blackwell - Scott Forschler, Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 44, Nos. 1–2, January 2013, Blackwell - Shelly Kagan, Does Consequentialism Demand too Much, Philosophy & Public Affairs,Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 239-254, Wiley - Shelly Kagan, Kantianism for Consequentialists, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. ED: Allen wood, Yale University Press - Wood. Allen, Kant’s Formulations of the Moral Law, A Companion to Kant, ED: Graham Bird, Blackwell - Wood. Allen, Kantian ethics, Cambridge - Wood. Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge - Wood. Allen, The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals Interpretative essays, ED: Mark Timmons, oxford. (shrink)

This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components (...) and is to be understood as a declarative statement prefaced by an 'ideality operator'. Moral beliefs are genuinely representational, but their truth conditions can only be stated with reference to imaginary ideal worlds. Moral judgments are neither confirmed nor verified, but alternative moral positions are preferentially endorsed and adopted by individual agents on the basis of their perceived all-things-considered optimality. High aspiration moralities are normally very costly to agents in terms of their prudential and aesthetic interests, but they are theoretically as eligible as the adoption of other, less demanding sets of rules. (shrink)