In this article, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism. I argue that sufficientarianism combines three claims: a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges; a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority benefits in that range have. This characterization of sufficientarianism sheds new light on two long-standing philosophical (...) debates, namely about the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and about the common objections to sufficientarianism. (shrink)

Despite the prominence of thresholds and limits in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of their role within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around threshold views in distributive justice. In this thesis, I develop an account of the conceptual structure of such views. Such an account helps understand and characterize threshold views, can subsume what may seem to be different debates about such views under one conceptual header, and can be (...) used to further examine and develop patterns of justice that draw on thresholds. In light of this account, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism which sheds new light on the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and on the common objections to sufficientarianism. Moreover, I examine and defend limitarianism, which is the view that people should not have more than a certain amount of wealth. In particular, I argue in favour of limitarianism as a midlevel principle for guiding institutional design and individual actions and, furthermore, as a specification of what a just allocation of wealth requires under epistemic constraints. (shrink)

Universal health coverage is often implemented within countries through several national insurance schemes that collectively cover their populations. Yet the extent of services and benefits available can vary substantially between different schemes. This paper argues that these variations in coverage comprise tiering and then reviews different accounts of health and social justice that consider whether and when a tiered health system is fair. Using these accounts, it shows that the fairness of tiering can be determined by assessing whether differences in (...) coverage mean enrolees under some national insurance schemes do not achieve sufficient health or normal functioning and/or feel inferior relative to those belonging to other national insurance schemes. The paper further contends that these determinations of fairness should involve the people covered by different insurance schemes. Key universal health coverage questions to involve the public in answering are: Do the sum of differences between the schemes in your country generate feelings of unequal moral worth and/or mean enrolees struggle to achieve sufficient health or normal functioning? Which specific differences between health insurance schemes generate the greatest feelings of unequal moral worth in individuals? Which specific differences generate the greatest barriers to individuals achieving sufficient health or normal functioning? Rather than identifying which services to extend coverage to first, answering these questions will identify which disparities in services and benefits are the most morally urgent to address. Finally, some initial thoughts are offered on who from the public should be involved in making these decisions and how they might be involved as a matter of justice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.