Ageism is the view that it is of greater moral value to allocate health care resources to younger people than to older people. In medical ethics, it is well-known that standard interpretations of distributive principles such as utilitarianism and egalitarianism imply some form of ageism. At times, ethicists argue as if practical complications are the only or main reason for not abiding to ageism. In this article, we argue that inferences to ageism from such distributive principles tend to commit what (...) we call the anticipation-blindness fallacy: A much too narrow focus on life quality benefits of health care treatments inclines us to overlook the importance of life quality benefits of health care safety, that is the mere trust in and expectation of being treated and cared for as one grows old. This is a key omission because health safety has value for a much larger population and for much longer time. Taking health safety into account therefore has important implications as for how ageist we ought to be. (shrink)

Despite the prominence of thresholds and limits in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of their role within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around threshold views in distributive justice. In this thesis, I develop an account of the conceptual structure of such views. Such an account helps understand and characterize threshold views, can subsume what may seem to be different debates about such views under one conceptual header, and can be (...) used to further examine and develop patterns of justice that draw on thresholds. In light of this account, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism which sheds new light on the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and on the common objections to sufficientarianism. Moreover, I examine and defend limitarianism, which is the view that people should not have more than a certain amount of wealth. In particular, I argue in favour of limitarianism as a midlevel principle for guiding institutional design and individual actions and, furthermore, as a specification of what a just allocation of wealth requires under epistemic constraints. (shrink)

Universal health coverage is often implemented within countries through several national insurance schemes that collectively cover their populations. Yet the extent of services and benefits available can vary substantially between different schemes. This paper argues that these variations in coverage comprise tiering and then reviews different accounts of health and social justice that consider whether and when a tiered health system is fair. Using these accounts, it shows that the fairness of tiering can be determined by assessing whether differences in (...) coverage mean enrolees under some national insurance schemes do not achieve sufficient health or normal functioning and/or feel inferior relative to those belonging to other national insurance schemes. The paper further contends that these determinations of fairness should involve the people covered by different insurance schemes. Key universal health coverage questions to involve the public in answering are: Do the sum of differences between the schemes in your country generate feelings of unequal moral worth and/or mean enrolees struggle to achieve sufficient health or normal functioning? Which specific differences between health insurance schemes generate the greatest feelings of unequal moral worth in individuals? Which specific differences generate the greatest barriers to individuals achieving sufficient health or normal functioning? Rather than identifying which services to extend coverage to first, answering these questions will identify which disparities in services and benefits are the most morally urgent to address. Finally, some initial thoughts are offered on who from the public should be involved in making these decisions and how they might be involved as a matter of justice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.