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E. C. Tolman and the intervening variable: A study in the epistemological history of psychology

Ron Amundson

Philosophy of Science 50 (2):268-282 (1983)

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Philosophy of Psychology as Philosophy of Science.Gary Hatfield - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:19 - 23.details This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint.Gary Hatfield - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):388-404.details There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Black box inference: When should intervening variables be postulated?Elliott Sober - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):469-498.details An empirical procedure is suggested for testing a model that postulates variables that intervene between observed causes and abserved effects against a model that includes no such postulate. The procedure is applied to two experiments in psychology. One involves a conditioning regimen that leads to response generalization; the other concerns the question of whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind. Download Export citation Bookmark 22 citations
Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and functional analysis.Ron Amundson & Laurence D. Smith - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):657-666.details Robert Cummins has recently used the program of Clark Hull to illustrate the effects of logical positivist epistemology upon psychological theory. On Cummins's account, Hull's theory is best understood as a functional analysis, rather than a nomological subsumption. Hull's commitment to the logical positivist view of explanation is said to have blinded him to this aspect of this theory, and thus restricted its scope. We will argue that this interpretation of Hull's epistemology, though common, is mistaken. Hull's epistemological views were (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Psychology and epistemology: The place versus response controversy.Ron Amundson - 1985 - Cognition 20 (2):127-153.details Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

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