Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations.Carl F. Craver & Mark Povich - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:31-38.
    In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Abstract Versus Causal Explanations?Reutlinger Alexander & Andersen Holly - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):129-146.
    In the recent literature on causal and non-causal scientific explanations, there is an intuitive assumption according to which an explanation is non-causal by virtue of being abstract. In this context, to be ‘abstract’ means that the explanans in question leaves out many or almost all causal microphysical details of the target system. After motivating this assumption, we argue that the abstractness assumption, in placing the abstract and the causal character of an explanation in tension, is misguided in ways that are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What Would Hume Say? Regularities, Laws, and Mechanisms.Holly Andersen - 2017 - In Phyllis Ilari & Stuart Glennan (eds.), Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanistic Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 157-168.
    This chapter examines the relationship between laws and mechanisms as approaches to characterising generalizations and explanations in science. I give an overview of recent historical discussions where laws failed to satisfy stringent logical criteria, opening the way for mechanisms to be investigated as a way to explain regularities in nature. This followed by a critical discussion of contemporary debates about the role of laws versus mechanisms in describing versus explaining regularities. I conclude by offering new arguments for two roles for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-Causal.M. Chirimuuta - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):849-880.
    This article examines three candidate cases of non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that there are instances of efficient coding explanation that are strongly analogous to examples of non-causal explanation in physics and biology, as presented by Batterman, Woodward, and Lange. By integrating Lange’s and Woodward’s accounts, I offer a new way to elucidate the distinction between causal and non-causal explanation, and to address concerns about the explanatory sufficiency of non-mechanistic models in neuroscience. I also use this framework to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • On What Matters, Volume Three, by Derek Parfit and Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, Edited by Peter Singer.John Skorupski - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):602-611.
    © Mind Association 2018Derek Parfit’s death just before the publication of the third, and now perhaps last, volume of On What Matters makes reviewing it a rather melancholy task. That his death is a serious loss to moral philosophy goes without saying. As for this review, it is sad that there is no longer the possibility of discussing with him the disagreements it raises, or learning from his responses. His ideas and arguments in this volume are as fresh and forceful (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Was Regression to the Mean Really the Solution to Darwin’s Problem with Heredity?: Essay Review of Stigler, Stephen M. 2016. The Seven Pillars of Statistical Wisdom. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. [REVIEW]Adam Krashniak & Ehud Lamm - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy (5):1-10.
    Statistical reasoning is an integral part of modern scientific practice. In The Seven Pillars of Statistical Wisdom Stephen Stigler presents seven core ideas, or pillars, of statistical thinking and the historical developments of each of these pillars, many of which were concurrent with developments in biology. Here we focus on Stigler’s fifth pillar, regression, and his discussion of how regression to the mean came to be thought of as a solution to a challenge for the theory of natural selection. Stigler (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Pragmatist Challenge to Constraint Laws: Marc Lange: Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, Xxii+489 Pp, $74.00 HB.Holly Andersen - 2018 - Metascience 27 (1):19-25.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, by Marc Lange.Holly Andersen - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):593-602.
    Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, by LangeMarc. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xxii + 489.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark