# The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations

*Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*63:31-38 (2017)

**Abstract**

In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation.

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References found in this work BETA

The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation.Craver, Carl F.

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Citations of this work BETA

Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics.Povich, Mark & Craver, Carl F.

Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account.Isaac, Alistair M. C.

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2017-05-26

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