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  1. A Similarity-based Approach Of Kuhn’s No-overlap Principle And Anomalies.Dragoş Bîgu - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):330-338.
    In their book Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen reconstruct Kuhn’s account of conceptual structure and change, based on the dynamic frame model. I argue against their reconstruction of anomalies and of the no-overlap principle and propose a competing model, based on the similarity relation. First, I introduce the concept of psychological distance between objects, and then I show that the conceptual structure of a theory consists of a set of natural families, separated by (...)
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  • Continuity through revolutions: A frame-based account of conceptual change during scientific revolutions.Xiang Chen & Peter Barker - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  • Nomic concepts, frames, and conceptual change.Hanne Andersen & Nancy J. Nersessian - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):241.
    Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published at the beginning of what has come to be known as “the cognitive revolution.” With hindsight one can construct significant parallels between the problems of knowledge, perception, and learning with which Kuhn and cognitive scientists were grappling and between the accounts developed by each. However, by and large Kuhn never utilized the research in cognitive science—especially in cognitive psychology—that we believe would have furthered his own paradigm. This is puzzling since he (...)
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  • Kuhn, incommensurability, and cognitive science.Peter Barker - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (4):433-462.
    : This paper continues my application of theories of concepts developed in cognitive psychology to clarify issues in Kuhn's mature account of scientific change. I argue that incommensurability is typically neither global nor total, and that the corresponding form of scientific change occurs incrementally. Incommensurability can now be seen as a local phenomenon restricted to particular points in a conceptual framework represented by a set of nodes. The unaffected parts in the framework constitute the basis for continued communication between the (...)
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  • Perceptual symbols and taxonomy comparison.Xiang Chen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S200-S212.
    Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural levels. This paper introduces Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols and explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background beliefs. The analogous nature of (...)
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  • Cognition, Meaning and Action: Lodz-Lund Studies in Cognitive Science.Piotr Łukowski, Aleksander Gemel & Bartosz Żukowski (eds.) - 2015 - Kraków, Polska: Lodz University Press & Jagiellonian University Press.
    The book is addressed to all readers interested in cognitive science, and especially in research combining a logical analysis with psychological, linguistic and neurobiological approaches. The publication is the result of a collaboration between the Department of Cognitive Science at University of Lodz and the Department of Cognitive Science at Lund University. It is intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of the key research issues undertaken in both Departments, including considerations on meaning, natural language and reasoning, linguistic as well as (...)
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  • The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its Significance: An Essay Review of the Fiftieth Anniversary Edition. [REVIEW]Alexander Bird - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):859-883.
    Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most cited books of the twentieth century. Its iconic and controversial nature has obscured its message. What did Kuhn really intend with Structure and what is its real significance? -/- 1 Introduction -/- 2 The Central Ideas of Structure -/- 3 The Philosophical Targets of Structure -/- 4 Interpreting and Misinterpreting Structure -/- 4.1 Naturalism -/- 4.2 World-change -/- 4.3 Incommensurability -/- 4.4 Progress and the nature of revolutionary change -/- 4.5 (...)
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  • From Features via Frames to Spaces: Modeling Scientific Conceptual Change Without Incommensurability or Aprioricity.Frank Zenker - 2014 - In T. Gamerschlag, R. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.), Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy. pp. 69-89.
    The frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of (...)
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  • The 'platforms' for comparing incommensurable taxonomies: A cognitive-historical analysis. [REVIEW]Xiang Chen - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):1-22.
    This paper examines taxonomy comparison from a cognitive perspective. Arguments are developed by drawing on the results of cognitive psychology, which reveal the cognitive mechanisms behind the practice of taxonomy comparison. The taxonomic change in 19th-century ornithology is also used to uncover the historical practice that ornithologists employed in the revision of the classification of birds. On the basis of cognitive and historical analyses, I argue that incommensurable taxonomies can be compared rationally. Using a frame model to represent taxonomy, I (...)
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  • A frame-based approach for theoretical concepts.Stephan Kornmesser - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):145-166.
    According to a seminal paper by Barsalou , frames are attribute-value-matrices for representing exemplars or concepts. Frames have been used as a tool for reconstructing scientific concepts as well as conceptual change within scientific revolutions . In the frame-based representations of scientific concepts developed so far the semantic content of concepts is determined by a set of attribute-specific values. This way of representing semantic content works best for prototype concepts and defined concepts of a conceptual taxonomy satisfying the no-overlap principle. (...)
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  • Kuhnian puzzle solving and schema theory.Thomas Nickles - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):255.
    Looking at Thomas Kuhn's work from a cognitive science perspective helps to articulate and to legitimize, to some degree, his rejection of traditional views of concepts, categorization, theory structure, and rule-based problem solving. Whereas my colleagues focus on the later Kuhn of the MIT years, I study the early Kuhn as an anticipation of case-based reasoning and schema theory. These recent developments in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence may point toward a more computational version of Kuhn's ideas, but they also (...)
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  • Analyzing Theories in the Frame Model.Stephan Kornmesser & Gerhard Schurz - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1313-1346.
    The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will (...)
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  • Frames and concepts in the philosophy of science.Stephan Kornmesser - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2):225-251.
    In the philosophy of science, the frame model is used in order to represent and analyze scientific concepts and conceptual change. However, the potential of the frame model is far from being fully exploited: Up to now, the frame model is only applied to a rather small set of different kinds of concepts and important advantages of the frame model for reconstructing and analyzing concepts have been neglected. In this article, we will essentially extend the frame model in the following (...)
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  • Kuhn on essentialism and the causal theory of reference.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):544-564.
    The causal theory of reference is often taken to provide a solution to the problems, such as incomparability and referential discontinuity, that the meaning-change thesis raised. I show that Kuhn successfully questioned the causal theory and Putnam's idea that reference is determined via the sameness relation of essences that holds between a sample and other members of a kind in all possible worlds. Putnam's single ‘essential' properties may be necessary but not sufficient to determine membership in a kind category. Kuhn (...)
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  • Theoretical concepts as goal-derived concepts.Matteo De Benedetto - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 107 (C):82-91.
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  • Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology.Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  • Innovation Systems Approach: a Philosophical Appraisal.Arash Moussavi & Ali Kermanshah - 2018 - Philosophy of Management 17 (1):59-77.
    The innovation systems approach has swiftly spread out worldwide in the last three decades and stood as an important framework for policy-making in the fields of science, technology, and innovation. At the same time, there have been serious and untreated concerns in the literature about the theoretical soundness of this approach. Our discussion in this paper is based on the belief that a detailed analysis on epistemological foundations of the approach could shed a judgmental light on the aforementioned concerns. To (...)
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  • Rereading Kuhn.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):217 – 224.
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  • Closing the door to cloud-cuckoo land: a reply to Šešelja and Straßer.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):328-331.
    Šešelja and Straßer’s critique fails to hit its target for two main reasons. First, the argument is not that Kuhn is a rationalist because he is a coherentist. Although Kuhn can be taken as a rationalist because of his commitment to epistemic values, coherence analysis provides a more comprehensive characterisation of cognitive process in scientific change than any of these values alone can offer. Further, we should understand Kuhn as characterising science as the best form of rationality we have outside (...)
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