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  1. On the logic of common belief and common knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.
    The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...)
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  • Modeling Bounded Rationality.Ariel Rubinstein - 1998 - MIT Press.
    p. cm. — (Zeuthen lecture book series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-262-18187-8 (hardcover : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-262-68100-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Decision-making. 2. Economic man. 3. Game theory. 4. Rational expectations (Economic theory) I. Title. II. Series.
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  • Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs.Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (1):23-50.
    This paper investigates, in a simple risk-sharing framework, the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts could be attributed to the complexity costs associated with the writing and the implementation of contracts. We show that, given any measure of complexity in a very general class, it is possible to find simple contracting problems such that, when complexity costs are explicitly taken into account, the contracting parties optimally choose an incomplete contract which coincides with the ‘default’ division of surplus. Optimal contracts (...)
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  • Undecidability in the imitation game.Y. Sato & T. Ikegami - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (2):133-43.
    This paper considers undecidability in the imitation game, the so-called Turing Test. In the Turing Test, a human, a machine, and an interrogator are the players of the game. In our model of the Turing Test, the machine and the interrogator are formalized as Turing machines, allowing us to derive several impossibility results concerning the capabilities of the interrogator. The key issue is that the validity of the Turing test is not attributed to the capability of human or machine, but (...)
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  • Robust program equilibrium.Caspar Oesterheld - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (1):143-159.
    One approach to achieving cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is Tennenholtz’s (Games Econ Behav 49(2):363–373, 2004) program equilibrium, in which the players of a game submit programs instead of strategies. These programs are then allowed to read each other’s source code to decide which action to take. As shown by Tennenholtz, cooperation is played in an equilibrium of this alternative game. In particular, he proposes that the two players submit the same version of the following program: cooperate if the (...)
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  • Common reasoning in games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
    We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalize common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann, arguing that the former avoids (...)
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