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  1. Mechanisms and functional brain areas.Gregory Johnson - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):255-271.
    Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas participate in mechanisms, then they must engage in (...)
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  • Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
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  • Pain: Modularity and Cognitive Constitution.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Discussions concerning the modularity of the pain system have been focused on questions regarding the cognitive penetrability of pain mechanisms. It has been claimed that phenomena such as placebo analgesia demonstrate that the pain system is cognitively penetrated; therefore, it is not encapsulated from central cognition. However, important arguments have been formulated which aim to show that cognitive penetrability does not in fact entail a lack of modularity of the pain system. This paper offers an alternative way to reject the (...)
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  • More Thumbs Than Rules: Is Rationality an Exaptation?Antonio Mastrogiorgio, Teppo Felin, Stuart Kauffman & Mariano Mastrogiorgio - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism—and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm—that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality—embodied rationality—based on the (...)
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  • Cognitive Recycling.David L. Barack - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):239-268.
    Theories in cognitive science, and especially cognitive neuroscience, often claim that parts of cognitive systems are reused for different cognitive functions. Philosophical analysis of this concept, however, is rare. Here, I first provide a set of criteria for an analysis of reuse, and then I analyse reuse in terms of the functions of subsystems. I also discuss how cognitive systems execute cognitive functions, the relation between learning and reuse, and how to differentiate reuse from related concepts like multi-use, redundancy, and (...)
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  • Functional Independence and Cognitive Architecture.Vincent Bergeron - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):817-836.
    In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from ‘behavioural’ dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and thus viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this article, I propose a notion of functional independence that does not (...)
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  • Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking.Felipe De Brigard - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):155-185.
    Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result (...)
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  • Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):233-253.
    The target article sketched and explored a mechanism (action-oriented predictive processing) most plausibly associated with core forms of cortical processing. In assessing the attractions and pitfalls of the proposal we should keep that element distinct from larger, though interlocking, issues concerning the nature of adaptive organization in general.
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  • Philosophical issues in neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.
    Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including (...)
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  • Massive redeployment, exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations.Michael L. Anderson - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):329 - 345.
    Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the (...)
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  • From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind.Micah Allen & Karl J. Friston - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2459-2482.
    Predictive processing approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered (...)
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  • Evolving Concepts of Functional Localization.Joseph B. McCaffrey - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (5):e12914.
    Functional localization is a central aim of cognitive neuroscience. But the nature and extent of functional localization in the human brain have been subjects of fierce theoretical debate since the 19th Century. In this essay, I first examine how concepts of functional localization have changed over time. I then analyze contemporary challenges to functional localization drawing from research on neural reuse, neural degeneracy, and the context-dependence of neural functions. I explore the consequences of these challenges for topics in philosophy of (...)
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  • The role of the amygdala in the appraising brain.David Sander, Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):161-161.
    Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete emotions. However, thenatureof such psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.
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  • On the neural enrichment of economic models: tractability, trade-offs and multiple levels of description.Roberto Fumagalli - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):617-635.
    In the recent literature at the interface between economics, biology and neuroscience, several authors argue that by adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of decision making, economists will be able to construct predictively and explanatorily superior models. However, most economists remain quite reluctant to import biological or neural insights into their account of choice behaviour. In this paper, I reconstruct and critique one of the main arguments by means of which economists attempt to vindicate their conservative position. Furthermore, I (...)
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  • Text Materialities, Affordances, and the Embodied Turn in the Study of Reading.Terje Hillesund, Theresa Schilhab & Anne Mangen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Digital texts have for decades been a challenge for reading research, creating a range of questions about reading and a need for new theories and concepts. In this paper, we focus on materialities of texts and suggest an embodied, enacted, and extended approach to the research on digital reading. We refer to findings showing that cognitive activities in reading are grounded in bodily and social experiences, and we explore the cognitive role of the body in reading, claiming that–influenced by tacit (...)
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  • Neural Reuse and the Modularity of Mind: Where to Next for Modularity?John Zerilli - 2019 - Biological Theory 14 (1):1-20.
    The leading hypothesis concerning the “reuse” or “recycling” of neural circuits builds on the assumption that evolution might prefer the redeployment of established circuits over the development of new ones. What conception of cognitive architecture can survive the evidence for this hypothesis? In particular, what sorts of “modules” are compatible with this evidence? I argue that the only likely candidates will, in effect, be the columns which Vernon Mountcastle originally hypothesized some 60 years ago, and which form part of the (...)
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  • Transactive memory reconstructed: Rethinking Wegner’s research program.Bryce Huebner - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):48-69.
    In this paper, I argue that recent research on episodic memory supports a limited defense of the phenomena that Daniel Wegner has termed transactive memory. Building on psychological and neurological research, targeting both individual and shared memory, I argue that individuals can collaboratively work to construct shared episodic memories. In some cases, this yields memories that are distributed across multiple individuals instead of being housed in individual brains.
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  • The sleeping brain and the neural basis of emotions.Roumen Kirov, Serge Brand, Vasil Kolev & Juliana Yordanova - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):155-156.
    In addition to active wake, emotions are generated and experienced in a variety of functionally different states such as those of sleep, during which external stimulation and cognitive control are lacking. The neural basis of emotions can be specified by regarding the multitude of emotion-related brain states, as well as the distinct neuro- and psychodynamic stages (generation and regulation) of emotional experience.
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  • Network Modularity as a Foundation for Neural Reuse.Matthew L. Stanley, Bryce Gessell & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):23-46.
    The neural reuse framework developed primarily by Michael Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that methods employed in network (...)
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  • Neural Plasticity, Neuronal Recycling and Niche Construction.Richard Menary - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):286-303.
    In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and constrains what the brain can learn. It is argued that the neural niche co-evolves with the environmental niche in a way that does not undermine (...)
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  • A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):71-88.
    Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive (...)
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  • Modularity in philosophy, the neurosciences, and psychiatry.Jürgen Zielasek & Wolfgang Gaebel - 2008 - Poiesis and Praxis 6 (1-2):93-108.
    The neurosciences are generating new findings regarding genetic and neurobiological aspects of the pathophysiology of mental disorders. Especially, certain genetic risk factors like neuregulin-1 seem to predispose individuals to a psychotic phenotype beyond the limits of traditional classificatory boundaries between organic psychoses in Alzheimer’s disease, bipolar affective disorder and schizophrenia. Little, however, is known about how such genetic risk factors actually confer an increased risk for psychosis in an individual patient. A gap between neuroscientific findings and psychopathological phenomena exists. The (...)
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  • The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: a Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence.Colin Klein - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (2):143-162.
    The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are (...)
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  • Neuroscience findings are consistent with appraisal theories of emotion; but does the brain “respect” constructionism?Klaus R. Scherer - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):163-164.
    I reject Lindquist et al.'s implicit claim that all emotion theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a “brain locationist” approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential appraisal theories. I also question the authors' claim that the meta-analysis they report provides support for thespecificassumptions of constructionist theories.
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  • Integrative Modeling and the Role of Neural Constraints.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):647-685.
    Neuroscience constrains psychology, but stating these constraints with precision is not simple. Here I consider whether mechanistic analysis provides a useful way to integrate models of cognitive and neural structure. Recent evidence suggests that cognitive systems map onto overlapping, distributed networks of brain regions. These highly entangled networks often depart from stereotypical mechanistic behaviors. While this casts doubt on the prospects for classical mechanistic integration of psychology and neuroscience, I argue that it does not impugn a realistic interpretation of either (...)
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  • Philosophical foundations of neuroeconomics: economics and the revolutionary challenge from neuroscience.Roberto Fumagalli - 2011 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines. This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that neuroeconomists can (...)
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  • Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them.Robert Schroer & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):357-387.
    In "Freedom and Resentment," P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other (...)
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  • Screen reading and the creation of new cognitive ecologies.Robert W. Clowes - 2018 - AI and Society 34 (4):705-720.
    It has been widely argued that digital technologies are transforming the nature of reading, and with it, our brains and a wide range of our cognitive capabilities. In this article, we begin by discussing the new analytical category of deep-reading and whether it is really on the decline. We analyse deep reading and its grounding in brain reorganization, based upon Michael Anderson’s Massive Redeployment hypothesis and Dehaene’s Neuronal Recycling which both help us to theorize how the capacities of brains are (...)
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  • Casimir: An Architecture for Mental Spatial Knowledge Processing.Holger Schultheis & Thomas Barkowsky - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (4):778-795.
    Mental spatial knowledge processing often uses spatio-analogical or quasipictorial representation structures such as spatial mental models or mental images. The cognitive architecture Casimir is designed to provide a framework for computationally modeling human spatial knowledge processing relying on these kinds of representation formats. In this article, we present an overview of Casimir and its components. We briefly describe the long-term memory component and the interaction with external diagrammatic representations. Particular emphasis is placed on Casimir’s working memory and control mechanisms. Regarding (...)
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