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Why God is not a semantic realist

In William P. Alston (ed.), Realism & Antirealism. Cornell Up. pp. 131--48 (2002)

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  1. Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem.David Leech Anderson - 2012 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to escape (...)
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