ABSTRACT:The ethics of high frequency trading are obscure, due in part to the complexity of the practice. This article contributes to the existing literature of ethics in financial markets by examining a recent trend in regulation in high frequency trading, the prohibition of deception. We argue that in the financial markets almost any regulation, other than the most basic, tends to create a moral hazard and increase information asymmetry. Since the market’s job is, at least in part, price discovery, we (...) argue that simplicity of regulation and restraint in regulation are virtues to a greater extent than in other areas of finance. This article proposes criteria for determining which high-frequency trading strategies should be regulated. (shrink)

The sale of faster access to financial market data has recently generated public controversy. NY Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has referred to such fast data feeds as “Insider Trading 2.0”. For example, Thomson Reuters sold the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index to computerized trading firms 2 seconds before releasing its data to its other paying clients. This paper explores the ethical issues involved in the sale of such information. Is selling faster access ethically the same as traditional insider trading, (...) which generally involves a breach of fiduciary duty or the use of misappropriated information? Such practices are extremely different from traditional insider trading as there is neither a breach of fiduciary duty nor misappropriation of inside information. The ethical issues are similar to other market segmentation and price discrimination issues, in which different prices are charged to different customers. The ability to price discriminate across segments can actually benefit large segments of the population who may receive lower prices because others, such as the high-speed traders, are paying more. The sale of faster access to information, especially by exchanges, raises additional ethical issues. There may be adverse effects on market quality that must be addressed. The moral distaste for the practice expressed by some stems from the seeming unfairness of a modern market structure that provides advantages to a small group of computerized traders. (shrink)

We develop a framework for assessing security market quality, relating five elements of market design to three metrics of market integrity and two metrics of market efficiency. We empirically implement this integrity–efficiency MQ framework by testing a hypothesis that trade-based ramping manipulation at the close raises execution costs on 24 security markets worldwide. Estimating a simultaneous equations model of ramping incidence, spreads, and the probability of deploying real-time surveillance, we show that quoted bid-ask spreads are positively related to the incidence (...) of MTC across seven liquidity deciles. The magnitude is economically significant; improving market integrity by cutting MTC in half reduces spreads 6–11 %. Allowing direct market access in conjunction with RTS, conducting auctions at the close, and developing regulations that require surveillance, all reduce MTC and thereby lower spreads, assuring better market integrity and enhancing market efficiency. Introducing circuit breakers or prohibiting shorts poses integrity–efficiency tradeoffs. (shrink)

Quantitative analysts or “Quants” are a source of competitive advantage for financial institutions. They occupy the relatively powerful but often misunderstood role of modeling, structuring, and pricing complex financial instruments in the capital markets. But Quants often function in a discipline free from ethical burdens. Models used to price complex instruments are usually beyond the mathematical understanding of financial sector participants who rely heavily on the integrity of the Quant who built them. Although there has been some attempt to cover (...) the ethics of mathematics applied to the capital markets, designing a set of rules to guide the ethical behavior of Quants cannot be made explicit and remains inexpressible. Because Quants generally experience a sense of detachment from moral obligation, there is a growing need to convert moral detachment into engagement. Our framework is indebted to key elements of Wittgenstein’s practical ethics philosophy and Rawls’ justice principle. The burden of balancing justice as fairness as defined by Rawls with the inability to explicitly articulate ethical rules as defined by Wittgenstein must fall to the Quant. We propose that the threshold delineating the barrier between ethical detachment and engagement can only be defined by the Quants themselves. It is their moral duty to disclose their level of ethical engagement when their models are put into practice. (shrink)

AbstractDuring the last 20 years, the financial sector has undergone an unprecedented transformation due to new regulations and the implementation of several technological advancements. The combination of regulation and technology has brought about new financial processes that have fundamentally changed how financial market making is done. This paper studies the ethics of financial market making and its implications for one of the most controversial financial innovations of modern times, namely high-frequency trading (HFT). We claim that the Aristotelian distinction between natural (...) chrematistics, which is aimed at serving the real economy, and unnatural chrematistics, whose ultimate purpose is wealth accumulation, can be a useful criterion to assess the ethics of financial market making and the goodness of an innovation as HFT, and how it can serve the common good of society. This approach can be defined as ‘purpose oriented’ or ‘purpose fulfillment’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFinance may suffer from institutional deformations that subordinate its distinctive goods to the pursuit of external goods, but this should encourage attempts to reform the institutionalization of finance rather than to reject its potential for virtuous business activity. This article argues that finance should be regarded as a domain-relative practice. Alongside management, its moral status thereby varies with the purposes it serves. Hence, when practitioners working in finance facilitate projects that create common goods, it allows them to develop virtues. This (...) argument applies MacIntyre’s widely acknowledged account of the relationship between practices and the development of virtues while questioning some of his claims about finance. It also takes issue with extant accounts of particular financial functions that have failed to identify the distinctive goods of financial practice. (shrink)

This essay examines three potential arguments against high-frequency trading and offers a qualified critique of the practice. In concrete terms, it examines a variant of high-frequency trading that is all about speed—low-latency trading—in light of moral issues surrounding arbitrage, information asymmetries, and systemic risk. The essay focuses on low-latency trading and the role of speed because it also aims to show that the commonly made assumption that speed in financial markets is morally neutral is wrong. For instance, speed is a (...) necessary condition for low-latency trading’s potential to cause harm in “flash crashes.” On the other hand, it also plays a crucial role in a Lockean defense against low-latency trading being wasteful developed in this essay. Finally, this essay discusses the implications of these findings for related high-frequency trading techniques like futures arbitrage or latency arbitrage—as well as for an argument as to why quote stuffing is wrong. Overall, the qualifications offered in this essay act as a counterbalance to overblown claims about trading at high speeds being wrong. (shrink)

Spoofing—placing orders on financial exchanges intending to withdraw them prior to execution—is widely legally prohibited. I argue instead on two main grounds that spoofing should be permitted and legalised. The first is that spoofing as a form of bluffing remains within the market practice of making legally binding offers—as opposed to lying or betraying trust—and primarily concerns the spoofer’s personal information. As a form of bluffing spoofing helps prevent financial speculators, in particular high-frequency algorithmic traders, from easily profiting by other (...) market actors reliably revealing their underlying preferences through their market activity. The second is that at the systemic level permitting spoofing would benefit non-speculative actors who place orders to hedge economic risk and whose activities provide the raison d’être for financial exchanges, differentiating them from simple forums for gambling. I also address potential concerns that legalised spoofing would drive speculators out of financial markets entirely and, therefore, undermine market liquidity. This work contributes to the wider debate in business ethics regarding bluffing by illustrating the acceptability of bluffs which do not betray counterparty trust or reliance on testimony by remaining within the framework of market practices. (shrink)

Prior research suggests brokers do not always act in the best interests of clients, although morally obligated to do so. We empirically investigated this issue focusing on trades executed at best execution price, before and after the introduction of electronic limit-order trading, on the London Stock Exchange. As a result of limit-order trading, the proportion of trades executed at the best execution price for the customer significantly increased. We attribute this to a sustained increase in the liquidity of stocks as (...) a result of limit-order trading, regardless of market capitalisation. We discuss the ethical implications of our findings and conclude that market structures that enhance market competitiveness may help reconcile broker and client interests. (shrink)

Drawing on ethical principles of fairness and integrative social contracts theory, moral obligations of fair dealing exist between the firm and all shareholders. This study investigates empirically whether privileged investors of publicly traded firms engage in legal, but morally questionable, trading that at the expense of non-privileged institutional or atomistic investors. In this context, we define privilege as the access to material, nonpublic earnings surprise information. Our results show that the opportunity for procedural unfairness increases with the presence of privileged (...) investors. However, this procedural unfairness does not appear to lead to distributive unfairness even though the level of abnormal trading also increases with the presence of privileged investors. That is, our findings suggest that other shareholders are in fact better off from an outcome perspective given that the abnormal stock price returns upon the announcement of an earnings surprise are either more positive or less negative when the firm has a high proportion of privileged investors. We extract the important implications of our study for future research on the fairness of capital markets and information asymmetry amongst classes of investors, as well as for public policy. (shrink)