The Middle Included is a systematic exploration of the meanings of logos throughout Aristotle’s work. It claims that the basic meaning is “gathering,” a relation that holds its terms together without isolating them or collapsing one to the other. This meaning also applies to logos in the sense of human language. Aristotle describes how some animals are capable of understanding non-firsthand experience without being able to relay it, while others relay it without understanding. Aygün argues that what distinguishes human language, (...) for Aristotle, is its ability to both understand and relay firsthand and non-firsthand experiences. This ability is key to understanding the human condition: science, history, news media, propaganda, gossip, utopian fiction, and sophistry, as well as philosophy. Ömer Aygün finds Aristotle’s name for this peculiar but crucial human ability of “gathering” both experiences is logos, and this leads to a claim about the specificity of human rationality and language. (shrink)

We present the results of a field study led in 2009 and aiming at a better understanding of the activity of the mosquito control workers of the EID Atlantique in the wetlands of the French Atlantic seaboard (from Morbihan to Gironde). First, we endeavor to characterize their context of work, in ecological terms as well as in social ones. Then, we propose a modelling of their activity, which brings to light in an original way its important social component: their work (...) consists in maintaining, in the areas they take care of, an ecological equilibrium minimizing the proliferation of mosquitos; but it also consists in maintaining a social equilibrium, which aims at the satisfaction of all the users they are dealing with (salt workers, oyster farmers, cattle breeders, members of hunting associations and naturalist associations, hikers, and walkers). (shrink)

Este estudo objetiva analisar o primeiro capítulo do tratado III, 5 [50], Sobre o amor, no qual Plotino discorre acerca do amor entendido como estado da alma (páthos). O amor estado da alma é característico do vivente, ou seja, o composto alma e corpo, e portanto, é o amor do homem no mundo sensível. Apresenta-se sob duas formas, puro e misto. O primeiro é aquele que deseja a beleza, o segundo deseja a beleza e a eternidade. Ao explicar cada uma (...) das formas deste amor, Plotino envereda por temas fundamentais à sua filosofia, tais como o belo, a contemplação, além da própria definição de homem. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, Aristotle gives a definition of the human good, and he does so by means of the “ ergon argument.” I clear the way for a new interpretation of this argument by arguing that Aristotle does not think that the ergon of something is always the proper activity of that thing. Though he has a single concept of an ergon, Aristotle identifies the ergon of an X as an activity in some cases but a product in (...) others, depending on the sort of thing the X is—for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what, I argue, it ought to be: “the best achievement of a human.”. (shrink)

Quand nous lisons un livre passionnant, quand nous passons une bonne soirée avec des amis ou quand nous dégustons des mets raffinés, nous nous trouvons parfois dans un état de plaisir. La notion de plaisir traverse de nombreux champs de recherche en philosophie. Une question centrale reste sans doute celle de sa nature : qu’est-ce donc que le plaisir ? Pour y répondre, une comparaison avec d'autres entités mentales plus familières se révèle fructueuse, et permet de mettre à jour ses (...) spécificités propres. La définition du plaisir doit rendre compte de sa diversité, puisque le plaisir semble toujours se présenter sous des formes multiples : qu'y a-t-il de commun parmi toutes les instances de plaisir ? Par ailleurs, le plaisir semble souvent avoir un objet, ce qui soulève une série de questions : Quel type de chose peut être un objet du plaisir ? Dans quelle mesure l'objet du plaisir constitue-t-il le plaisir lui-même ? Plus généralement, quelle est la nature du lien entre le plaisir et son objet ? Ces questions seront abordées dans la Section 1. Au-delà de ces questions définitionnelles, des questions plus spécifiques se posent concernant la manière dont on peut rendre compte du plaisir dans une optique naturaliste : dans quelle mesure le plaisir est-il une entité qui s’intègre dans une image unifiée du monde dans lequel on vit ? Puisqu'il est généralement entendu que la science manifeste cette ambition unificatrice, comment peut-on rendre compte du plaisir de manière scientifique ? La Section 2 est dédiée à ces questions. Une des principales difficultés rencontrées est que le plaisir ne semble pas neutre. Il paraît plutôt avoir une valeur affective positive, dans un sens qui reste bien sûr à éclaircir. Cette valeur se manifeste d'abord dans le fait que le plaisir est susceptible d'orienter nos actions et réactions : nous sommes typiquement attirés par le plaisir, de la même manière que nous cherchons à éviter la souffrance. C'est l'aspect motivationnel du plaisir. La valeur affective du plaisir semble cependant aller au-delà de son rôle motivationnel, pour donner lieu à des caractéristiques normatives. Non seulement le plaisir motive certaines actions, mais il les justifierait aussi, en fournissant des raisons d'agir qui semblent valides. Plus encore, le plaisir semble bon pour nous, ou nous faire du bien. Il semble donc avoir une valeur prudentielle, en ce qu'il contribuerait à rendre notre vie meilleure. Cela pourrait alors justifier son intégration dans le domaine de la morale. Ces considérations seront l’objet de la Section 3. (shrink)

If the opposition between “action and contemplation” seems characteristic of the history of philosophy, it also sums up Hannah Arendt’s personal history and philosophy – the diagnosis of the theoretician of the political practice on her contemporaries being eloquent. But the author of the Human condition invites us to reverse the conjunction. Arendt breaks up deliberately with philosophical tradition and particularly with Thomas Aquinas by making these terms exclusive and choosing to think either action or contemplation. We would like thus (...) to reflect on the relationship between these two thinkers by examining potential echoes of Summa Theologiae within Arendt’s 1958 essay. (shrink)

The human intellect has the capacity to assimilate the external world to man. This assimilation takes place according to the proper mode of the intellect that has an intentional manner to know. Thus is realized the act of knowing by which man manages to read from within the different realities, according to the etymology of the Latin word intellectus. Yet the intellect is not the only spiritual capacity of man, but there is also the will. The latter has a special (...) role in the act of intellectual knowledge. It is dependent on the action of the intellect, but it also influences the action of the intellect. In the following article I analyze this interdependence, especially the place of desire in the act of knowledge. Thomas Aquinas attributed desire to the will. In which sense can we attribute desire to the intellect as well? (shrink)