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  1. Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Deliberation and pragmatic belief.Brad Armendt - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
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  • The Sure Thing Principle Leads to Instability.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.
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  • Risk and Responsibility in Context.Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Routledge.
    This volume bridges contemporary philosophical conceptions of risk and responsibility and offers an extensive examination of the topic. It shows that risk and responsibility combine in ways that give rise to new philosophical questions and problems. Philosophical interest in the relationship between risk and responsibility continues to rise, due in no small part due to environmental crises, emerging technologies, legal developments, and new medical advances. Despite such interest, scholars are just now working out how to conceive of the links between (...)
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  • Individual Climate Risks at the Bounds of Rationality.Avram Hiller - 2023 - In Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead (eds.), _Risk and Responsibility in Context_. New York: Routledge. pp. 249-271.
    All ordinary decisions involve some risk. If I go outside for a walk, I may trip and injure myself. But if I don’t go for a walk, I slightly increase my chances of cardiovascular disease. Typically, we disregard most small risks. When, for practical purposes, is it appropriate for one to ignore risk? This issue looms large because many activities performed by those in wealthy societies, such as driving a car, in some way risk contributing to climate harms. Are these (...)
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  • Frustration and Delay.Arif Ahmed - manuscript
    A decision problem where Causal Decision Theory (CDT) declines a free $1,000, with the foreseeable effect that the agent is $1,000 poorer, and in no other way better off, than if she had taken the offer.
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  • Escaping the Cycle.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):99-127.
    I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. This decision should lead causalists to a better understanding of what it takes for a decision between some collection of options to count as a subdecision of a decision between a larger collection of options. And with (...)
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  • Act Consequentialism without Free Rides.Preston Greene & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):88-116.
    Consequentialist theories determine rightness solely based on real or expected consequences. Although such theories are popular, they often have difficulty with generalizing intuitions, which demand concern for questions like “What if everybody did that?” Rule consequentialism attempts to incorporate these intuitions by shifting the locus of evaluation from the consequences of acts to those of rules. However, detailed rule-consequentialist theories seem ad hoc or arbitrary compared to act consequentialist ones. We claim that generalizing can be better incorporated into consequentialism by (...)
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  • How to Save Pascal (and Ourselves) From the Mugger.Avram Hiller & Ali Hasan - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-17.
    In this article, we re-examine Pascal’s Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal’s Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there (...)
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  • Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist.Melissa Fusco - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I respond to a dilemma for Causal Decision Theory (CDT) under determinism, posed in Adam Elga's paper “Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist”. The treatment I present highlights (i) the status of laws as predictors, and (ii) the consequences of decision dependence, which arises natively out of Jeffrey Conditioning and CDT's characteristic equation.My argument leverages decision dependence to work around a key assumption of Elga's proof: to wit, that in the two problems he presents, the CDTer must employ subjunctive-suppositional (rather (...)
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  • A plan-based causal decision theory.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):264-272.
    In ‘An argument against causal decision theory’, Jack Spencer shows that standard formulations of causal decision theory run afoul of his Guaranteed Principle. In the sequential choice problem he employs to make this case, the transgression stems from an awkward discrepancy between how causalists typically value present vs future acts. This note suggests a version of causal decision theory that avoids this incongruity and so respects the Guaranteed Principle in Spencer’s problem. However, this formulation, and hence symmetric appraisal of present (...)
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  • Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.
    Epistemologists routinely distinguish between two kinds of justification or rationality – the propositional and the doxastic kind – in order to characterize importantly different ways in which an attitude can be justified or rational for a person. I argue that these notions, as they are commonly understood, are well suited to capture rationality judgments about the attitudes that agents reach as conclusions of their reasoning. Yet, these notions are ill-suited to capture rationality judgments about attitudes that agents form while their (...)
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  • Structural Stability in Causal Decision Theory.Simon M. Huttegger & Greg Lauro - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):603-621.
    There are decision problems in which rational deliberation fails to result in choosing a pure act. This phenomenon is known as decision instability and has been discussed in the literature on causal decision theory. In this paper we investigate another type of instability, called structural instability in dynamical systems theory. Structural instability indicates that certain qualitative features of the process of rational deliberation are under-determined in a decision situation. We illustrate some of the issues arising from structural instability with a (...)
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  • Structural Stability in Causal Decision Theory.Greg Lauro & Simon M. Huttegger - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):603-621.
    There are decision problems in which rational deliberation fails to result in choosing a pure act. This phenomenon is known as decision instability and has been discussed in the literature on causal decision theory. In this paper we investigate another type of instability, called structural instability in dynamical systems theory. Structural instability indicates that certain qualitative features of the process of rational deliberation are under-determined in a decision situation. We illustrate some of the issues arising from structural instability with a (...)
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  • Evidence, Causality, and Sequential Choice.Gerard Rothfus - forthcoming - Theory and Decision.
    Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.
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  • Reconciling Evidential and Causal Decision Theory.Simon Huttegger & Simon M. Huttegger - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.
    In this paper I study dynamical models of rational deliberation within the context of Newcomb's problem. Such models have been used to argue against the soundness of the "tickle'" defense of evidential decision theory, which is based on the idea that sophisticated decision makers can break correlations between states and acts by introspecting their own beliefs and desires. If correct, this would show that evidential decision theory agrees with the recommendations of causal decision theory. I argue that an adequate understanding (...)
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