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On Risk and Rationality

Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-9 (2014)

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  1. (2 other versions)Hope as a Source of Grit.Catherine Rioux - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (33):264-287.
    Psychologists and philosophers have argued that the capacity for perseverance or “grit” depends both on willpower and on a kind of epistemic resilience. But can a form of hopefulness in one’s future success also constitute a source of grit? I argue that substantial practical hopefulness, as a hope to bring about a desired outcome through exercises of one’s agency, can serve as a distinctive ground for the capacity for perseverance. Gritty agents’ “practical hope” centrally involves an attention-fuelled, risk-inclined weighting of (...)
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  • How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orii Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.
    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true, its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but (...)
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  • Risky business.Alan Hájek - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):189-205.
    Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 189-205, December 2021.
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  • On the Offense against Fanaticism.Christopher Bottomley & Timothy Luke Williamson - 2024 - Ethics 135 (2):320-332.
    Fanatics claim that we must give up guaranteed goods in pursuit of extremely improbable Utopia. Recently, Wilkinson has defended Fanaticism by arguing that nonfanatics must violate at least one plausible rational requirement. We reject Fanaticism. We show that by taking stakes-sensitive risk attitudes seriously, we can resist the core premises in Wilkinson’s argument.
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  • Risk and Rationality, by Buchak, Lara: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xii + 256, £40. [REVIEW]John Collins - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):825-828.
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