Cet article défend une définition de l’exploitation, restreinte aux relations de travail, en tentant d’une part d’expliciter une certaine compréhension de sens commun du concept (rémunération inéquitable en fonction du travail presté), et d’autre part d’échapper aux difficultés qui ont affecté la définition marxiste traditionnelle de l’exploitation comme extorsion de la plus-value (dans ses diverses variantes). Il explore ainsi le lien entre l’exploitation et l’obligation matérielle de travailler pour subvenir à ses besoins fondamentaux. Après avoir mis en garde contre les (...) politiques d’activation des chômeurs, il conclut que l’exploitation est un phénomène contre lequel on peut lutter à l’aide de mécanismes relativement simples, même dans les sociétés capitalistes. Il rappelle toutefois que cela ne suffit pas à réaliser la justice sociale, resituant l’exploitation parmi d’autres enjeux fondamentaux pour une philosophie politique égalitariste. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that exploitation is unjust; some think it is part of the very meaning of the word 'exploitation' that it is unjust. Those who think this will suppose that the just society has to be one in which people do not exploit one another, at least on a large scale. I will argue that exploitation is not unjust by definition, and that a society (such as Our own) might be fundamentally just while nevertheless being pervasively exploitative. I (...) do think that exploitation is nearly always a bad thing, and will try to identify the moral belief which makes most of us think it is. But I will argue that its badness does not always consist in its being unjust. (shrink)

Research Articles Matt Zwolinski, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

Gerald A. Cohen, in ?The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation?, argues that, contrary to the traditional assumption, Marx's charge of exploitation against capitalism does not require the labor theory of value. However, there is a related but simpler basis for the charge. Hence Marx's criticism can stand even if the labor theory of value falls. Furthermore, he argues that the labor theory of value is false. It is argued here that Cohen is mistaken; the charge Marx (...) makes against capitalism does require the labor theory of value. Cohen's conception of exploitation is weaker than Marx's both theoretically and morally. It is also argued that Cohen's criticisms of the labor theory of value rest on misunderstandings of the theory and Marx's methodology. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the usage of Albert Hirschman’s categories of market behaviour as of exit and voice in debates about workplace democracy by taking seriously his critique of the neoclassical analysis of competition. Pro-market liberals are generally hostile to the idea of workplace democracy and tend to favour top-down hierarchies as a way of organising labour. This hostility is generally inspired by the neoclassical analysis of exploitation and efficiency, which leads them to defend distributions achieved through exit-based competitive equilibria. Following (...) Hirschman, I propose to consider a hypothetical alternative: a democratic equilibrium, reached through the use of voice. I show that it would present the same appealing characteristics than its competitive counterpart while also accounting for the non-ideal conditions in which markets operate. Support for free markets should entail support for workplace democracy minimally understood as a strengthening of voice. (shrink)

This paper reviews the recent literature on exploitation. It distinguishes between three main species of exploitation theory: teleology-based accounts, respect-based accounts, and freedom-based accounts. It then addresses the implications of each.

In Exploitation: What It Is and Why It's Wrong (2003), I argued that the major non‐Marxist “ethically thick” approaches to exploitation were not successful in capturing what we find morally objectionable in paradigmatic cases of exploitation. My argument there focused on the consequentialist account of exploitation defended by Robert Goodin. Here I revisit the question of whether the recent multi‐level act consequentialist account of exploitation defended by Richard Arneson is successful. I raise questions about the nature of the account, and (...) conclude that it is a possibly coherent and ultimately inadequate account of the wrongness of exploitation. (shrink)

Are socialists best regarded as those who are most truly and consistently committed to democracy, under modern industrial conditions? Is the underlying issue that divides liberals from socialists the degree of their wholeheartedness in affirming the ideal of a democratic society? On the liberal side, Friedrich Hayek has remarked: “It is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible that a democracy governs with a total lack of liberalism. My personal preference is for (...) a liberal dictator and not for a democratic government lacking in liberalism.” No doubt many socialists would wish to quibble with Hayek's free-market oriented conception of liberalism. But I am wondering whether the conceptual map implicit in Hayek's remark is apt. Hayek appears to assume that there are two independent lines of division, one marking greater and lesser commitment to liberal values, the other marking greater and lesser commitment to democratic procedures. According to the conception of socialism as democracy that I wish to examine, a better picture of the political landscape would show one line of division with gradations indicating greater and lesser commitment to democracy. On this continuum, socialists are located at the extreme pro-democratic end, those who favor autocracy at the other end, and liberals somewhere in the middle. The analyst who finds this latter conceptual picture the more illuminating of the two will say that Hayek reveals his rejection of socialism by being less than wholehearted in his support of democracy. (shrink)

Philosophical inquiry into exploitation has two major deficiencies to date: it assumes that exploitation is wrong by definition; and it pays too much attention to the Marxian account of exploitation. Two senses of exploitation should be distinguished: the 'moral' or pejorative sense and the 'non-moral' or 'non-prejudicial' sense. By demonstrating the conceptual inadequacy of exploitation as defined in the first sense, and by defining exploitation adequately in the latter sense, we seek to demonstrate the moral complexity of exploitation. We contend, (...) moreover, that moral evaluation of exploitation is only possible once we abandon a strictly Marxian framework and attempt, in the long run, to develop an integral ethic along Godwinian lines. (shrink)

Wearable robots and exoskeletons are relatively new technologies designed for assisting and augmenting human motor functions. Due to their different possible design applications and their intimate connection to the human body, they come with specific ethical, legal, and social issues, which have not been much explored in the recent ELS literature. This paper draws on expert consultations and a literature review to provide a taxonomy of the most important ethical, legal, and social issues of wearable robots. These issues are categorized (...) in wearable robots and the self, wearable robots and the other, and wearable robots in society. (shrink)

On Catharine MacKinnon’s view, feminism aspires to be a theory of the kind that Marxism is: a theory of the organisation of the social world as sex hierarchy, just as Marxism is a theory of the organisation of the social world as class hierarchy. In 1982, MacKinnon observed that feminism was not yet such a theory, and set out to make it one. She did this by developing a theory of sexuality as to feminism what work is to Marxism. If (...) one shares MacKinnon’s view that feminism aspires to be a theory of the kind that Marxism is, then one sees MacKinnon as, with her theory of sexuality, creating, albeit in beginning form, a feminist theory. One thus considers MacKinnon’s theory of sexuality a definitive moment in the history of feminist theory. Yet, for all its importance, no one, neither critics nor proponents, has analysed this theory on its own terms. It is therefore not clear whether MacKinnon’s theory of sexuality succeeds, and so whether feminism is yet a theory of the kind that Marxism is. In the spirit of progressing MacKinnon’s project, in this paper, I return to her theory and consider whether it succeeds. (shrink)

:This paper explores the foundations of the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour. The key intuitions behind all of the main approaches to UEL exploitation are explicitly analysed as a series of formal axioms in a general economic environment. Then, a single domain condition calledLabour Exploitationis formulated, which summarizes the foundations of UEL exploitation theory, defines the basic domain of all UEL exploitation forms, and identifies the formal and theoretical framework for the analysis of the appropriate definition (...) of exploitation. (shrink)

The law of contracts, at least in its orthodox expression, concerns voluntary, or chosen, legal obligations. When Brody accepts Susan’s offer to sell him a canoe for a set price, the parties’ choices alter their legal rights and duties. Their success at changing the legal landscape depends on a background system of rules that specify when and how contractual acts have legal effects, rules that give the offer and acceptance of a bargain-exchange a central role in generating obligations. Contract law (...) conceived as a body of rules empowering individuals to shape their own rights and responsibilities presents an object of philosophical study. The philosophy of contract includes two broad sets of projects. One set, the focus of the first part of this entry, targets the basic structure and normative justification of the law of contracts. The aim is to subsume a salient body of contract law rules under general principles in order to clarify contract law’s conceptual categories, distinguish it from other areas of law, and specify criteria relevant to its normative appraisal. This kind of philosophical work presupposes detailed knowledge of the law in existing legal regimes, and the entry begins by outlining the common law of contracts. A second set of projects draws on resources from the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy to address debates within contract law. Questions about the nature of meaning and interpretation, intentionality, freedom in contract, and distributive justice drive contemporary legal debates concerning contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. Philosophical work on these topics has attracted significant commentary which serves as the focus of the second part of this entry. (shrink)

La présente contribution interroge le rapport de la théorie de Marx aux problématiques en termes de justice sociale. Nous proposons une interprétation selon laquelle une théorie de la justice en soi est inutile car idéaliste. Nous la confrontons à une lecture qui implique qu’une critique du capitalisme fondée sur des critères de justice est nécessaire afin d’éviter l’écueil économiste niant l’individualité. Classification JEL : A13, B49, B51, D63.

This article addresses the problem of filling in a missing component of David Miller's non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice, as elaborated in his recent National responsibility and global justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Miller originally included non-exploitation as one of the norms of global justice, but he does not provide a theory of exploitation in his recent book. This article is a preliminary attempt to suggest how Miller might fill in this gap. This article identifies the problems Miller faces (...) in coming up with a theory of exploitation, given the limits imposed by the other parts of his theory of global justice. It examines and criticises several possible theories of exploitation that Miller might use. Finally, it argues that a modified version of Hillel Steiner's liberal theory of exploitation fits into Miller's overall theory of global justice. (shrink)

Recently, business organizations have increasingly turned to a novel form of non-monetary incentives—that is, “gamification,” which refers to a motivation technique using video game elements, such as digital points, badges, and friendly competition in non-game contexts like workplaces. The introduction of gamification to the context of human resource management has immediately become embroiled in serious moral debates. Most notable is the accusation that using gamification as a motivation tool, employers exploit workers. This article offers an in-depth analysis of the moral (...) charge of exploitation. This article maintains that there are no clear grounds for believing that gamification of labor is exploitative and that if gamification of labor involves a wrong or vice, it must be something other than exploitation. (shrink)

Is restructuring an underhanded way to make the rich richer and the poor poorer? Or is it necessary, although bitter, medicine for an ailing economy? In The Ethics of the New Economy: Restructuring and Beyond, professionals from the fields of philosophy, ethics, management, as well as those representing the groups affected by restructuring, tackle thorny ethical issues. Referring to concrete case studies, these timely essays discuss a variety of topics, including justified and unjustified restructuring; employers’ obligations during the restructuring process; (...) equity issues; the rise of part-time employment; the effects of restructuring on communities; the internal risks faced by restructuring corporations; deprofessionalization in health care; the consequences of restructuring in the developing world; philanthropy and cause-related marketing; corporate “judo” and restructuring; and responsible and irresponsible restructuring. (shrink)