When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant's future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I (...) present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counterarguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant's life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view. (shrink)

Withdrawal of artificially delivered nutrition and hydration (ANH) from patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) requires judicial approval in England and Wales, even when families and healthcare professionals agree that withdrawal is in the patient9s best interests. Part of the rationale underpinning the original recommendation for such court approval was the reassurance of patients’ families, but there has been no research as to whether or not family members are reassured by the requirement for court proceedings or how they experience (...) the process. The research reported here draws on in-depth narrative interviews with 10 family members (from five different families) of PVS patients who have been the subject of court proceedings for ANH-withdrawal. We analyse the empirical evidence to understand how family members perceive and experience the process of applying to the courts for ANH-withdrawal and consider the ethical and practice implications of our findings. Our analysis of family experience supports arguments grounded in economic and legal analysis that court approval should no longer be required. We conclude with some suggestions for how we might develop other more efficient, just and humane mechanisms for reviewing best interests decisions about ANH-withdrawal from these patients. (shrink)

With few exceptions, the literature on withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment considers the bare fact of withdrawing or withholding to lack any ethical significance. If anything, the professional guidelines on this matter are even more uniform. However, while no small degree of progress has been made toward persuading healthcare professionals to withhold treatments that are unlikely to provide significant benefit, it is clear that a certain level of ambivalence remains with regard to withdrawing treatment. Given that the absence of clinical (...) benefit means treating patients is not only ethically questionable but also taxing on resources that could meet the needs of others, this ambivalence is troubling. Equally, the enduring ambivalence of professionals might be taken to indicate that the issue warrants further attention. In this paper, we review the academic literature on the ethical equivalence of withdrawing and withholding medical treatment. While we are not in outright disagreement with the arguments presented, we suggest that asserting theoretical and decontextualized claims about the ethical equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment does not fully illuminate the moral questions associated with the relevant clinical realities. We argue that what is required is a broader perspective, one rooted in an understanding that withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment are different practices, the meanings of which are fully comprehensible only through an appreciation of their place within the practice of healthcare more generally. Such an account suggests that if one is to engage with the inappropriate protraction of life-saving treatment resulting from healthcare professionals’ disinclination to withdraw it, then the differences between these practices should be taken seriously. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEntscheidungen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende sind häufig komplex und von ethischen Problemen begleitet. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht die entscheidende Frage, wie hilfreich existierende „Ethik-Richtlinien“, die eine ethische Orientierung bei solchen Entscheidungen geben sollen, in der klinischen Praxis tatsächlich sind. Die Frage, welchen Nutzen „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei der Entscheidungsfindung haben oder haben können, wird hier exemplarisch an einem klinischen Fallbeispiel aus einer Ethik-Kooperationsstudie in der Intensivmedizin analysiert. Vergleichend werden hierzu „Ethik-Richtlinien“ aus Deutschland, der Schweiz und aus Großbritannien (...) herangezogen, die Gegenstand eines internationalen Projekts zur Analyse von Richtlinien waren. Die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer ethischen Orientierung an „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei Entscheidungsproblemen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende werden anhand der Fallstudie diskutiert und illustriert. Abschließend werden Schlussfolgerungen für die Entwicklung ethischer Richtlinien für die klinische Praxis formuliert. (shrink)

Entscheidungen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende sind häufig komplex und von ethischen Problemen begleitet. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht die entscheidende Frage, wie hilfreich existierende „Ethik-Richtlinien“, die eine ethische Orientierung bei solchen Entscheidungen geben sollen, in der klinischen Praxis tatsächlich sind. Die Frage, welchen Nutzen „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei der Entscheidungsfindung haben oder haben können, wird hier exemplarisch an einem klinischen Fallbeispiel aus einer Ethik-Kooperationsstudie in der Intensivmedizin analysiert. Vergleichend werden hierzu „Ethik-Richtlinien“ aus Deutschland, der Schweiz und aus Großbritannien (...) herangezogen, die Gegenstand eines internationalen Projekts zur Analyse von Richtlinien waren. Die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer ethischen Orientierung an „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei Entscheidungsproblemen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende werden anhand der Fallstudie diskutiert und illustriert. Abschließend werden Schlussfolgerungen für die Entwicklung ethischer Richtlinien für die klinische Praxis formuliert. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider three arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect in end-of-life decision making. The third argument is our own and, to that extent, we seek to defend it. The first argument is that end-of-life decisions do not in fact shorten lives and that therefore there is no need for the doctrine in justification of these decisions. We reject this argument; some end-of-life decisions clearly shorten lives. The second is that the doctrine of double (...) effect is not recognized in UK law ; therefore, clinicians cannot use it as the basis for justification of their decisions. Against this we suggest that while the doctrine might have dubious legal grounds, it could be of relevance in some ways, e.g. in marking the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable practice in relation to the clinician's duty to relieve pain and suffering. The third is that the doctrine is irrelevant because it requires there to be a bad effect that needs justification. This is not the case in end-of-life care for patients diagnosed as dying. Here, bringing about a satisfactory dying process for a patient is a good effect, not a bad one. What matters is that patients die without pain and suffering. This marks a crucial departure from the double-effect doctrine; if the patient's death is not a bad effect then the doctrine is clearly irrelevant. A diagnosis of dying allows clinicians to focus on good dying and not to worry about whether their intervention affects the time of death. For a patient diagnosed as dying, time of death is rarely important. In our conclusion we suggest that acceptance of our argument might be problematic for opponents of physician-assisted death. We suggest one way in which these opponents might argue for a distinction between such practice and palliative care; this relies on the double-effect doctrine's distinction between foresight and intention. (shrink)

Background Post-September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has labeled thousands of Afghan war detainees "unlawful combatants". This label effectively deprives these detainees of the protection they would receive as "prisoners of war" under international humanitarian law. Reports have emerged that indicate that thousands of detainees being held in secret military facilities outside the United States are being subjected to questionable "stress and duress" interrogation tactics by U.S. authorities. If true, American military physicians could be inadvertently becoming complicit in detainee abuse. (...) Moreover, the American government's openly negative views towards such detainees could result in military physicians not wanting to provide reasonable care to detainees, despite it being their ethical duty to do so. Discussion This paper assesses the physician's obligations to treat war detainees in the light of relevant instruments of international humanitarian law and medical ethics. It briefly outlines how detainee abuse flourished in apartheid South Africa when state physicians became morally detached from the interests of their detainee patients. I caution U.S physicians not to let the same mindset befall them. I urge the U.S. medical community to advocate for detainee rights in the U.S, regardless of the political culture the detainee emerged from. I offer recommendations to U.S physicians facing dual loyalty conflicts of interest in the "war on terror". Summary If U.S. physicians are faced with a conflict of interest between following national policies or international principles of humanitarian law and medical ethics, they should opt to adhere to the latter when treating war detainees. It is important for the U.S. medical community to speak out against possible detainee abuse by the U.S. government. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the ruling inY[2018], the UK Supreme Court has confirmed that there is no general requirement for the courts in England and Wales to authorise the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The perceived requirement, which originated in a court ruling in 1993, encompassed those in the vegetative state and those in the minimally conscious state. The ruling inYconfirms that the court may still be approached to decide difficult or contested cases, but (...) there is otherwise no routine requirement that the judges be approached.Main bodyThere is much to welcome in this ruling, particularly as it means that these decisions for these patients are no longer (unusually) singled out for a judicial decision, with all the financial and emotional costs that court proceedings can entail. However, there is also a risk that the ruling might have unwelcome consequences. First, there is the possibility that patients might die too soon, particularly if doctors should now adopt the courts’ previous reasoning, which has suggested that patients in the vegetative state lack interests, so treatment may – perhaps must – be withdrawn. Secondly, there is the converse possibility that patients might live too long, since empirical research suggests that – whether intentionally or not – patients’ families, clinicians, and the health system appear to promote treatment-by-default.ConclusionRather than adopt general positions, which may be contestable and potentially risky, this article argues, on a pluralistic basis, that the individual patient should be the focus of any decision made in his or her ‘best interests’. The existing legal framework in England and Wales, which is provided by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, already points in this direction, although more efforts may be needed to ensure that those involved in making these decisions are suitably educated and supported. Fortunately, new guidance from the British Medical Association could help clinicians and families to make decisions in the future, which are appropriate for the incapacitated individual patient in question. (shrink)

Das belgische Parlament verabschiedete am 28. Mai 2002 das Euthanasiegesetz. Hierdurch wurden die verschiedenen Pflegeeinrichtungen mit einem neuen rechtlichen Rahmen konfrontiert. Das neue Gesetz lässt Euthanasie unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen zu. Dieser Beitrag möchte einige Orientierungspunkte für einen vertretbaren Umgang mit dem Euthanasiegesetz in katholischen Pflegeeinrichtungen liefern. Als Ausgangspunkt hierfür gilt der Grundsatz, dass alles Mögliche getan werden muss, um dem Sterbenden und seiner Umgebung den nötigen Beistand und die bestmögliche Betreuung zu geben und seinem Verlangen nach einem menschenwürdigen Lebensende entgegenzukommen. (...) Wird um Euthanasie gebeten, so entscheiden sich die katholischen Pflegeeinrichtungen Belgiens für die palliative Filterprozedur. Bevor hier die Konturen einer solchen Sorge für ein menschenwürdiges Lebensende umrissen werden, werden zunächst einige fundamentale Annahmen zum Menschsein und dem Wert der Autonomie inhaltlich beleuchtet. Der Autor stützt sich hierfür auf eine relationale Auffassung der Person, wie diese innerhalb der personalistischen Strömungen der Ethik entwickelt wird. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDas belgische Parlament verabschiedete am 28. Mai 2002 das Euthanasiegesetz. Hierdurch wurden die verschiedenen Pflegeeinrichtungen mit einem neuen rechtlichen Rahmen konfrontiert. Das neue Gesetz lässt Euthanasie unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen zu. Dieser Beitrag möchte einige Orientierungspunkte für einen vertretbaren Umgang mit dem Euthanasiegesetz in katholischen Pflegeeinrichtungen liefern. Als Ausgangspunkt hierfür gilt der Grundsatz, dass alles Mögliche getan werden muss, um dem Sterbenden und seiner Umgebung den nötigen Beistand und die bestmögliche Betreuung zu geben und seinem Verlangen nach einem menschenwürdigen Lebensende entgegenzukommen. (...) Wird um Euthanasie gebeten, so entscheiden sich die katholischen Pflegeeinrichtungen Belgiens für die palliative Filterprozedur. Bevor hier die Konturen einer solchen Sorge für ein menschenwürdiges Lebensende umrissen werden, werden zunächst einige fundamentale Annahmen zum Menschsein und dem Wert der Autonomie inhaltlich beleuchtet. Der Autor stützt sich hierfür auf eine relationale Auffassung der Person, wie diese innerhalb der personalistischen Strömungen der Ethik entwickelt wird. (shrink)

The researcher believes that James Rachels’s defense of active euthanasia deserves a critical and normative analysis because of its dehumanizing consequences. The researcher demonstrates that Rachels’s position is conceptually, theoretically, practically, and normatively unjustifiable. The researcher supports his position by three steps.

Recent bioethical issues that have emerged in the field of medicine include, but are not limited to, eugenics, palliative care, euthanasia, abortion, and the development of enhanced human body parts. These bioethical issues have raised ethical questions related to the use of modern technology and how it may affect the future of society. These questions consider issues such as: what is the identity of future children? Have human beings become a commodity exchanged by those who have the ability to own (...) them? What is the meaning of justice in medical treatment? How can physicians and nurses perform humanitarian work? Discussions of these questions should begin by determining their relationships with typical social and cultural values in society, such as life and death, marriage, family, fatherhood, motherhood, relatives, and next-of-kin. This paper presents a review of the important Arabic literature that has been written on these bioethical issues to show the contributions of Arab scholars in this field. Arabic studies in bioethics can be classified into three types: original Arabic writings, translated studies, and congresses held in the Arab region. (shrink)

There are numerous and varied pathologies that can lead to a state of terminal illness, provoking numerous bioethical dilemmas that are inherent and specific to each circumstance. The objective of the present work has been to provide a current and useful analysis that can help to understand the main bioethical problems, from the perspective of biolaw that must be solved in the inevitable path towards the end of life that any terminal illness implies. The methodology used included a study of (...) bibliographic documentation in the main databases of interest in bioethics. It can be concluded that the biolaw is a very useful tool that helps health care professionals and relatives when it comes to the analysis and decision making regarding a terminal illness. Independently of medical practice based on protocols and scientific knowledge, it is necessary to ensure that not everything that can legally be carried out is accepted in the field of biolaw. (shrink)