Social dilemmas, in which individually selfish behavior leads to collectively deficient outcomes, continue to be an important topic of research because of their ubiquity. The present research with Japanese participants replicates, with slight modifications, public goods games previously run in the United States. In contrast to recent work showing profound cross-cultural differences, the results of two studies reported here show remarkable cross-cultural similarities. Specifically, results suggest that (1) as in the U.S., allowing incremental commitment to a public good is effective (...) at eliciting contributions, (2) individual differences in trust affect contributions, (3) the distribution of player types in the U.S. and Japan are very similar, and (4) the dynamics of play in the public goods games used here are strikingly parallel. These results are discussed in the context of the relationship between cross-cultural differences and economic institutional environments. (shrink)

This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's (...) theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed. (shrink)

Trust is an important phenomenon to reduce organisational complexity and uncertainty. In the literature many types of trust are distinguished. An important framework to understand the variety and development of trust in organisations is provided by Zucker. She distinguishes three types of trust: process-based trust.

Although serotonin, testosterone, and genes contribute to sociopathy, the relationships are probably indirect and subject to modifiers (e.g., present only under certain conditions of rearing and temperament). Age at menarche may be a marker variable as well as a causal factor. Since the genders differ in all four areas, sex differences in sociopathy represent a very complex interaction of these factors.

Mealey's work has several interesting implications: It refutes the charge that sociobiology paints a cynical portrait of human nature and adopts a one-sided reductionism; it exemplifies a general theoretical scheme for constructing evolutionary biopsychosocial models of human behavior; and it has the practical effect of promoting and informing early intervention in children at risk for psychopathic disorder.

In the evolutionary approach to the repeated prisoner's dilemma, strategies spread in populations of emulating and experimenting agents through the principle of survival of the fittest. Although no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in such populations, the processes of differential strategy propagation provide a promising area of study. This paper employs computer simulations to uncover how these processes govern the oscillating and open-ended evolution of alternative forms of behaviour. Certain `ecological' relationships between important strategy types which are found to be (...) responsible for these behavioural shifts are explored. (shrink)

The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.

Alliances and other forms of cooperation between firms often promise great benefits, for example, by the exchange of knowledge or co-specialization of resources. At the same time, the necessary actions to realize these benefits can augment vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour of partners. In addition to formal contracts to mitigate the resulting behavioural uncertainties, often, mechanisms, such as reputation or ethical values, are suggested as important supplements. However, when it comes to assessment of a specific cooperation opportunity, it is difficult to (...) account systematically for the economic consequences of these 'softer factors'. Therefore, this paper aims to surpass mere financial analysis of chance and risk and to integrate systematically both reputation and ethical values into an economic assessment of cooperative relationships. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical framework that is based on a simple-decision model to account for reputation and ethical values of potential partners as drivers of behavioural uncertainty reduction. We also discuss how this framework can be used to assess cooperative relationships and illustrate these ideas with reference to the inter-organizational accounting practices of a large drugstore chain and its suppliers. (shrink)

Alliances and other forms of cooperation between firms often promise great benefits, for example, by the exchange of knowledge or co‐specialization of resources. At the same time, the necessary actions to realize these benefits can augment vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour of partners. In addition to formal contracts to mitigate the resulting behavioural uncertainties, often, mechanisms, such as reputation or ethical values, are suggested as important supplements. However, when it comes to assessment of a specific cooperation opportunity, it is difficult to (...) account systematically for the economic consequences of these ‘softer factors’. Therefore, this paper aims to surpass mere financial analysis of chance and risk and to integrate systematically both reputation and ethical values into an economic assessment of cooperative relationships. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical framework that is based on a simple‐decision model to account for reputation and ethical values of potential partners as drivers of behavioural uncertainty reduction. We also discuss how this framework can be used to assess cooperative relationships and illustrate these ideas with reference to the inter‐organizational accounting practices of a large drugstore chain and its suppliers. (shrink)

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they (...) serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. (shrink)

To make regulation more responsive to the public interest, Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite recommend improved administrative techniques, such as enforcement pyramids, to improve industry compliance; and they advocate vesting public interest groups with regulatory powers, so as to reduce regulatory capture by industry. Their arguments, while suggestive, do not take seriously enough the subtle and multifarious influences of interest groups. Consequently, the authors’ recommendations are not likely to improve regulation's responsiveness to the general welfare.

(1995). Selection of organization at the social level: Obstacles and facilitators of metasystem transitions. World Futures: Vol. 45, The Quantum of Evolution, pp. 181-212.

What I call "strategic injustice" involves a set of formal and informal regulatory rules and conventions that often lead to grossly unfair outcomes for a class of individuals despite their resistance. My goal in this paper is to provide the necessary conditions for such injustices and for eliminating their instances from our social practices. To do so, I follow Peter Vanderschraaf's analysis of circumstances of justice and expand his account by embedding "asymmetric conflictual coordination games" that summarize fair division problems (...) in a dynamic social network. I use the network effect on such coordination games to explain the emergence of stable exploitative behavior and conventions by a class of individuals even in the presence of restraining efforts by others. I conclude that such unfair conventions are resilient to uncoordinated individual actions and interventions. In fact, maintaining a rough equality itself turns into another coordination problem. Finally, I show that something similar to a social movement that restructures the network of social relations is necessary to solve such coordination problems. (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

Organizations are exposed to increasing pressures from their constituents to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles into their ongoing business practices. But accepting new and potentially open-ended commitments is not a harmless exercise, and companies may well expose themselves to serious risks when embracing such principles. To identify these risks, we conducted two naturalistic studies: one exploratory, the other corroborative. The results show that CSR adoption is associated with at least seven different business risks, ranging from failing strategy implementation to (...) legitimacy destruction. To alleviate these risks, we discuss a set of managerial mitigation strategies that have the potential to realign companies’ CSR activities with their strategic objectives. (shrink)

Contractualism is one of the most promising ‘centers of gravity’ in business ethics. In this guest editorial we provide a concise roadmap to the field, sketching contractualism’s historic and disciplinary antecedents, the basic argumentative structure of the contract model, and its boundary conditions. We also sketch two main dimensions along which contributions to the contractualist tradition can be positioned. The first dimension entails positive versus normative theorizing – does a given contribution analyze the world as it is or how it (...) ought to be? The second dimension involves four different levels of analysis that are commonly employed in contractualist business ethics: the nano, micro, meso, and macro levels. We then proceed to position the articles comprising this special issue along these two dimensions. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz untersucht, was mit der Metapher von der moralischen "Einbettung" von Märkten gemeint ist. Zunächst werden verschiedene Formen der deskriptiven Einbettung - soziologisch, rechtlich, und institutionell - unerschieden, was zu der These führt, dass kein Markt in einem deskriptiven Sinn „uneingebettet“ ist, und dass die Frage nach Einbettung nicht alleine durch die Betrachtung von Märkten beantwortet werden kann, sondern eine breitere institutionelle Analyse erfordert. Anschließend wird vorgeschlagen, Einbettung im moralischen Sinn als die Forderung nach der Vermeidung verschiedener Formen von (...) Schädigungen zu verstehen, und diese nach dem systematischen Ort der Schädigung und anhand der Kategorien materiell versus immateriell zu kategorisieren. Anschließend werden Hindernisse für die vorgeschlagene Konzeptualisierung und deren praktische Umsetzung diskutiert, nämlich die Frage nach den relevanten Vergleichsmaßstäben und das Problem der Dynamik unbeabsichtigter Folgen, das eine entsprechende Dynamik auch in den Reaktionen auf diese Folgen nötig macht. Der Aufsatz schließt mit Überlegungen zu den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der normativen Einbettung von Märkten auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene. (shrink)

Common property has been theoretically linked to environmental degradation through the metaphor of “the tragedy of the commons,” which discounts local solutions to commons dilemmas and typically posits the need for strong states or privatization. Though neither solution is theoretically or empirically adequate—because of the nature of states and nature in the real world—local arrangements for averting the tragedy suffer certain lacunaeas well, including stringent boundary conditions and overlapping/overarching commons situations that necessitate larger scale cooperation than is possible in the (...) face-to-face communities that are conducive to cooperation. Second-order or meta-commons issues expand the scope of inquiry necessarily beyond conservationto preservation.The Sundarbans illustrates the contradictory implications of the Leviathan solution to comons dilemmas, as well as the centrality of alternative perceptual framings of natural systems. (shrink)

HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION by Jean Hampton Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 299 pp., $42.50 THE RHETORIC OF LEVIATHAN: THOMAS HOBBES AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION by David Johnston Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 234 pp., $25.00 HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY by Gregory S. Kavka Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 460 pp., $45.00, $12.95 HOBBES by Tom Sorell London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 163 pp., $34.lb50.

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...) small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life. Key Words: altruism; cooperation; cross-cultural research; experimental economics; game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; self-interest. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungObwohl Sportinteraktionen selten ohne einen Unparteiischen ablaufen, ist dieser Umstand soziologisch kaum erforscht. Die Spielleitung im Fußball, dem hier das Hauptinteresse gehört, ist in der Regel an einen neutralen Dritten delegiert, der das Spiel situativ beeinflusst, wie z.B. Elfmeterentscheidungen zuweilen drastisch vor Augen führen. Über einen Vergleich von Spielen ohne Schiedsrichter mit dem Kreisligafußball frage ich nach den strukturellen Unterschieden, die die Anwesenheit eines Schiedsrichters erzeugt. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ihre Präsenz die lautere und unlautere Konkurrenz im Spiel erhöht und (...) dass sich Spieler und Schiedsrichter in einer strategischen Interaktion befinden. Schließlich beschreibe ich die dramaturgischen Herausforderungen für Schiedsrichter, wie etwa ihre Darstellung von Neutralität und sicheren Entscheidungen. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been growing awareness among evolutionary ethicists that systems of cooperation based upon “weak” reciprocity mechanisms lack scalability, and are therefore inadequate to explain human ultrasociality. This has produced a shift toward models that strengthen the cooperative mechanism, by adding various forms of commitment or punishment. Unfortunately, the most prominent versions of this hypothesis wind up positing a discredited mechanism as the basis of human ultrasociality, viz. a “greenbeard.” This paper begins by explaining what a greenbeard (...) is, and why evolutionary theorists are doubtful that such a mechanism could play a significant role in explaining human prosociality. It goes on to analyze several recent philosophical works in evolutionary ethics, in order to show how the suggestion that morality acts as a commitment device tacitly relies upon a greenbeard mechanism to explain human cooperation. It concludes by showing how some early scientific models in the “evolution of cooperation” literature, which introduced punishment as a device to enhance cooperation, also tacitly relied upon a greenbeard mechanism. (shrink)

What does a naturalistic epistemologist do? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9531-7 Authors William F. Harms, Humanities and Social Sciences, Seattle Central Community College, 1701 Broadway, Seattle, WA 98122-9905, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Critical Discourse Analysis has recently begun to consider the implications of research in Evolutionary Psychology for political communication. At least three positions have been taken: i) that this research requires Critical Discourse Analysis to re-examine and defend some of its foundational assumptions ; ii) that this research provides a useful explanatory framework for Critical Discourse Analysis in which questions can be addressed as to why speakers might pursue particular discursive strategies and why they might be so persuasive ; and iii) (...) that findings bare little or no relevance for Critical Discourse Analysis. In this article, I take up the first two of these positions and in doing so, of course, implicitly disagree with the third. I consider the positions in i) and ii), then, specifically in relation to Sperber’s notion of a ‘logico-rhetorical’ module. Taking the argument that Chilton makes concerning this module one stage further, I suggest that the logico-rhetorical module evolved as much for persuasion as it did for vigilance. I further suggest that the semantic category of evidentiality operationalized in media discourse serves to satisfy the conditions of acceptance laid down by the logico-rhetorical module. I show how this semantic category therefore performs a legitimizing function in media discourse on immigration. (shrink)

Empirical research has discovered that experimental subjects in ultimatum bargaining situations generally fail to play the decision-theoretic optimum strategy, and instead play something between that strategy and a fair split. In evolutionary dynamics, fair division and nearly fair division strategies often go to fixation and weakly dominated strategies can do quite well. Computer simulations were done using three different ultimatum bargaining games as determinates of fitness. (1) No tendency toward the elimination of weakly dominated strategies was observed, with or without (...) mutation. (2) Strategies making fair demands had sizable basins of attraction. (3) In a system where five different demands can be made, demands closest to (approximately) 91% had the largest basins of attraction. (4) If the strategies have thresholds for acceptable demands, rather than individuated responses to each demand, the apparent optimum demand may be quite low: 64% for one set of trials. (shrink)

The evolution of economic altruism is one of the most vigorous areas of study at the intersection of biology, economics, and philosophy. The basic problem is easily understood. Biological organisms, be they people or paramecia, have ample opportunity to confer benefits on others at relatively low cost to themselves. If conferring such benefits becomes common, the overall productivity of the population in which it occurs is increased. Presumably, there is no advantage to refusing such benefits, but it is also the (...) case that there is considerable advantage to pursuing a strategy according to which such benefits are accepted, but not conferred. In populations where individuals interact at random with others and when individuals play pure strategies (i.e., they always confer or do not confer benefits), the inevitable outcome is that altruistic behavior is driven to extinction. (Axelrod 1984) Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that self-sacrificing behavior is common in nature. (Sober and Wilson 1998) Consequently, individuals must not be interacting at random. The pressing question is then: what patterns of non-random interaction are responsible for the prevalence of altruistic behavior, and more theoretically, what sorts of plausible mechanisms exist that could generate the right kind of non- 1 The research reported here was supported by Canada ????? grant # ????? and the Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of British Columbia. (shrink)

In this study meal sharing is used as a way of quantifying food transfers between households. Traditional food-sharing studies measure the flow of resources between households. Meal sharing, in contrast, measures food consumption acts according to whether one is a host or a guest in the household as well as the movement of people between households in the context of food consumption. Our goal is to test a number of evolutionary models of food transfers, but first we argue that before (...) one tests models of who should receive food one must understand the adaptiveness of food transfers. For the Ye’kwana, economies of scale in food processing and preparation appear to set the stage for the utility of meal sharing. Evolutionary models of meal sharing, such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism, are evaluated along with non-evolutionary models, such as egalitarian exchange and residential propinquity. In addition, a modified measure of exchange balance—proportional balance—is developed. Reciprocal altruism is shown to be the strongest predictor of exchange intensity and balance. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes (...) clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness. (shrink)

I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and (...) include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism. (shrink)

I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting (...) Singer's and Kavka's claim about the selective advantage of altruism proper, it is doubtful whether that type of claim can be used in a particular sort of sociobiological argument against psychological egoism. (shrink)

Boycotts are among the most frequent forms of consumer expression against unethical or egregious acts by firms. Most current research explains consumers’ decisions to participate in a boycott using a universal cost-benefit model that mixes instrumental and expressive motives. To date, no conceptual framework accounts for the distinct behavioral motives for boycotting though. This article focuses on motivational heterogeneity among consumers. By distinguishing two stable behavioral models—a self-regarding type and a strongly reciprocal type—we introduce the notion of strong reciprocity to (...) the boycott literature. We argue that the presence of strongly reciprocal consumers can enhance boycott success. First, in interactions with the target firm, strongly reciprocal consumers perceive higher levels of egregiousness and are more willing to engage in boycotting behavior, even in unfavorable strategic conditions, which provides a stable basis for boycotting. Second, in interactions with self-regarding consumers, strongly reciprocal consumers are willing to sanction those others, according to whether they participate in the boycott, which increases overall participation in and the likelihood of success of a consumer boycott. These findings have implications for further research, as well as for firms, nongovernmental organizations, and boycotters. (shrink)

Contemporary discussion about the ontology of society identifies two groups of perspectives. One of them, associated with Searle, includes rules in the inventory of elements that constitute social reality. The other one, associated with Smit, Buekens, and du Plessis, claims that rules can be reduced to more fundamental units. Despite the fact that both perspectives seem equally efficient in describing institutional phenomena, we identify both flaws in the viewpoint that dismisses rules and reasons to prefer the alternative position.