We consider to what extent the fundamental question of spacetime singularities is relevant for the philosophical debate about the nature of spacetime. After reviewing some basic aspects of the spacetime singularities within general relativity, we argue that the well known difficulty to localize them in a meaningful way may challenge the received metaphysical view of spacetime as a set of points possessing some intrinsic properties together with some spatiotemporal relations. Considering the algebraic formulation of general relativity, we argue that the (...) spacetime singularities highlight the philosophically misleading dependence on the standard geometric representation of spacetime. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

I propose a theory of space with infinitesimal regions called smooth infinitesimal geometry based on certain algebraic objects, which regiments a mode of reasoning heuristically used by geometricists and physicists. I argue that SIG has the following utilities. It provides a simple metaphysics of vector fields and tangent space that are otherwise perplexing. A tangent space can be considered an infinitesimal region of space. It generalizes a standard implementation of spacetime algebraicism called Einstein algebras. It solves the long-standing problem of (...) interpreting smooth infinitesimal analysis realistically, an alternative foundation of spacetime theories to real analysis, 277–392, 1980). SIA is formulated in intuitionistic logic and is thought to have no classical reformulations. Against this, I argue that SIG is such a reformulation. But SIG has an unorthodox mereology, in which the principle of supplementation fails. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the relationship between general relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras. We show that according to a formal criterion for theoretical equivalence recently proposed by Halvorson and Weatherall, the two are equivalent theories.

In this article, I examine whether or not the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics are equivalent theories. I do so by applying a standard for equivalence that was recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson and Weatherall. This case study yields three general philosophical payoffs. The first concerns what a theory is, while the second and third concern how we should interpret what our physical theories say about the world. 1Introduction 2When Are Two Theories Equivalent? 3Preliminaries on (...) Classical Mechanics 3.1Hamiltonian mechanics 3.2Lagrangian mechanics 4Are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian Mechanics Equivalent Theories? 4.1Tangent bundle versus cotangent bundle 4.2Tangent bundle versus symplectic manifold 4.3Lagrangian vector field versus Hamiltonian vector field 5Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

The celu of the philosophical literature on the hole argument is the 1987 paper by Earman \& Norton ["What Price Space-time Substantivalism? The Hole Story" Br. J. Phil. Sci.]. This paper has a well-known back-story, concerning work by Stachel and Norton on Einstein's thinking in the years 1913-15. Less well-known is a connection between the hole argument and Earman's work on Leibniz in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn can be traced to an argument first presented in 1975 by (...) Howard Stein. Remarkably, this thread originates with a misattribution: the argument Earman attributes to Stein, which ultimately morphs into the hole argument, was not the argument Stein gave. The present paper explores this episode and presents some reflections on how it bears on the subsequent literature. (shrink)

We address a recent proposal concerning ‘surplus structure’ due to Nguyen et al.. We argue that the sense of ‘surplus structure’ captured by their formal criterion is importantly different from—and in a sense, opposite to—another sense of ‘surplus structure’ used by philosophers. We argue that minimizing structure in one sense is generally incompatible with minimizing structure in the other sense. We then show how these distinctions bear on Nguyen et al.’s arguments about Yang-Mills theory and on the hole argument.

Category theory has become central to certain aspects of theoretical physics. Bain has recently argued that this has significance for ontic structural realism. We argue against this claim. In so doing, we uncover two pervasive forms of category-theoretic generalization. We call these ‘generalization by duality’ and ‘generalization by categorifying physical processes’. We describe in detail how these arise, and explain their significance using detailed examples. We show that their significance is two-fold: the articulation of high-level physical concepts, and the generation (...) of new models. 1 Introduction2 Categories and Structuralism 2.1 Categories: abstract and concrete 2.2 Structuralism: simple and ontic3 Bain’s Two Strategies 3.1 A first strategy for defending Objectless 3.2 A second strategy for defending Objectless4 Two Forms of Categorical Generalization 4.1 Generalization by duality 4.2 Generalization by categorification 4.3 The role of category theory in physics5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Prominently, Norton argues against constructivism about spacetime theories, the doctrine that spatiotemporal structure in the dynamics only has derivative status. Among other things, he accuses Brown and Pooley's dynamical approach to special relativity of being merely half-way constructivist: setting up relativistic fields as presupposed in the dynamical approach to special relativity already requires spatiotemporal background structure. We first assess a recent solution proposal by Menon and then provide our very own defense of constructivism along two independent lines.

In recent years, philosophers of science have explored categorical equivalence as a promising criterion for when two theories are equivalent. On the one hand, philosophers have presented several examples of theories whose relationships seem to be clarified using these categorical methods. On the other hand, philosophers and logicians have studied the relationships, particularly in the first order case, between categorical equivalence and other notions of equivalence of theories, including definitional equivalence and generalized definitional equivalence. In this article, I will express (...) some skepticism about categorical equivalence as a criterion of physical equivalence, both on technical grounds and conceptual ones. I will argue that “category structure” likely does not capture the structure of a theory, and discuss some recent work in light of this claim. (shrink)

Ladyman and Presnell have recently argued that the Hole argument is naturally resolved when spacetime is represented within homotopy type theory rather than set theory. The core idea behind their proposal is that the argument does not confront us with any indeterminism, since the set-theoretically different representations of spacetime involved in the argument are homotopy type-theoretically identical. In this article, we will offer a new resolution based on ZFC set theory to the argument. It neither relies on a constructive-intuitionistic form (...) of mathematics, as used by Ladyman and Presnell, nor is foundationally problematic, such as the existing set-theoretic suggestions. (shrink)

This dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part I defend substantivalism. I do this by offering, in chapter 1, a counterpart-theoretic defense of substantivalism from Leibniz’ shift arguments. Then, in chapter 2, I defend substantivalism from the hole argument and argue, against the consensus, that the question of haecceitism is irrelevant to substantivalism in the context of general relativity. In the second part of the dissertation I defend supersubstantivalism. I do this by offering, in chapter 3, an (...) argument against dualistic substantivalism. The argument appeals to plausible principles of modal plenitude to show that the dualist is committed to a range of problematic possibilities. Then, in chapter 4, I consider a range of supersubstantivalist positions. I conclude by arguing for a version of supersubstantivalism I call compresence supersubstantivalism. (shrink)

Noncommutative geometries generalize standard smooth geometries, parametrizing the noncommutativity of dimensions with a fundamental quantity with the dimensions of area. The question arises then of whether the concept of a region smaller than the scale—and ultimately the concept of a point—makes sense in such a theory. We argue that it does not, in two interrelated ways. In the context of Connes’ spectral triple approach, we show that arbitrarily small regions are not definable in the formal sense. While in the scalar (...) field Moyal–Weyl approach, we show that they cannot be given an operational definition. We conclude that points do not exist in such geometries. We therefore investigate (a) the metaphysics of such a geometry, and (b) how the appearance of smooth manifold might be recovered as an approximation to a fundamental noncommutative geometry. (shrink)