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Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219 (2000)

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The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.details One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 30 citations
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem. Download Export citation Bookmark 93 citations
Consciousness and false HOTs.Jonah Wilberg - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.details In this paper I aim to defend David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness against a prominent objection. The central claim of HOT theory is that a mental state is conscious only if one has the HOT that one is in that state. In broad outline, the objection is that HOT theory is unable to account for cases where the relevant HOTs are false. I consider two variants of the objection, corresponding to two kinds of false HOT: those that merely (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 26 citations
Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.details Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details Download Export citation Bookmark 75 citations
Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character.Jennifer Matey - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.details A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature—phenomenality or consciousness—has proven to be particularly intractable. The Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) has been offered as one reductive theory of consciousness. According (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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