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Jennifer Matey [4]Jennifer J. Matey [3]
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Jennifer J. Matey
Southern Methodist University
  1. Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self.Jennifer Matey - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):380-400.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView. Despite the acknowledgement of the moral significance of consent there is still much work to be done in determining which specific sexual encounters count as unproblematically consensual. This paper focuses on the impact of deception. It takes up the specific case of deception about one's self. It may seem obvious that one ought not to lie to a sexual partner about who one is, but determining which features of oneself are most relevant, as well as (...)
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  2. Good Looking.Jennifer Matey - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):297-313.
    Studies show that people we judge to have good character we also evaluate to be more attractive. I argue that in these cases, evaluative perceptual experiences represent morally admirable people as having positive (often intrinsic) value. Learning about a person's positive moral attributes often leads us to feel positive esteem for them. These feelings of positive esteem can come to partly constitute perceptual experiences. Such perceptual experiences evaluate the subject in an aesthetic way and seem to attribute aesthetic qualities like (...)
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  3. Color Synesthesia.Berit Brogaard, Dimitria Gatzia & Jennifer J. Matey - 2019 - In Renzo Shamey (ed.), Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology 2nd Edition. Springer. pp. 1-7.
    Encyclopedia entry on color synesthesia with cognitive/neurscientific focus.
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  4.  59
    Book Review of Evaluative Perception Eds. Bergqvist and Cowan. [REVIEW]Jennifer J. Matey - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (6).
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  5.  81
    The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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