Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The (...) second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons. (shrink)

In this article of 1995, which had been translated into Russian already in 2013, the German Historian Stefan Troebst studied the question of the « breakthrough of the modern age » in Russia, usually attributed to tsar Peter I « the Great », suspecting that the new Era had in fact begun earlier, in the XVIIth century. After a theoretical reflexion about periodization in history, and its application to the history of Russia, he demonstrates that the « threshold year » (...) takes place in 1667, examining this theory from different points of view: state and institutions, international relations, economical policy, religion, culture and fine arts. But this modernization has also caused violent revolts and oppositions during the reign of tsar Alexis Mikhailovitch. (shrink)