I propose a new perspective on the study of scientific revolutions. This is a transformation from an object-only perspective to an ontological perspective that properly treats objects and processes as distinct kinds. I begin my analysis by identifying an object bias in the study of scientific revolutions, where it takes the form of representing scientific revolutions as changes in classification of physical objects. I further explore the origins of this object bias. Findings from developmental psychology indicate that children cannot distinguish (...) processes from objects until the age of 7, but they have already developed a core system of object knowledge as early as 4 months of age. The persistence of this core system is responsible for the object bias among mature adults, i.e., the tendency to apply knowledge of physical objects to temporal processes. In light of the distinction between physical objects and temporal processes, I redraw the picture of the Copernican revolution. Rather than seeing it as a taxonomic shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric cosmology, we should understand it as a transformation from a conceptual system that was built around an object concept to one that was built around a process concept. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Throughout the early modern period, the most widely read astronomical textbooks were Johannes de Sacrobosco's De sphaera and the Theorica planetarum, ultimately in the new form introduced by Georg Peurbach. This essay argues that the images in these texts were intended to develop an “intelligent eye.” Students were trained to transform representations of specific heavenly phenomena into moving mental images of the structure of the cosmos. Only by learning the techniques of mental visualization and manipulation could the student “see” (...) in the mind's eye the structure and motions of the cosmos. While anyone could look up at the heavens, only those who had acquired the intelligent eye could comprehend the divinely created order of the universe. Further, the essay demonstrates that the visual program of the Sphaera and Theorica texts played a significant and hitherto unrecognized role in later scientific work. Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler all utilized the same types of images in their own texts to explicate their ideas about the cosmos. (shrink)

For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...) structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change. (shrink)

En su artículo “Towards a Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics” (2023), Pablo Melogno aborda, junto a Leandro Giri, la tarea de reconstruir el camino recorrido por Thomas Kuhn en el desarrollo de una semántica capaz de dar cuenta del cambio científico. En particular, los autores examinan las conexiones existentes entre las Conferencias Lowell de 1951 y las Conferencias Notre Dame de 1980, afirmando que ambas responden a un mismo programa de inquietudes semánticas que permite realizar una lectura continuista del pensamiento (...) kuhniano en lo referente a cuestiones de tipo semántico. El presente artículo pretende extender este análisis a La Estructura de las Revoluciones Científicas (1962), resaltando los paralelismos que pueden establecerse entre esta obra y las Conferencias Lowell en lo que respecta a determinados aspectos lingüísticos que forman parte del cambio científico, mediante el análisis de las partes concernientes a esta temática presentes en ambos escritos. (shrink)

The function of concepts must be taken seriously to understand the scientific practices of developing and working with concepts. Despite its significance, little philosophical attention has been paid to the function of concepts. A notable exception is Brigandt (2010), who suggests incorporating the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use as an additional semantic property along with the reference and inferential role. The suggestion, however, has at least two limitations. First, his proposal to introduce epistemic goals as the third component (...) of concepts lacks independent grounding, except to account for the rationality of semantic change (the Grounding Problem). Second, it is hardly justified to consider epistemic goals as a semantic property (the Misplacement Problem). To remedy these predicaments, we suggest a new perspective that takes concepts as cognitive entities with a 2-layered structure rather than as merely linguistic entities and develop an account of the function of concepts. We provide empirical evidence showing that functional information affects our cognitive processes. It is claimed that the function of concepts is not a semantic property but a type of meta-information regulating a body of concept-constitutive information. (shrink)