In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation.

All popular concepts of deity believe in divinity. In Theism, “God” has attributes such as consciousness, will, goodness, and so forth, which can be seen in humans. On the contrary, pantheists argue that: a) the person is equal to the human being; b) embodiment is a prominent feature of the human being; c) having attributes such as consciousness, will, and so forth, requires a body and equates to anthropomorphism. In other words, these attributes are inevitably associated with embodiment and the (...) resulting limitations. Thereby, the pantheistic deity is impersonal. There is a duality of the “personality” and “impersonality” of the deity. The crucial question of this article is, “what is the relationship between divinity and personality?” The relationship of embodiment to personality and the relationship of perfection to the impersonal deity, constitute the sub-questions of it. We show that there is a significant relationship between personality and divinity. In the first section, the term divinity is examined; firstly, it is assumed that, contrary to pantheism, divinity is definable. Otto’s attempting to trace the origins of the “holy” and the historical studying of pantheistic approaches confirms this assumption. Secondly, “Infinity, ” “influence, ” and “transcendence” are three critical terms in defining divinity. Pantheistic argument showed that all critiques of personality are summed up in the fact that personality is a limiting factor. That is, it is inconceivable that the transcendent, infinite, and influential deity can be a person. Therefore, in the second part, the concept of person is examined, and we conclude that: 1) there is a relation between the practical terms in person’s meaning and the terms of divinity; 2) Although the main critique of the deity’s personality is the embodiment, it is not a crucial term in defining the person. That is why Michael Levin is in contradiction when he believes that divine unity doesn’t need to be a person or conscious, it is sufficient to be perfect. The question arises as to what perfection means without consciousness, power, and will? Isn’t a human being more complete due to the pantheistic divine unity? Accordingly, an analysis of perfection without addressing personal attributes puts pantheists in an apparent contradiction. Besides, impersonality faces a severe dilemma; if they do not take the personal attributes, according to Kant, the deity is reduced to an object. Instead, there could be some responses to anthropomorphism; firstly, the basis of the Pantheistic mistake is to generalize the meaning of finite consciousness or will to an infinite being, whereas temporality is an attribute of the deity’s knowledge or will’s objects, not of the deity’s knowledge and will. Secondly, the study shows where personality is interpreted to anthropomorphism, it focuses on the late idea in Christian thought about Jesus, while the history of attributing the deity to consciousness, will, and so forth, is much older. Finally, it is indicated that the critiques of the personality are not strong enough to challenge it. So, according to the “Principle of Simplicity”, believers in the personality of the deity have a more justified view. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument is one of the key contemporary justifications for atheism and has prompted numerous responses from those defending the plausibility of belief in God. I will outline a recent counterargument from Michael C. Rea, who claims that relationships with God are far more widely available than Schellenberg assumes. However, I will suggest that it invites a response from proponents of the hiddenness argument because it leaves some nonbelievers unaccounted for. I will rectify this by suggesting that (...) a model of panentheism in which God is embodied in the cosmos allows all, including all nonbelievers, to have a relationship with God. I will then claim that semantic externalism and externalism about beliefs can enable nonbelievers to get to know this God. I will then challenge the hiddenness argument by suggesting that these relationships can accommodate the key motivations behind Schellenberg's insistence on personal relationships without requiring subjects to recognize that they are in a relationship with God. (shrink)

Theologian Benedikt Paul Göcke claimed that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ :75). As much of my research considers the alternatives to classical theism, I published a damning reply essay : 389–395). I comprehensively noted the many problems with his notion of ‘panentheism’, finding that it differed greatly from mainstream and earlier Eastern and Western interpretations, had little to do with the (...) etymology of the term and differed only from his concept of theism in that the world is necessary instead of contingent. It is the latter point that led to Göcke’s ‘unattractive’ conclusion, though he had not demonstrated whether the world is contingent or necessary. Göcke responded to my essay : 397–400), and this is my further response, which explains that—and why—my criticisms still stand. (shrink)

Panentheism has been one major view of God and the God-world relation for many centuries. It is a middle view between classical theism on the one hand and pantheism on the other. This essay examines several expressions of panentheism. It begins with two ancient expressions, one by Plotinus and the other by Ramanuja. It then considers some reasons for the rise of panentheism in recent decades. One example of this rise is Charles Hartshorne's dipolar expression. After exploring Hartshorne's view, the (...) article concludes by noting several objections to panentheism. (shrink)

Analytic Panpsychism has been brought into contact with Indian philosophy primarily through an examination of the Advaita Vedānta tradition and the Yogācāra tradition. In this work I explore the relation between Rāmānuja, the 12th century father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition, and analytic panpsychism. I argue that Rāmānuja’s philosophy inspires a more world affirming form of cosmopsychism where there are different kinds of reality, rather than one fundamental reality of pure consciousness and an ordinary wrold that is illusory from the (...) perspective of fundamental reality. (shrink)

In his recent article in Sophia, Benedikt Paul Göcke concluded that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ : 75). As the article progresses, Göcke clarifies his view of what panentheism is, essentially identical to Göcke’s view of classical theism in every way, except in the world’s modal relation to God. This concept is vastly different to many of the panentheistic notions that (...) are more commonly held. While it is not initially made transparent—especially with the label Göcke chooses to use—it becomes increasingly clear that Göcke critiques a God concept of his own making. More common variations of panentheism are contrasted with Göcke’s version, in order to provide a broader and more accurate view of the ancient concept, and to demonstrate that Göcke’s view of panentheism is idiosyncratic. It is finally explained that even if Göcke’s view of panentheism were definitive, he has not successfully argued for the relative unattractiveness of the concept, relative to his view of classical theism. (shrink)