Dans l’étude des relations entre la philosophie et la sociologie naissante en France, un chapitre demeure inexploré : l’interprétation des sciences sociales par Léon Brunschvicg. S’il apprécie la valeur de la recherche ethnologique de Lévy-Bruhl, sa critique de Durkheim est sévère. Il identifie deux problèmes dans le projet durkheimien, étroitement liés : avoir cherché l’origine de la connaissance dans des formes « primitives » de savoir ; avoir soumis l’autonomie du jugement au primat du social. L’idéalisme critique de Brunschvicg cherche (...) alors à opposer aux représentations collectives de Durkheim un autre modèle d’esprit collectif, incarné dans les avancées de la science et dans le progrès de la philosophie scientifique. (shrink)

I argue that the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) decided to constitute sociology, a novel field, as ‘scientific’ early in his career. He adopted evolutionized biology as then practiced as his principal model of science, but at first wavered between alternative repertoires of concepts, models, metaphors and analogies, in particular Spencerian Lamarckism and French neo-Lamarckism. I show how Durkheim came to fashion a particular deployment of the French neo-Lamarckian repertoire. The paper describes and analyzes this repertoire and explicates how it (...) might have been available to a non-biologist. I analyze Durkheim’s very early writings between 1882 and 1892 in this context to substantiate my argument. (shrink)

The value of life can be viewed from moral, biologic, and economic perspectives. In connection with the development of genetics, each of these perspectives has gained importance throughout history. Whereas agricultural genetics has always been directed towards having an economic impact, from the beginning genetics research in humans has focused on all dimensions of the value of life. Today, health insurance, employers, politicians, and public health scientists view genetics research as one of the key disciplines to predict costs and economic (...) values of human beings. However, the reasoning cannot go without considering biologic health risks and moral values to the same extent. This paper examines the historical dimensions of current debates surrounding genetics and the value of life. Thus, the paper is conceptual and offers a heuristic model and analytical categories for answering the question, “what is so intriguing about genetics that it can be closely connected with different value concepts,” although the consideration of the moral, biologic, or economic value of life may lead to completely different ideas of man and society. A special emphasis will be placed on the use of genetics for the purposes of the eugenics movement. During the heyday of eugenics, the economic value of life changed the understanding of the moral value, as well as the biologic value of life by referring to genetic principles. It will be argued that an intended intertwinement of the different dimensions of the concept of “value” on the one hand increased the impact of genetics as a key discipline of the eugenics movement, and on the other hand had a lasting impact on debates about the economic usefulness of genetics as a predictive, prophylactic medical discipline. (shrink)

In 1877, the young Alfred Espinas defended a philosophical study, ‘doctorat ès lettres’, at the Sorbonne University, entitled Des Sociétés animales. This was to become one of the principal sources of French organicist sociology. The paradox, however, is that this work seems to be fundamentally a study of natural science. Espinas tried to justify his position theoretically through two types of reciprocally exclusive and uncomplementary arguments. The first one consists in showing that only certain kinds of animal groupings belong legitimately, (...) if not academically, to sociology. The second one has a greater audacious and uncontrollable dimension. It consists in asserting that all pluricellular organisms are true societies. In this article we first focus on the role played by cellular theory in such a ‘sociologization’ of biology, concerning the extension of sociology. Second, we examine the importance of such confusion within the fields of extension, in aiming to explain the conceptual transfers between social sciences and life sciences, in the second half of the 19th century. (shrink)

Differing accounts are conventionally given of the origins of medical sociology and its parent discipline of sociology. These distinct ‘histories’ are justified on the basis that the sociological founders were uninterested in medicine, mortality and disease. This article challenges these ‘constructions’ of the past, proposing the theorization of health not as a ‘late development of sociology’ but an integral part of its formation. Drawing on a selection of key sociological texts, it is argued that evidence of the founders’ sustained interest (...) in the infirmities of the individual, of mortality, and in medicine, have been expunged from the historical record through processes of ‘canonization’ and ‘medicalization’. (shrink)