Mit Beiträgen von Heiner Hastedt, Peter Schefe, Michael Heidelberger, Wolfgang Coy, Peter Janich, Sybille Krämer, Heinz Zemanek, Rafael Capurro, Ekkehard Martens, Yvonne Dittrich, Holm Tetens, Geert Keil, John R. Searle, Margaret A. Boden, Godela Unseld, Ulrike Teubner, Rüdiger Weingarten, Florian Rötzer und Simone Dietz.

Sinology has been reproached for showing more understanding for the Chinese government than for the plight of Chinese dissidents. As a matter of fact, although there is no unanimous position, sinologists have directly or indirectly justified the authoritarian rule of the People’s Republic in the name of Chinese culture. This attitude seems to be rooted primarily in a specific view of Chinese culture rather than in mere opportunism related to the necessity of cooperating with Chinese institutions. According to this view, (...) dissent is foreign to the Chinese value system, and political stability and harmony rather than participation in a democratic culture of debate (Streitkultur) is a shared common concern. This alleged Chinese characteristic is, among other things, attributed to the absence of the idea of transcendence. This article criticizes the respective arguments as clinging to a traditional one-dimensional Western view of China and, in some cases, to antimodern sentiments. -/- . (shrink)

»Chinese characteristic«, zhongguo tese, has become a key word of China’s political language. The more implausible it becomes to invoke historical materialism to justify its rule, the louder the Communist Party appeals to the peculiarity of Chinese culture. This makes China a prime example of the connection between political oppression and the construction of cultural identity. The connection is part of an ideological global system of complementarity of universal technical and economical imperatives on the one hand and relative diferent value (...) orientations of the »cultures« on the other. This system has its roots already in the Chinese 19th century with the attempt to adopt Western »practical« knowledge while keeping the traditional authority structures as China’s cultural »substance« intact. The idea has been infuential to this day. China streamlines its culture for an identity management that is to ban »Western« liberalism. It is intrinsically interwoven with authoritarianism. A pre-political identitity is manfactured absent a system of rule that would allow for identi fcation by political participation. (shrink)

In the first part of his paper, the author uses a phylogenetic adaptation of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory to reconstruct different positions of the ethical debate of the Chinese "axial age" as stages of progress towards a postconventional morality. In the second half, various aspects of the controversy revolving around the applicability of Kohlberg's categories to Chinese moral thought are critically examined.

China is one of the ecologically most threatened regions on earth. It has been argued that the ecological disaster is mainly due to the incursion of Western modernity with its unleashing of instrumental reason. In order to find a way out, China would have to rediscover its ecological wisdom of the past. Without calling into question the specific responsibility of the West, this article argues that in fact there is no cultural dichotomy of this kind. It is true that China (...) has known the idea of a sympathetic relationship between man and nature, which was developed above all in Daoist philosophy. But it has also known the idea of the subjugation of nature by man as a necessary precondition of culture, which has typically been brought forward in the Confucian literature. And it has done severe damage to the natural environment already in antiquity. These facts suggest that the environmental crisis is not the product of a specific cultural tradition but of human culture in general and the long-term result of the eccentric positionality of the ‘thetic’ human being. (shrink)

This article discusses the role and validity of arguments of culture in biomedical ethics. It is often maintained that any fundamental bioethical consensus is ruled out by the existence of incommensurable value axioms rooted in the different traditions, above all with regard to diverging conceptions of the human being. For example, it is argued that the <Christian>Western culture leads to more restrictive and the <Confucian> Chinese culture to more permissive stances with regard to consumptive embryo research. However, what a <culture> (...) says has always been a matter of interpretation and debate. Confucianism, too, offers more than just one option to answer crucial bioethical questions. There is no established cultural position that would absolve one from a responsible decision. Rather than exerting a one-sided impact on ethics, culture can also be reshaped and changed in view of ethical challenges. (shrink)

The Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” deals with topics, at least some of which I have myself dealt with throughout my sinological and philosophical life. I came to Frankfurt in autumn 1968: fascinated by Frankfurt School, I started studying sociology, but to my surprise this did not mean studying Critical Theory. Instead, it meant going through quite a conventional education in the social sciences, and moreover, it meant (...) studying economics and statistics. This was not quite what I expected and after a few semesters I changed my major to philosophy. In need of a second subject, I chose sinology because of some vague interest in foreign cultures, and also because of the news coming from China at that time. It was the time of the Cultural Revolution that exerted a certain fascination on the German student movement especially since its revolutionary rhetoric differed so remarkably from the ossified language of Eastern European Marxist orthodoxy. So, like many members of my generation, I began to develop an interest in revolutionary China that was definitely not shared by my philosophy teachers – they were skeptical, at least to some extent. -/- . (shrink)

Mit Herbert Schnädelbach bestimmen die Autoren dieses Bandes Philosophie als 'Versuch gedanklicher Orientierung im Bereich der Grundsätze unseres Denkens, Erkennens und Handelns'. Ihre Texte sind Beiträge zur inhaltlichen Ausführung dieser programmatischen Begriffsbestimmung.

Der akademischen Philosophie wird manchmal nachgesagt, sie suche Antworten auf Fragen, die außer Philosophen niemanden umtreiben. In diesem Band sind »zwölf philosophische Antworten« auf Fragen versammelt, die sich jeder irgendwann einmal stellt und über die professionelle Philosophen lediglich etwas schärfer und gründlicher nachdenken. Die Autoren dieses Bandes greifen pointiert, allgemeinverständlich und mit philosophischem Vertiefungsanspruch aktuelle Kontroversen auf. Sie erheben dabei den Anspruch, philosophisch argumentativ sowohl dem Zeitgeistrelativismus als auch der Dominanz empirischer Wissenschaften entgegenzutreten. Es ist keineswegs „alles bloß Ansichtssache“; denn (...) Toleranz ist nicht einfach nur achselzuckendes Wegschauen. Um zu einer klugen und begründeten Orientierung zu kommen, bedarf es auch nicht der einseitigen Zuflucht zu heute populären Antwortinstanzen wie der Religion, der Neurobiologie oder der Ökonomie. In der Tradition der philosophischen Aufklärung ist weiterhin auf den nachdenkenden Menschen zu setzen, der in der Philosophie vertiefende Anregungen erhält, um sich zu aktuellen Kontroversen ein begründetetes Urteil zu bilden. Über das Handwerk des Philosophen – Meinen, Glauben und Wissen – Rechte und Pflichten, Werte und Normen – Fairness als Prinzip – Zur Verteidigung der Freiheit als Dilemma – Zum Streit über das Lebewesen Mensch – Das Geist-Körper-Problem und die Hirnforschung – Das Schuldprinzip und die Willensfreiheit – Die Wissenschaft zwischen Natur und Kultur – Grenzen des wirtschaftlichen Denkens – Das Wahrheitsproblem in der Mediengesellschaft – Religion im Streit der Meinungen Mit Beiträgen von Simone Dietz, Heiner Hastedt, Detlef Horster, Peter Janich, Geert Keil, Corinna Mieth, Herbert Schnädelbach und Anke Thyen. (shrink)

Up until the present day, Confucianism has been a major factor in the normative discourses of East Asia. At first glance, it has sided with the preservation of the old and against innovation, according to Confucius’s self-declaration that he “only transmits and creates nothing new.” This also describes the historical role that Confucianism in distinction to other philosophies has actually played over long stretches of time. Nevertheless, Confucian ethics contains structural features, figures of thought and ideas which point beyond mere (...) traditionalism. They reflect the deep crisis of tradition against the background of which Confucianism came into existence and which has left its mark on it. They could set free a dynamic that made it possible to distance oneself from the Confucian tradition within this tradition itself and open it up to something new, if not in terms of its creation then at least in terms of its acceptance and support. This potential also intrinsically relates to the possibility of a “modern” Confucianism. The following three short essays do not claim to give a comprehensive account of the outlined problematique. It is only intended to throw a light upon some of the corresponding thought formations that developed in ancient China and explore by a few examples the extent to which the said potential has actually been realized in later Confucian discourse in Korea and Japan, assuming that border crossing might be among the factors to unleash it. (shrink)

Esta edição contém a única transcrição estudantil sobrevivente das Lições de Metafísica de Kant da década de 1770. A Lição foi ministrada o mais tardar no inverno de 1779/80 e, portanto, antes mesmo da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura (1781). Um exceção é, contudo, a parte sobre a ontologia que seguramente se remonta a uma Lição que Kant ministrou depois de 1781. Estas transcrições de Lições são de valor inestimável para a história do desenvolvimento da filosofia de Kant e, (...) em especial, para a gênese de sua Crítica da Razão Pura . Elas representam também um complemento importante para suas outras Lições, como por exemplo, as de antropologia, nas quais Kant também se ocupou com as questões da psicologia empírica e racional. É interessante observar que Kant se serve de métodos distintos, nas Lições de Antropologia e de Metafísica, para demonstrar a substancialidade e a imortalidade da alma. Embora Kant ainda leve a doutrina da alma da psicologia racional muito a sério na Metafísica-Pölitz, ele rejeitará de fato suas pretensões de conhecimento pouco tempo depois na Crítica na seção sobre os paralogismos da doutrina pura da alma. Aquele que deseja se aprofundar na filosofia de Kant e conhecer seu contexto histórico-filosófico não pode deixar de ler as Lições de Metafísica-Pölitz. Heiner F. Klemme Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. (shrink)

No centro da filosofia moral de Kant está sem dúvida sua doutrina do imperativo categórico. Por esse motivo não é de se surpreender que a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes (1785), na qual Kant explica, em detalhes, essa doutrina pela primeira vez, tenha sido o foco da atenção por décadas. Mas há alguns anos é observável uma significativa mudança na literatura que é univocamente bem vinda: ao lado da pesquisa das Doutrinas da Virtude e do Direito publicadas por Kant nos (...) anos noventa do século 18, agora também são intensamente estudadas suas perspectivas filosófico-morais desenvolvidas antes de 1781. Nesse sentido assume uma posição de destaque o manuscrito estudantil de uma lição de ética ministrada no meio dos anos 70, que é publicada aqui, em língua portuguesa, pela primeira vez em uma tradução comentada. Ainda hoje, esta lição serve como uma introdução à ética de Kant, muito embora pareça divergir, em alguns aspectos, da doutrina crítica do imperativo categórico. As Lições de Ética são um „trabalho em andamento“. Por um lado, somos capazes de assistir Kant "pensando" e compreender como ele se reporta ao livro de Alexander Baumgarten sobre os Príncípios da Metafísica Prática (Initia philosophiae practicae primae, 1760). E, por outro lado, somos capazes de vivenciar como ele desenvolve suas próprias perspectivas filosófico-morais em contraste a Baumgarten. Para todos que se interessam pela filosofia moral de Kant e pela história da ética na época da Aufklärung, o estudo desse manuscrito é indispensável. -/- Heiner F. Klemme (Martin Luther Universität - Halle-Wittenberg) . (shrink)